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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

MR. FARRELL:

Good morning.

I’m Joe Farrell.

3

You’re going to be welcomed by the Chairman and the

4

Assistant Attorney General in just a moment.

5

pre-welcome which consists of telling you about security.

6

Those of you from outside the agency know all too much

7

about security already this morning, I guess.

8

asking to read you the following.

9

I’m doing a

But I’m

First of all, if you go outside the building

10

and you don’t have an FTC badge and you want to get back

11

in, you have to go through security again.

12

Second, if there’s a fire or evacuation, please

13

leave the building in an orderly fashion.

14

building, go across the street to the Georgetown Law

15

Center, look to the right front sidewalk -- I’m not sure

16

whether that’s right as looked at from here or from

17

there.

That’s our rallying point.

18

Outside the

So, rally there.

And if it’s perceived to be safer to remain

19

inside, you will be told where to go inside the building.

20

And if you spot suspicious activity, please alert

21

security.

22

Those are the security briefing.

I have two

23

other logistical comments.

One is there are cards for

24

questions at the back of the room.

25

for panelists, please write them on the cards and pass

If you have questions
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2

them up to the moderator.
And, secondly, outside, there are copies of the

3

1992/1997 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and you might be

4

interested in those.

5

called “Where To Eat Near the FTC Conference Center.”

6

noticed that the Where To Eat list is organized by price

7

bands and, so, if you wondered whether it’s legitimate to

8

define a market by price bands, there’s your answer.

9
10

And there’s also a little flyer
I

So, without further ado, let me introduce the
FTC Chairman, Jon Leibowitz, to welcome you here.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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WELCOMING REMARKS BY CHAIRMAN JON LEIBOWITZ
CHAIRMAN LEIBOWITZ:

I love it when economists

make jokes to start off a meeting.
On behalf of Christine Varney and myself, let

5

me welcome you to our scheduled workshop on updating the

6

horizontal merger guidelines.

7

started talking about this during the summer, we thought

8

it was going to be a good time to think about updating

9

the guidelines.

When Christine and I

But timing is everything, and given the

10

announcement of Comcast/NBC Universal this morning, it’s

11

a truly propitious time to start updating the guidelines.

12

Let me commend the FTC and DOJ team that’s been

13

working to put this together.

On the FTC side, that

14

would be Joe Farrell, who you’re acquainted with, Rich

15

Feinstein and Howard Shelanski.

16

Department, that would be Molly Boast, Phil Weiser and

17

Carl Shapiro.

18

together extremely well, which shouldn’t be a great

19

surprise -- and I see Gene Kelman here, also an integral

20

part of any policy-related matter.

21

surprise that they have worked really well together

22

because several of them have now worked for both agencies

23

and, also, because I think Phil lived in Howard’s house

24

for a time and, of course, Carl and Joe are the virtual

25

Chang and Eng of the antitrust economist community.

And for the Justice

By all accounts, this group has worked

And it shouldn’t be a
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We are really a far cry from the bad old days

2

of the Schering brief, the Section 2 Report, and ugly

3

clearance battles, I think stretching on for months.

4

It’s really been the approach, I believe since Christine

5

and I started in our current jobs, to work together

6

collaboratively.

7

conflict between the FTC and the Antitrust Division

8

rather than talking about our similarly held enforcement

9

priorities and policies, but the reality is we play

I know it can be fun to talk about

10

really, really well together, as this project

11

demonstrates.

12

Many of you know that I’ve been a critic of the

13

extent to which the Chicago School’s -- and by the way,

14

I’m wearing my badge.

15

all have to wear our badges, particularly because the

16

magnetometer is broken outside, as all of you know.

17

I just wanted to show that.

We

Many of you know that I’ve been a critic of the

18

extent to which the Chicago School’s optimism about

19

efficiencies and indifference towards oligopoly conduct

20

have affected merger reviews, as well as how it’s

21

affected antitrust law generally.

22

perspective, this effort isn’t about giving any priority

23

to one antitrust school or another.

24

good government and making sure that the rules of the

25

road are clear and well understood, especially by those

But from my

It’s really about
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who enforce them.

2

From my perspective, the current guidelines

3

have actually worked pretty well since the last update in

4

1992.

5

enormous credit for being the leader of that 1992 update

6

-- What?

7

Yet, I think they don’t explain the process clearly

8

enough to businesses.

9

enough to judges.

And I know Jim Rill is right here and he deserves

You do.

Don’t be so self deprecating, you do.

They don’t explain it clearly

Probably, if I had to be honest, I

10

would say that has helped us in some instances; it has

11

hurt us in others.

12

economic thinking.

13

And they don’t incorporate the latest

So, hopefully, by giving everyone a better idea

14

of how we look at mergers and also how they ought to be

15

examined by the Courts, we can clear up some

16

misconceptions and demystify the process.

17

do that, I think everybody wins, especially consumers who

18

benefit most from balanced, yet aggressive, antitrust

19

enforcement and businesses which, as you all know,

20

benefit enormously from certainty.

21

And if we can

The reason why we need to update our guidelines

22

is pretty clear.

Over the past 17 years, since the last

23

revision of the guidelines, merger analysis has developed

24

in important ways.

25

three years ago -- and where is -- is Tom Barnett here?

But as our joint commentary noted
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He’s around here somewhere.

2

Debbie Majoras were the leaders of that commentary.

3

Guidelines tend to exaggerate the extent to which the

4

agencies follow a single, rigid, step by step broad

5

approach to merger analysis, and we don’t always follow

6

that approach when we evaluate mergers.

7

our inquiry on one key question, whether the merger under

8

review is really likely to lessen or substantially lessen

9

competition.

10

Thank you.

Tom Barnett and

Instead, we set

So, the areas we’ll be thinking about stem from

11

that inquiry.

12

evidence of anti-competitive effects as an indication

13

that a merger may harm consumers, whether to clarify how

14

and why the agencies use the hypothetical monopolist test

15

to define markets, whether to update the description of

16

how the agencies use concentration statistics, like HHIs,

17

to understand the impact of the merger on the market --

18

you know, really, I think the question is really how much

19

should we increase the HHI thresholds in the guidelines

20

to better correspond to how we understand them -- and

21

whether to put remedies in the guidelines as other

22

antitrust jurisdictions have done.

23

going to keep an open mind, but I think all of these

24

ideas make a lot of sense.

25

And among them are, the use of direct

And, of course, I’m

Today, we’re going to have four panels and a
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veritable cavalcade of antitrust luminaries to help us

2

illuminate these issues.

3

Bob Pitofsky, Tim Muris, Jim Rill, Doug Melamed.

4

here?

5

All right, that was an antitrust joke.

6

in the morning.

7

there, too.

8

first panel.

Doug is not here.

9

Among those speaking today are
Is Doug

Well, we know why he’s busy.
I know it’s early

And Deb Garza and Tom Barnett who’s back

And most of those people are just on the

After their overview on the role of the

10

guidelines, we’ll have specific panels on direct evidence

11

of competitive effects, market definition and unilateral

12

effects and, of course, this is just the start of the

13

project.

14

examination on the road, holding workshops in New York

15

and Chicago next week and in Palo Alto next month, and

16

the final workshop will be back here in Washington, D.C.

17

at the end of January.

18

We’ll be taking our merger guidelines

These workshops, of course, as you know, are

19

about transparency.

But just as importantly, they’re

20

about thinking through the merger review process with

21

very smart folks in the antitrust community outside of

22

our occasionally -- I would say often -- occasionally

23

insular, inside the inside of the Beltway/Justice

24

Department/FTC Antitrust axis.

25

forward to hearing from all of you, from incorporating

So, we really do look
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your ideas.

2

course, my staff does on a minute-by-minute basis to me.

3

You should feel free to challenge us as, of

And with that, again, let me thank everyone for

4

coming today and let me turn it over to my very, very

5

good friend and colleague who is doing just a spectacular

6

job at the Antitrust Division, Christine Varney.

7

(Applause.)

8
9
10
11
12
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WELCOMING REMARKS BY CHRISTINE VARNEY

2

MS. VARNEY:

Thanks, Jon.

Jon did a terrific

3

job laying out why we’re all here today and what we’re

4

doing in this undertaking and what we’re going to be

5

doing today.

6

me just add my thanks and my welcome.

7

So, before we turn to our first panel, let

I know I’ve gotten a lot of questions, as I’m

8

sure Jon has this morning, about the Comcast/NBC deal

9

that was announced this morning.

So, let me share with

10

you what I shared with my staff, and that is, we’re not

11

commenting on that today.

12

kind of undertaking can help us understand the emerging

13

complex deals that we face, such as that one.

14

morning, welcome and have a good day.

But we’re hopeful that this

So, good

Thank you.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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PANEL ONE:

OVERVIEW, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, ROLE OF

2

THE GUIDELINES

3

MR. SHAPIRO:

So, if the people on the first

4

panel will come up, we’re five minutes early because our

5

leaders are so efficient, as opposed to security.

6

Take your spot.

We may just take a couple

7

minutes to assemble here so we’re not starting ahead of

8

time.

9
10

We’re still waiting for Bob it looks like.
(Brief pause in the proceedings.)
MR. SHAPIRO:

All right, let us get started.

11

It’s now actually 9:30, so we’re on time.

12

had all my panelists, but they’re a slippery crew.

13

lost one again.

14

I thought I
I

Okay.

Welcome.

I’m Carl Shapiro.

I’m one of the

15

members of the working group at the DOJ and the FTC for

16

the review project here.

17

of you who are here physically and others who may be

18

watching from elsewhere.

19

Thank you all for coming, those

As already indicated, we have a really

20

distinguished panel.

I’m very grateful for everybody

21

here on the panel for joining me.

22

has extensive high-level experience in the antitrust

23

agencies and considerable experience in private practice,

24

in the private sector as well.

25

perspectives are extremely valuable.

Everybody on the panel

Those are dual
This panel is our
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first panel of the five workshops, the first of four

2

panels today.

3

And, so, particularly given the distinguished

4

group, this is an overview panel to really put the

5

guidelines in historical perspective, talk about their

6

role, their function and what types of things should be

7

in the guidelines and what things shouldn’t be in the

8

guidelines, as well as, more specifically, where updating

9

and revisions might be most valuable and where they

10
11

should not be done.

So to frame some of that.

We already indicated in our questions for

12

public comment, we see two general reasons why we’re

13

undertaking this project at this time.

14

a gap has developed between the guidelines as written and

15

actual practice, and good government would call for

16

closing that gap.

17

experiences developed in the intervening 17 or 18 years

18

that could be reflected.

19

concepts, but they’re overlapping interests here, and

20

we’ll be addressing those on the panel.

21

One is to see if

And the other is the learning and

Those are not just joint

In getting ready for this morning, I went back

22

and looked at the 1968 merger guidelines.

I think we may

23

hear a little bit about them from some of our panelists.

24

We’ve got historical perspective.

25

pointing out that the 1968 guidelines themselves are 17

I can not resist
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pages in total and they cover horizontal, vertical and

2

conglomerate mergers; eight pages on the horizontal

3

mergers and they are very structuralist.

4

market that is highly concentrated with the top four

5

firms having at least 75 percent of the market, if the

6

acquiring firm has a 10 percent and the acquired firm has

7

2 percent or more of the market, this would be ordinarily

8

challenged at the time and it goes from there.

9

And so, in a

We’ve come a long way and the question is what

10

the next step might be.

11

think, is the decline of the structural presumption over

12

the decades and how that affects merger enforcement and

13

how it should be reflected in the guidelines.

14

One of the backdrops for this, I

I’ve asked each of the panelists to give some

15

introductory remarks for five to ten minutes a piece.

16

will be tough and cut them off, their distinguished

17

nature notwithstanding.

18

Pitofsky as one of the deans of the antitrust community.

19

And I’d like to start with Bob

Bob, please start, and all of you all have been

20

instructed to speak into the mic.

21

MR. PITOFSKY:

22
23

I

Thank you, Carl.

Good morning,

everybody.
I’m going to do two things.

I am going to talk

24

about the historical role of the guidelines with respect

25

to American antitrust and then I’m going to talk a bit
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about, if there is going to be another iteration, some of

2

the things that ought to be included, excluded,

3

clarified, amplified and so forth.

4

Let me start with the guidelines.

5

the guideline process, in many ways, has had the most

6

important influence on American antitrust policy in the

7

last 50 years.

8

the Supreme Court, isn’t there?

9

and there’s speeches and statements by the enforcement

Now, you say, wait, wait, wait, there’s
And there’s scholarship

10

people.

11

Court.

12

antitrust cases did they take?

13

merger Supreme Court case was 35 years ago in General

14

Dynamics.

15

economy, but the Court just isn’t interested.

16

Yeah.

In my view,

Wait, wait, wait, there’s the Supreme

What have they done?

How many Supreme Court
The last horizontal

It’s not exactly an unimportant sector of the

Academics are very powerful influences, but

17

they work their way into the guidelines.

18

the enforcement people make speeches and statements and

19

bring cases, but it’s a little hard to tell compared to

20

the guidelines what it is they have in mind and which way

21

they were going.

22

And, of course,

The first guidelines were issued in 1968 by the

23

Department of Justice.

In those days, it was the style

24

of the Federal Trade Commission to sit out projects like

25

this and they sat this one out and did not join these
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guidelines.

2

Kirkpatrick, they joined the DOJ in later iterations of

3

the guidelines.

4

Although later on, I think under Miles

The dominant influence by far was Donald

5

Turner.

Not only because he conceived of the concept of

6

guidelines, but he drew into those guidelines the

7

beginnings of sophisticated economic analysis and we have

8

progressed from there.

It wasn’t exactly a non-

9

controversial process.

Don’s view was enforcement people

10

had an obligation to tell the private sector what their

11

enforcement intentions were.

12

thought it was right at the time.

13

lot of the lawyers at the DOJ said, what do you mean

14

you’re going to give them a blueprint of what we think is

15

okay and what we think isn’t?

16

any cases?

17

front of the judge and say, see, we followed the

18

guidelines.

19

I think that’s right.

I

The problem is that a

How are we going to win

All they’ll do is wave the guidelines in

It hasn’t worked out that way.

It hasn’t

20

worked out that way at all.

21

continues to win cases when it is forced to go to court.

22

The FTC, during my six and a half years, won 12 out of 14

23

cases when it was forced to go to court.

24

to his guns and, in fact, the guidelines have survived.

25

The Department of Justice

So, Don stuck

Indeed, each iteration gets better and better.

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

17
1

Although, I will say two things about them.

2

iteration makes it somewhat more difficult for the

3

plaintiff, for the government, to win and, more

4

importantly, each iteration has far more sophisticated

5

economic analysis incorporated.

6

Each

My dominant point today -- I hope I’ll have

7

more than one or two chances to talk about it -- is the

8

following:

9

guidelines is that they should incorporate, not

An aim of the people who are revising these

10

exclusively, but should incorporate the idea of making

11

these guidelines simpler, and clearer and, in some

12

particular areas, so as to give people a better idea of

13

what is intended.

14

Simpler.

My example would be barriers to entry.

It used

15

to run on about six or eight or nine pages in the

16

guidelines and introduced concepts like committed and

17

uncommitted entrants, sunk costs, viable minimum scale.

18

I mean, in a way, it’s a brilliant piece of analysis.

19

And the lawyers in New York and the lawyers in

20

Washington, they get it, they’re on board.

21

a lot of lawyers and business people who find it very

22

difficult to know what minimum viable scale would be in a

23

year that hasn’t happened yet.

24
25

But there are

What do I think ought to be introduced into the
guidelines that is not there now?

Innovation markets.
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It seems to me that as you look around the world, the

2

action has to do with innovation.

3

the very beginning, have been preoccupied with price.

4

But price is not the only anti-competitive consequence of

5

various kinds of transactions.

6

working on the same improvement in a pharmaceutical or

7

widget or gidget or whatever they’re working on and they

8

propose to merge, that could have a negative consumer

9

welfare consequence.

10

The guidelines, from

If two companies are both

Now, the usual argument is, but you can’t

11

measure market share in innovation markets.

12

fairly common reaction and it is very difficult.

13

think the answer is that you can.

14

many patents these two companies obtained in the last

15

several years, how large is their staff, how qualified is

16

their staff, what kind of machinery do they have.

17

Bork, among many others, has said, look, it is extremely

18

difficult, but it can be and it should be done.

19

market shares can be measured in those areas.

20

That’s
But I

I want to know how

Judge

And

A couple of final points, very briefly.

I have

21

been writing for a long time and I’m very cranky about

22

the failing company defense.

23

I think Congress didn’t have in mind all those

24

qualifications before you could assert a failing company

25

defense and I don’t even think it’s good economics.

I think it’s too stringent.
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we’re going to talk about that on the panel later on, so

2

I’ll hold my comments until a later point.

3

A few other changes, HHI, 100/1,800 and so

4

forth, is it really only a safe harbor if you’re under

5

1,000?

6

two cases.

7

they were marketers and they were in around the 1,500,

8

1,600 range.

9

fact, government’s intention is not to bring cases unless

10

Nobody’s brought a case -- actually, we brought
I can’t say nobody.

But both oil companies,

But that’s once in a blue moon.

And if, in

the HHI is over 2,000 or 2,500, we ought to say so.

11

Many people think the SSNIP test is 5 percent,

12

and maybe it is.

13

percent and everybody in the know knows it.

14

true.

15

think is it ought to be clearly stated in the guidelines

16

as to what the SSNIP test is and if it’s changed.

17

ought to be changed, as Don Turner would put it, to tell

18

people what the enforcement intentions are of the

19

enforcement agencies.

20

Many other people would say it’s 10
Maybe that’s

I don’t know it one way or the other.

What I do

It

And, finally, this is just a pet peeve on my

21

part, but I’m sure all of you recognize that even though

22

trend to concentration was the principal concern of

23

Congress when they amended the Celler-Kefauver Act in

24

1950, the principal concern, trend to concentration has

25

never been regarded as a factor in deciding whether or
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not there had been or will be anti-competitive effects.

2

All I ask is that the people who are working on revising

3

the guidelines take a look at that and see if it belongs

4

in the next version of the guidelines.

5

MR. SHAPIRO:

Thanks, Bob.

Thank you.
Next, I’d like to

6

ask Jim Rill to speak to us.

Jim was Assistant Attorney

7

General when the current guidelines in chief were drafted

8

in ‘92.

9

and the results and how they’ve held up.

I think he has great insights about that process

10

Jim?

11

MR. RILL:

Thanks very much, Carl.

It’s really

12

an honor to be here with such a guest panel and it’s rare

13

that I am not the oldest person on the panel.

14

that honor to Bob Pitofsky.

15

I’ll give

Let’s take a look at what guidelines are

16

supposed to do and at the ‘92 guidelines themselves.

17

think, they set forth an explication which makes a lot of

18

sense.

19

guidelines, “The guidelines have the dual purpose of

20

leading to appropriate enforcement decisions on

21

horizontal mergers and providing the bar and the business

22

community with reasonably clear guidance with which to

23

access to antitrust enforcement risks of proposed

24

transactions.”

25

I

The guidelines -- quoting now from the

Good so far as it goes.

There’s another
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player, though, that’s not mentioned in that statement

2

and another player which I think is of importance in

3

considering revision of the guidelines and, in fact, has

4

played a major role in the revision of the guidelines

5

that took place in 1982 and again in 1992 and again, I

6

think, in 1997, and that is, of course, the Courts.

7

So, the guidelines have an intellectual -- an

8

analytical path, hopefully an intellectual path, too, but

9

an analytical path, but it’s not a cookbook.

The

10

guidelines are not a cookbook.

11

articulate, well defined recipe to follow in designing

12

every aspect of merger enforcement, but rather a broad,

13

but clear, analytical path.

14

against anyone who talks to me about something called a

15

guideline violation.

16

a guideline violation.

17

They’re not a nice,

I have a personal vendetta

I submit there is no such thing as

So, how does one achieve those purposes?

It

18

seems to me there are three principles, and I owe this

19

thought to an interesting paper that was prepared by Tim

20

Muris in New Institutional Economics.

21

I think this applies to guidelines -- needs to be:

22

based on sound law and economics; two, and of great

23

importance, needs to be readily understandable and

24

practical by counsel, by firms and by courts; and three,

25

needs to be sufficiently flexible to adapt to new

Any principle, and
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learning in law and economics.

2

should, I submit, guide the process that’s going on right

3

now.

4

Those three principles

I endorse the process that’s going on right

5

now.

It’s been 17 years since the 1992 guidelines.

6

1992 guidelines were 10 years after the 1982 guidelines,

7

which were 14 years after the 1968 guidelines.

8

just given you my total knowledge of econometrics.

9

The

I have

I agree with Bob that the Turner guidelines

10

were revolutionary in 1968, not only because of the

11

infusion of some economic learning into the guidelines,

12

but the Assistant Attorney General had the fortitude to

13

do that which I would never have done.

14

Supreme Court of the United States that it was full of

15

baloney and that he certainly wouldn’t bring cases that

16

would fit under the rubric of the Vonns case or the Papst

17

Blatz case.

18

guideline levels are well above the learning of those two

19

cases.

20

He told the

If you look at the Turner guidelines, the

But the Turner guidelines went so far as they

21

went.

And by 1982, economic learning and court

22

decisions, particularly General Dynamics, had begun to

23

expose the error of reliance on rigid market or tests.

24

Thus, the Baxter guidelines undertook to raise the

25

thresholds and identify factors such as entry, in
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particular, that went beyond market shares.

2

The 1982 guidelines were a massive step

3

forward, I think a sea change, a seismic change in

4

antitrust, and for that reason, I think Bill Baxter was

5

one of the truly great Assistant Attorneys General to

6

serve in that post.

7

and the flawed market share paradigm was put in terms of

8

likelihood of challenge, which I think went much too far.

9

But, they remain largely structural

A second problem with the 1982 guidelines is

10

that they were only as -- with the ‘68 guidelines, only

11

Justice Department guidelines.

12

guidelines came out, the Federal Trade Commission,

13

several days later, put out a very general statement that

14

they weren’t necessarily following the ‘82 guidelines but

15

were going to look at the law and facts of each case.

16

During the next decade, court decisions and

And when the 1982

17

economic literature put further doubt in the structural

18

approach, even of the ‘82 guidelines, and we had cases

19

like Baker Hughes which called into serious question the

20

market share paradigm and dwelt, to a great extent, on

21

entry.

22

At the same time, the entry issue was being

23

rather superficially handled when you look at cases like

24

waste management in the Second Circuit where entry was

25

sophisticatedly analyzed on the basis, well, it must be
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cheap to buy a trash truck.

2

properly being defined either in the guidelines or

3

certainly by the courts, and the Calder decision a year

4

later was to the same effect, not with trash trucks, but

5

hose nozzles.

6

Entry, obviously, was not

Advanced economic thinking, moreover -- my

7

particular favorite is Bobby Willig’s article in

8

Brookings, produced a reliance on unilateral effects

9

analysis which had not been incorporated in the ‘82

10

guidelines, particularly in the area of differentiated

11

products.

12

actually anticipated in enforcement decisions, such as

13

the Procter and Gamble/Rorer case, finding within a broad

14

stomach remedy market, unilateral effects by the

15

acquisition of Maalox by Pepto Bismol.

16

The ‘92 guidelines in that area were somewhat

Thus, there was a need to accommodate new

17

learning and replace some of the gaps, to use Carl’s

18

term, that existed in the guidelines versus the courts

19

and economic learning.

20

In the ‘92 guidelines, the notion of a

21

presumption on the market share paradigm replaced the

22

notion of a likelihood of challenge.

23

effects provisions of the guidelines were greatly

24

expanded into a separate and rather long section.

25

was a much more comprehensive approach to entry and, as

The competitive
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Bob indicated, a somewhat intricate approach to entry.

2

There was, I think, most importantly, the infusion of the

3

notion of unilateral effects, particularly in

4

differentiated markets, but also in commodity markets,

5

apart from the analysis of coordinated effects.

6

yes, they were the first ever joint guidelines issued by

7

the Federal Trade Commission as well as the Department of

8

Justice.

9

but won’t in this panel.

10

And,

And there are stories there I could tell you,

So, let’s go back to the desirability of

11

revision now.

12

Yes.

13

paradigm and presumptions.

14

the guidelines what the agencies are doing now?

15

one looks at the FTC’s reports on when challenges are

16

made and in what particular industry, at what market

17

share level, at what level of customer complaints and

18

other factors, they bear little relationship to the

19

1,800/100 formula that’s set forth in the guidelines,

20

even as a presumption.

21

Is there new learning to be reflected?

Certainly, with respect to the market share
Do we accurately explain in
No.

If

Is the presumption right or is simply the

22

market share paradigm a trigger to further analysis,

23

which it seems to be in many of the court decisions?

24

we need to wonder whether the guidelines currently

25

provide an explanation of what the agencies are doing and
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what the courts are doing in a concise and understandable

2

manner.

3

which I think does cry out for further explanation, but

4

not necessarily radical change.

There I go to the issue of unilateral effects,

5

I think that we want to keep the -- I would

6

urge the drafters to keep the market definition and

7

hypothetical monopolist tests.

8

stood the weather-beating winds of time.

9

widely been adopted by the courts, and I could cite all

These are tests that have
They have

10

the cases from Swedish Match to Oracle as a starting

11

paradigm.

12

paradigm or can there be a holistic approach?

13

holistic approach is fine if it doesn’t become mush.

14

Oracle, Country Lakes Food, Sunguard, Swedish Match, all

15

of these cases adopt the market definition paradigm and

16

it seems to me that’s appropriate.

17

The question is, does it have to be a starting
I think a
But

The courts raised question of the HHI levels,

18

in fact, in the Arch Coal decision.

The District Court

19

not only looked at the guidelines, but then looked at the

20

FTC report which indicated the FTC, itself, doesn’t

21

follow the rigid principles of the guidelines.

22

one reads Oracle and would have to say that the arguments

23

or the positions taken by Judge Vaughn Walker, in that

24

case, illuminate some of the areas where unilateral

25

effects can be addressed in guideline form.

I think

But I would
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urge the drafters not to, even in the unilateral effects

2

differentiated product area, to abandon the market

3

definition principle.

4

Bob mentioned the SSNIP test.

I agree with

5

him.

6

5 percent SSNIP test is deviated from and then what

7

reasons and why, because it’s not spelled out in the

8

guidelines, but it happens.

9

submitted, it happens a lot in energy and in the retail

10
11

I think there needs to be an explanation of when a

If you look at the paper we

food industry.
Finally, I think the power buyer point needs to

12

be looked at, if there is such a principle to be

13

considered.

14

but also in the ADM Synthetic Sweetener business.

15

It came up in not only Country Lake Foods,

So, after 17 years, this adolescent, I think,

16

is ready to grow into somewhat more maturity.

17

say radical change is not appropriate.

18

is quite probably appropriate, but I don’t think a

19

treatise is appropriate because if you start writing a

20

treatise, you get into big formulas, and you lose both

21

comprehensibility and flexibility.

22

I would

Some commentary

Overall, I think the project is timely,

23

excellent and certainly led by competent people who

24

should be leading a project of this sort and, again, I’m

25

honored to be able to participate.

Thanks, Carl and Joe.
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MR. SHAPIRO:

Thank you so much, Jim.

That’s

2

very gracious.

3

questions you’ve posed in the discussion for sure.

4

We’re going to return to some of these

Next, I’d like to ask Doug Melamed to speak.

5

Doug was Deputy Assistant Attorney General and Acting

6

Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Division in

7

the late nineties and I’m sure will put that hat on and

8

not his new hat as Intel’s General Counsel as he speaks.

9

MR. MELAMED:

I’m always thinking of the public

10

interest, Carl, and the happy news is that the interests

11

of Intel and the interests of the public are always

12

aligned.

13

(Laughter).

14

MR. MELAMED:

15

Let me just say at the outset I think

So, there’s no tension there.

16

guidelines in the merger area are especially important

17

because, unlike the Sherman Act where 99 percent of the

18

law and the guidance that is given to the business

19

community arises out of the case law, sort of the common

20

law process, in the merger context, it’s largely a

21

regulatory process.

22

case law and one in which the case law is influenced by

23

the regulatory actions.

24

process in terms of its most immediate and significant

25

impact on the business community.

Obviously, one constrained by the

But it is largely a regulatory
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And, so, it’s critical that the regulators -- I

2

don’t like that word, but it’s not about shorthand --

3

articulate with as much clarity as possible the way that

4

they think, and they think the private parties and courts

5

ought to think, about mergers.

6

are important.

7

17 years, it is very desirable to bring them up to date

8

to reflect contemporary learning.

9

So, I think guidelines

And, that being the case, I think after

In the introductory comments, I want to make

10

two points, one a broad one and one a narrow one.

11

broad one is this.

12

guidelines for a long time or hadn’t until a couple days

13

ago when I read them in anticipation of this panel.

14

guess maybe I had gone back to look for little passages

15

to cite in briefs or something, but not really looked at

16

them in any comprehensive way.

17

The

I actually haven’t read the

I

Rereading them, I was struck by how formalistic

18

they are.

They have all sorts of definitions and

19

categories of abstractions, committed versus uncommitted

20

entry, the definition of a market, notion of HHIs, and

21

most importantly, the five-step analysis -- which

22

although there’s some lip service paid to, well, this is

23

only an aid in answering the question of competitive

24

effects -- is really presented almost as a decision tree

25

kind of process.
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Now, the various analytical tools that are

2

described in the guidelines, whether they’re the SSNIP

3

test or diversion ratios or minimum viable scale and so

4

forth, are important analytical tools, and I think it

5

would be very valuable for the agencies to update the

6

description of those tools and how they are used to

7

reflect current practice and current economic thinking.

8

But they’re not ends in themselves.

9

kind of an exercise -- merger review is not an exercise

This isn’t

10

of applying these various analytical tools.

11

simply tools, means of shedding light on the ultimate

12

question, which is whether the contemplated merger is

13

going to injure competition and disadvantage some segment

14

of the community that we want to protect.

15

They are

So, I think while the analytical tools of the

16

sort described in the guidelines are very valuable, I

17

don’t think the guidelines actually describe, taken as a

18

whole, the process that practitioners of the agencies

19

actually go through in reviewing a merger.

20

in that respect they are somewhat -- I don’t want to say

21

misleading because I think at least the regular

22

practitioners know that, but they ought to be updated, I

23

think, starting from perhaps that preface.

24
25

And I think

Roughly speaking, here’s what I do, and I think
a lot of people do something like this, in analyzing a
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horizontal merger.

2

represent A and if you’re in practice or if you’re in the

3

agency, you’re looking at contemplated merger.

4

you say, okay, do A and B compete?

5

Who are the consumers or the suppliers if you’re

6

concerned about buy side markets?

7

they compete?

And then you ask, well, who else do they

8

compete with?

Who else constrains their behavior vis-a-

9

vis those trading partners?

10

You have companies A and B.

You

And so

And if so, where?

For whose patronage do

And then you ask, okay, if we eliminate rivalry

11

between A and B, what’s going to happen?

12

to be other extant competitors to constrain it?

13

likely that people on the fringes will enter or readjust

14

their competitive behavior?

15

substitutes for one another or are they not so close?

16

You know, are we dealing with homogeneous products?

17

we have concerns about coordinated effects?

18

dealing with a unilateral effects story?

19

Are there going
Is it

Are these rivals close

Do

Are we

But the analysis starts, at least to my likes,

20

by asking who are the merging parties, where do they

21

compete, what’s the affected area of commerce and now how

22

do I analyze the question, or answer the question, what

23

happens if we eliminate rivalry between these two merging

24

parties?

25

In the course of thinking of it, building up
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from the facts that way, at various times, one might

2

think, gee, there are certain analytical tools that might

3

be helpful here.

4

market.

5

likely entrants.

6

committed, I don’t think that’s part of most people’s

7

active vocabulary.

8

they’re going to enter.

9

go into that dichotomy and the guidelines and so forth.

10

It might be helpful to know what is the

It might be helpful to know whether there are
And I don’t know committed, non-

But you do ask how likely is it that
And you look at the factors that

The problem, I think, with starting sort of

11

from the abstractions and working down is that, it not

12

only doesn’t describe I think what, in fact, happens,

13

which reflects that it’s a problem, but that it can lead

14

to some erroneous conclusions.

15

outside the market can be important constraints on

16

behavior of firms in the market.

17

example, a monopolist merging with the closest, albeit

18

distant, substitute who’s outside the market, you might

19

be very concerned about the competitive impact of losing

20

the constraint of that outside the market, closest

21

substitute.

22

HHIs, you know, you’re obviously going to lose sight of

23

that.

24
25

For example, firms

If you imagine, for

If you focus just on the market and the

Committed, uncommitted is really a matter of
degree.

I think the dichotomy doesn’t make a lot of
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sense.

2

than others.

3

shares is that we don’t really care about historical

4

market shares, we only care about future market shares.

5

And, so, we might want to say -- if we want to make a

6

prediction, what will the market shares be in some

7

relevant time horizon, we might start with historical

8

market shares on a kind of past is prologue notion, but

9

always asking the question, is this a prologue or do we

10
11

Market shares matter sometimes and sometimes more
And, of course, the problem with market

have a General Dynamics kind of situation here?
One big suggestion is that I’d like to see the

12

guidelines focus more on how one actually builds up a

13

competitive analysis starting from the facts, how one

14

uses the analytical tools that are presently in the

15

guidelines and I assume will be enriched by this

16

revision, rather than by coming up with a nice conceptual

17

framework of how one might employ all these tools in some

18

stylized merger analysis.

19

The second and narrower suggestion I would have

20

has to do with efficiencies.

Efficiencies are really

21

important, obviously.

22

All the studies we all know show that innovation

23

contributes a great deal more to economic welfare than

24

avoiding dead weight loss and so forth.

25

have to keep an eye on efficiencies.

Innovation is really important.

So, we really

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

34
1

Now, I understand probably a fraction as much

2

as others in this room, but to some extent at least,

3

efficiencies are commonly over-predicted in mergers not

4

just for agency consumption but probably for Board of

5

Director consumption and we have all the studies about

6

mergers that fail and so forth.

7

important, it seems to me, that the agencies and the

8

practitioners and, ultimately, the courts have a clear

9

idea of how to think about efficiencies, how to assess

But it is still very

10

them recognizing the uncertainty of prediction, and then

11

how to evaluate them, how to compare them against what

12

might look like games of market power by the merging

13

firms.

14

I’m particularly interested in an issue that

15

was treated in the ‘97 update as a footnote item and I

16

think is really a very important question that I don’t

17

know the answer to.

18

the courts would say in response to this question.

19

do you do if you have significant efficiencies in market

20

-- I’ll use that term -- market A and what apparently

21

looks like a moderate and competitive concern in market

22

B?

23

are clear, you can’t weigh the benefits in market A

24

against the harms in market B, that’s an anti-competitive

25

transaction.

I don’t know what the agencies or
What

A lot of people I think would say, well, the courts

I don’t think that would be the right
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policy result and I would hope the new guidelines would

2

explicitly grapple with that issue and give us some

3

guidance as to how that comparison, that trade-off could

4

be handled.

5

MR. SHAPIRO:

Thank you, Doug.

Again, lots of

6

food for thought later.

7

up innovation and I think it’s something we really want

8

to return to.

9

that.

10

A number of people have brought

There’s not much on the guidelines on

So, everybody put your thinking caps on.
Next, I’d like to ask Tim Muris to speak.

Tim

11

has experience going back to the eighties in the time of

12

the ‘82 guidelines and, more recently, of course,

13

Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission.

14

us.

15

MR. MURIS:

Thank you, Carl.

So, Tim, tell

It’s a pleasure

16

to be here at old timer’s day, except for Carl who’s a

17

recidivist, I guess, as others of us are.

18

Let me try to discuss three principles for

19

revising the guidelines.

To begin, the guidelines have

20

succeeded in significant part because they do not try to

21

do too much.

22

they provide a flexible and durable framework that

23

reflects the antitrust community’s consensus.

24

on consensus should underlie any potential changes to the

25

guidelines.

Rather than complex, lengthy regulations,
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The lack of such consensus doomed the recent

2

attempt to provide a one-size-fits-all test for analyzing

3

unilateral conduct under Section 2.

4

consensus regarding the relative insignificance of simple

5

concentration tests, which we’ve heard about already,

6

justifies reflection of that view in any revisions to the

7

current guidelines.

8

consensus, however, risk the fate of last year’s Section

9

2 report.

10

The long-held

Major changes that lack such

My second point is that the guidelines should

11

reflect agency practice.

12

this in two ways, the data release, which I’ll discuss

13

momentarily, and the merger commentary, which we began as

14

well.

15

HHI thresholds and no longer characterize certain mergers

16

as presumptively anti-competitive.

17

revision stated that the numbers are only the starting

18

point, and I agree with that.

19

When I was Chairman, I pushed

In terms of practice, the agency should adjust the

Jim Rill’s 1992

Nevertheless, the numbers can provide useful

20

screens, and let me suggest three.

21

post-merger HHI below 1,800, there’s unlikely to be

22

competitive concerns.

23

2,000, but I’ll talk about the data release in more

24

detail in a second.

25

First, when there’s a

It sounds like Bob had an idea of

Second, post-merger HHIs between 1,800 and
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2,400 are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects

2

when the delta is below 300.

3

delta of 300 or more are likely to require detailed

4

investigation into their likely competitive effects.

5

And, third, post-merger HHIs of 2,400 or greater are

6

unlikely to have adverse competitive effects when the

7

delta is below 150.

8

above 150 or more require detailed investigation into

9

their likely competitive effects.

10

Mergers in this tier with a

Mergers in this tier with deltas

Now, these numbers don’t come from any theory,

11

these numbers, I believe, come from the agency’s data

12

releases.

13

it’s possible -- and the agencies have the actual numbers

14

in hand -- it’s possible that these numbers aren’t

15

precisely correct and there should be some adjustments.

16

But I do believe that the experience would provide a very

17

useful screen and the numbers reflect hundreds of merger

18

investigations.

19

in the late nineties, most of the numbers are still from

20

the Clinton Administration.

21

Now, because the data releases were in ranges,

Indeed, because the merger wave occurred

Another topic on which the guidelines and

22

practice diverge involves fixed cost.

I think the

23

commentary makes it clear that fixed costs count, under

24

certain circumstances, and any revisions should reflect

25

that.
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Moreover, the guidelines should confirm that

2

the burden on the parties to demonstrate efficiencies is

3

no greater than the agency’s burden to show anti-

4

competitive effects.

5

leaders accept the statement that I just made, although

6

there are some on the staff that I don’t think agree.

7

agency practice is to apply different burdens, then I

8

think any revisions should justify such an extraordinary

9

position.

10

Now, my experience is that agency

If

My third and final point is that evaluation of

11

individual mergers is heavily fact specific and that,

12

therefore, any changes to the guidelines should highlight

13

those facts that are particularly probative.

14

suggest five examples.

15

And let me

The first is that the best evidence for

16

determining efficiencies involves actual experience.

17

Just as the agencies rightly dismiss unsubstantiated

18

claims, they should accept as presumptively valid, those

19

claims based on the best possible evidence, which is the

20

resulting efficiencies or lack thereof in recent mergers

21

involving one of the merging companies or others in a

22

relevant industry.

23

include improvements in product quality, not just

24

reductions in cost.

25

And, of course, such evidence can

Second, the guidelines should not assume the
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form of competition among firms offering differentiated

2

products.

3

certain form of competition, for example, that firms

4

compete by simply setting price, would make it more

5

difficult for the guidelines to characterize existing

6

competition accurately and to predict any loss of

7

competition following a merger.

8
9

Any revision to the guidelines that assumes a

The guidelines’ framework searches for ways in
which market power may be exercised successfully and that

10

analysis depends heavily on the particular industry

11

setting and the form the competition takes.

12

the form of competition, independent of the industry

13

particulars, risks serious error.

14

Specifying

And I associate here myself with an article by

15

Werden, Froeb and Scheffman, who noted that after 15

16

years of using various models, we all have a greater

17

appreciation on the complexity and variety of competitive

18

processes and clearer understanding that differing

19

modeling assumptions can amplify or attenuate merger

20

price increases.

21

structural presumptions, they should not incorporate

22

models that do not reflect real world competition.

23

As the guidelines move away from

The third highly probative fact any revision

24

should recognize is that merging firms have an incentive

25

to pass on marginal cost savings, regardless of the
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number of remaining competitors, which is a proposition

2

that simply follows from the fact that almost everyone

3

faces a downward sloping demand curve.

4

Fourth, the guidelines should reflect the

5

importance of customer views in determining the

6

likelihood of anti-competitive effects.

7

showed that strong, consistent complaints almost always

8

lead to a challenge.

9

people’s experience is that when you’ve got strong,

10

The data release

In my experience, I think most

consistent support, the agencies will not challenge.

11

Unfortunately, in Heinz, Arch Coal and Oracle,

12

Courts were dismissive of customer opinions.

13

assessing customer testimony, the Courts and the agencies

14

should recognize the policy judgment that underlies the

15

business judgment rule so prominent in corporate law.

16

This rule essentially requires judicial abstention from

17

second guessing corporate decisions based in part on the

18

relative experience of businesses versus judges and

19

courts.

20

presumption that corporate directors and officers act on

21

an informed basis, in good faith, and in the best

22

interests of the corporation.

23

In

The business judgment rule creates the

This rationale applies to customer testimony.

24

Once the agencies or courts have screened customers to

25

ensure their testimony is reasonably informed, in good
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faith and not based on conflicting or anti-competitive

2

incentives, the decision makers should give great weight

3

to customers’ views on mergers likely effects.

4

will most directly experience the effects of a merger.

5

Their self-interest, combined with their knowledge of the

6

industry, ensures that their views will provide crucial

7

evidence.

8
9

Customers

Most antitrust lawyers, on both sides of the
table, agree that customers remain the most objective

10

marketplace participants.

11

frequently provide a better window on how the merger

12

actually functions than an economist’s model or the

13

court’s intuition.

14

The decisions they make

Finally, my final probative fact involves the

15

importance of post-merger evidence in consummated

16

mergers.

17

different than typically is the case in the normal HSR

18

process -- or they can have it anyway -- that’s evidence

19

of the merger’s actual competitive impact.

20

evidence of that impact is available, it should trump the

21

predictive analysis used in the standard HSR process.

22

The relevant analogy is to judicial decisions regarding

23

the superiority of direct evidence of competitive impact

24

in Section 1 decisions.

25

Here the agencies have something fundamentally

When reliable

Now, of course, the post-merger evidence has to
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be reliable and the agencies have to be confident that

2

their measurements are accurate and merger-specific.

3

at least two instances, reliable measurements of the

4

merger’s impact will likely be impossible.

5

involves cases in which too little time has passed post-

6

merger to measure the effect.

7

a good example of that.

8

merging parties have manipulated the post-acquisition

9

evidence.

In

The first

I think Chicago Bridge was

And the second occurs when the

10

Thank you and I look forward to our discussion.

11

MR. SHAPIRO:

12

Our last speaker, Deb Garza, like Doug, was a

Okay, thank you very much, Tim.

13

Deputy Assistant Attorney General and then Acting

14

Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Division, a

15

bit more recently.

16

Deb, please go ahead.

MS. GARZA:

Thank you.

It really is an honor

17

to join this panel of colleagues, each of whom has

18

contributed significantly to antitrust scholarship and

19

the development of competition policy, both within and

20

outside the United States.

21

respect to the ICN, which you’re responsible for.

22

Jim, particularly, with

My comments today will draw largely on the work

23

of the Antitrust Modernization Commission, as well as on

24

my experience in both private practice and in government,

25

using the merger guidelines, explaining them to clients,
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merging parties and persons affected by mergers.

2

also had a bit of experience working on guidelines,

3

including the 1984 revisions to the 1982 Justice

4

Department merger guidelines.

5

to the challenges that the agencies are facing.

6

I’ve

So, I’m very sympathetic

I’m also very sympathetic to the notion of why

7

it’s an important thing to be engaged in review and

8

potential revision of the guidelines.

9

serve several important purposes.

The guidelines

Educating the public

10

about the goals and substance of competition policy is

11

one.

12

enforcement is another.

13

needed for the free flow of capital in well functioning

14

markets, facilitating voluntary compliance with the law

15

and sometimes also advancing the development of the law

16

in the courts.

17

Ensuring the transparency and fairness of
Providing certainty that is

I think the ‘68 guidelines, the ‘82, the ‘84,

18

all the subsequent guideline revisions have actually done

19

a remarkable job of helping to forge the development of

20

merger law in the United States and abroad.

21

hand, and we may discuss this later, I don’t think it

22

should be the primary purpose of the guidelines to try to

23

advance the law.

24
25

On the other

I also think that even the process of
developing, reviewing and updating guidelines serves a
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very important purpose of fostering dialogue and

2

understanding, forcing the agencies to examine the

3

efficacy of current policy and their articulation of that

4

policy and ensuring that enforcement policy remains

5

valid.

6

guidelines, there is a real value, I think, to confirming

7

the consensus support for them.

8
9

Even if no significant changes are made to the

Of course, it’s important to ensure that the
guidelines remain current, that they accurately reflect

10

both the agencies’ actual enforcement policy and

11

practices and recent developments in the law.

12

gap between what the guidelines say and what the agencies

13

do actually could undermine public confidence and

14

legitimacy of government enforcement.

15

A material

I want to quickly go to the AMC

16

recommendations, and I note, too, going last gives me the

17

opportunity to see that, just as at the AMC, there was a

18

substantial amount of bipartisan consensus about a number

19

of things I think that I’ve seen developing up here

20

already, while there are some differences, some

21

substantial consensus on a number of matters.

22

Let me go quickly through the AMC

23

recommendations that I think are relevant to the current

24

exercise for those of you who don’t carry the AMC report

25

around with you.
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UNIDENTIFIED MALE:

2

MS. GARZA:

3

It’s big.

It is big, yeah.

I should get a

nice little abridged version of it.

4

First, the AMC concludes that there was a

5

general consensus that the basic framework for analyzing

6

mergers followed by the U.S. enforcement agencies and

7

courts is sound, and I think that’s an important starting

8

point.

9

Second, the AMC concluded that no major changes

10

to merger enforcement policy are needed to address issues

11

in industries characterized by technological change and

12

innovation because current law, including the merger

13

guidelines, are sufficiently flexible to address those

14

aspects of competition.

15

make several recommendations specifically related to the

16

review of innovation-related aspects of mergers.

17

At the same time, the AMC did

The AMC recommended that the merger guidelines

18

should be updated to explain more extensively how the

19

agencies evaluate the potential impact of a merger on

20

innovation.

21

reason for some mergers and innovation is extremely

22

important to economic welfare, yet the current guidelines

23

mention innovation only in passing in footnote six, which

24

they said sellers with market power also may lessen

25

competition on dimensions other than price, such as

The ability to innovate is a significant
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product, quality, service and innovation.

2

The Commission recognized that there remains a

3

need for additional learning regarding innovation

4

competition, but concluded that the agencies have

5

sufficiently considered the issues involved to provide

6

some more useful guidance than what we see in that

7

footnote.

8
9

Next, the AMC recommended that the merger
guidelines should be updated to include an explanation of

10

how the agencies evaluate non-horizontal mergers.

11

realize that this exercise is specifically designed to

12

think about the horizontal merger guidelines, but let me

13

tilt at some windmills here and represent the AMC by

14

suggesting that it would be very worthwhile for the

15

agencies to revisit their treatment and articulation of

16

their treatment by vertical guidelines.

17

Now, I

The ‘82 and ‘84 merger guidelines, which were

18

only the DOJ, contained a section addressing non-

19

horizontal mergers, including vertical mergers and

20

mergers raising potential competition concerns.

21

that section of the ‘82 and ‘84 guidelines addressing

22

non-horizontal mergers was never formally abandoned, the

23

‘92 merger guidelines and the ‘97 revisions did not

24

include that section and the FTC has never, to my

25

knowledge, issued any sort of guidelines or statements
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about their treatment of vertical mergers.

2

Although significant thinking has occurred

3

regarding vertical mergers since 1984, the guidelines

4

haven’t been updated.

5

horizontal merger guidelines have brought significant

6

transparency on how the agencies evaluate horizontal

7

mergers.

8

petitioners have benefitted and we think they would

9

benefit greatly from some updated articulation of the

10

The AMC concluded that the

The business community has benefitted,

competitive effects of vertical mergers.

11

I’ll note that Chairman Leibowitz mentioned

12

today the Comcast/NBC Universal merger, which I don’t

13

know, but I suspect may have some vertical aspects to it.

14

Just another illustration, the agencies do look at

15

vertical aspects of transactions in important

16

transactions and it seems to me a real mess not to do

17

something to address the fact that the last time that

18

they spoke to this issue was in 1982.

19

The AMC recommended that the agencies should

20

increase the weight given to fixed cost efficiencies,

21

such as research and development expenses in dynamic

22

innovation-driven industries where marginal costs are low

23

relative to typical prices.

24

guidelines appears to weigh most heavily efficiencies

25

that will reduce price to consumers in the short run.

The current merger
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Reductions in total costs, including fixed costs, such as

2

improving upon the rate and quality of innovation, have

3

less, if any, effect on pricing in the short run,

4

obviously.

5

such efficiencies could also likely benefit consumers in

6

the form of lower prices, increased choice and improved

7

quality.

8

In the longer run, however, some, if not all,

Although the current merger guidelines do

9

recognize that R&D efficiencies should be considered,

10

they appear to treat them with particular skepticism.

11

While the AMC recognized the difficulty of measuring

12

efficiencies and balancing the value of future benefits

13

that may result from innovation against the current costs

14

to consumers, given the importance of innovation and the

15

centrality of innovation-based industries to our current

16

economy, the Commission urged the agencies to, in effect,

17

give the highest priority to the appropriate treatment

18

and articulation of how it looks at innovation issues in

19

merger analysis.

20

The AMC recommended that the agencies should

21

give substantial weight to demonstrating that a merger

22

will enhance consumer welfare by enabling the companies

23

to increase innovation, recommended that that agency

24

should be flexible in adjusting the two-year time horizon

25

for entry where appropriate to account for innovation
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that may change competitive conditions.

2

expressed concern that the current merger guidelines do

3

not clearly acknowledge the possibility of dynamic change

4

over a longer period of time than two years.

5

The Commission

Innovation may result in entry beyond the two-

6

year time horizon.

While we recognize that the

7

guidelines do not purport to present a hard and fast

8

rule, the Commission recommended that the agencies

9

increase their flexibility in this regard to ensure that

10

innovation that will change competitive conditions more

11

than two years out receive the proper consideration.

12

And, finally, the AMC recommended further study

13

of merger policies.

Specifically, the Commission

14

recommended that the agencies seek to heighten

15

understanding of the basis for U.S. merger enforcement

16

policy, including through study of the relationship

17

between concentration and other market characteristics

18

and market performance to provide a better basis for

19

assessing the efficacy of current merger policy.

20

you.

Thank

21

MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, thank you very much, Deb.

22

Before we turn to discussion, I wanted to have

23

a brief advertisement for our next panel.

So, a word

24

from our sponsor.

25

Judge Doug Ginsburg here on the next panel.

We’re particularly fortunate to have
We’re very
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honored that he accepted our invitation to come and

2

speak.

So, stay tuned for that.

3

Now, back to our regularly scheduled

4

programming.

5

kind of move it along, and I’ll look for each of you to

6

indicate when you want to weigh in here.

7

I have a number of questions and I want to

The innovation topic, almost every one of you

8

has mentioned it, okay?

So, let’s stipulate that

9

innovation is really important.

Let’s even stipulate

10

it’s more important than small price changes, okay?

11

AMC says that we should factor that more in.

12

virtually nothing in the guidelines on innovation

13

effects.

14

The

There’s

How might we do that while maintaining

15

flexibility and while recognizing that it may be very

16

hard for the agencies to peer into the future far enough

17

to really discern innovation effects?

18

markers could we look to if we want to add some material

19

on that in the guidelines?

What kind of

20

Tim, I know you’re interested in this topic.

21

MR. MURIS:

Sure.

I think you should give more

22

guidance.

I’m not sure you’re ready to do guidelines.

23

There are three particular issues that make this

24

particularly difficult.

25

point in any uniform way.

One is the economics doesn’t
We know, I think with great
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confidence, and the statistics show this, that mergers to

2

monopoly and mergers to duopoly normally are bad and

3

should be challenged.

4

The economic models and limited evidence on the

5

innovation point -- and some of the best summary is still

6

in a report Bob did in that first set of hearings that he

7

had.

8

called mergers to monopoly situations, sometimes it’s

9

anti-competitive, but not always.

About the best that you can say is that in so-

So, you’ve got a

10

fundamentally different meaning of numbers than you have

11

in product market cases.

12

That’s the first problem.

The second problem is the benefits from

13

successful innovation, in many cases, are just

14

overwhelming.

Take the drug situation.

15

Genzyme case.

It was one of the few cases when I was

16

Chairman that was controversial and we allowed what was a

17

two-to-one merger to go through, and they succeeded in a

18

drug to deal with a horrible disease called Pompe’s

19

Disease.

20

benefits in the typical product merger of, you know, 5 to

21

7 percent lower cost.

22

with innovation, I think people believe.

We did the

Those kind of benefits, you know, dwarf the

And that’s more true generally

23

The third problem is our experience -- I still

24

say our, I guess I can’t get over that -- the experience

25

of being the government when the analysis of innovation

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

52
1

is mostly at the FTC and mostly with drug mergers.

2

There’s nothing wrong with that, but they have -- there’s

3

a particular regulatory process that makes the whole

4

innovation issue more tractable.

5

So, what I would suggest is rather than do

6

guidelines is that you offer more guidance, beginning

7

with someone writing a nice paper about just exactly what

8

the FTC has done in all those drugs cases, you know, why

9

they’ve done it, how they’ve done it, the arguments that

10

have occurred.

11

least in part.

12

Try to make it relatively neutral, at

So, again, more guidance for sure.

13

sure we’re ready for guidelines.

14

MR. SHAPIRO:

15

MR. PITOFSKY:

I’m not

Bob?
I agree entirely that defining

16

an innovation market and the measuring market share is

17

much more difficult than other efforts that we’ve engaged

18

in because so many innovation markets suggest ideas, and

19

after spending a hundred million dollars, it turns out

20

the idea isn’t going to go anywhere.

21

a preliminary, the people who are going to revise the

22

next set of guidelines should take a look at what

23

happened over the last 20 years in terms of innovation,

24

get some statistics together.

25

So, I agree that as

But then to opt out and not give as much
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direction as we can to the public sector about market

2

definition and market share, I talked about market share

3

in my initial remarks.

4

people have been working on it.

5

it.

6

wrote a little bit on it.

7

price analysis is done.

8

can’t be done, or you do as much as you can, give as much

9

hint to the public sector as you can and move on from

10

I know how difficult it is.

But

There are articles on

RAP (phonetic) has an article on it.

Judge Bork

It’s not easily done the way

But that doesn’t mean that it

there.

11

MR. SHAPIRO:

12

MS. GARZA:

Deb?

Yes.

The AMC appreciated that --

13

directly in its recommendations and report that there is

14

an issue, about whether or not the agencies’ thinking has

15

matured sufficiently to get guidelines, as Tim suggested.

16

And it is important, I think, that the guidelines

17

represent a consensus document and don’t sort of

18

represent the flavor of the month club in terms of

19

economic thinking.

20

But what we saw with AMC was that the public --

21

the non-experts that looked at the -- the policymakers

22

that looked at the guidelines that seemed to be looking

23

at a static world and seemed to be really focused more

24

highly on price effects and didn’t seem to, frankly, give

25

enough weight and consideration to innovation issues.
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don’t think that’s a true assessment of what actually

2

happens at the agencies.

3

their analysis, they are thinking of competition in a

4

dynamic sense.

5

I think when the agencies do

It’s just that the nature of the guidelines

6

because of the way they were written, they were really

7

more focused on a sort of static competition world and

8

more on the price effects.

9

they don’t adequately leave room for consideration of the

10

effects on innovation, which, as Tim has said, can really

11

swamp any other effects or concerns.

12

I think the concern is that

So, even while you may not be able to specify

13

much in the guidelines about how you’re going to look at

14

innovation issues, the AMC thought it was important to

15

make sure and clear that innovation is an issue and then,

16

frankly, urge that through this process of looking at the

17

guidelines and potentially revising them that there

18

should be a lot more work and thinking and articulation,

19

whether or not it’s in the guidelines, but a lot more

20

articulation of the issues that are relevant to

21

innovation and merger analysis.

22

guidelines or outside the guidelines, you are pushing

23

forward the thinking in that area and articulating the

24

issue clearly, even if it’s not in sort of the strict

25

structural guideline sense.

So, whatever is in the

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

55
1

MR. SHAPIRO:

Doug and then Jim.

2

MR. MELAMED:

Just a couple of modest thoughts.

3

I don’t claim any great expertise here, but here are my

4

thoughts.

5

One, I think, first of all, innovation has two

6

potential roles here.

One is are we worried about harm

7

to some innovation in what some people would call the

8

innovation market?

9

future innovation and kind of efficiency benefit that one

And the other is the prospective

10

might imagine from the merger.

11

might be different.

12

I think the analysis

As to the former, my sense is to have great

13

skepticism about the value of defining innovation

14

markets, trying to figure out how to measure shares in

15

them and so forth.

16

doesn’t really apply.

17

shares is to figure out, you know, sort of whether

18

there’s a likelihood of anybody being able to price off a

19

marginal revenue curve rather than a demand curve and

20

create some dead weight loss.

21

issue is how are you going to be able to -- how you’re

22

likely to shift the demand curve.

23

I think the whole premise of that
The whole premise of defining

But for innovation, the

There’s a tremendous incentive often, even for

24

a monopolist, to shift the demand curve.

So, I’m not

25

sure that even if we could define an innovation market
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and measure shares would tell us an awful lot about the

2

likelihood that incentives for innovation would be

3

affected.

4

That’s one thought.
The second thought is maybe the way to look at

5

innovation on either of these questions, the plus and the

6

minus, is to go directly to the question of whether we

7

think the transaction affects incentives to innovate?

8

Often, two big potential innovators might get together

9

precisely because they see potential synergies or, you

10

know, they can -- whether it’s just spreading their fixed

11

cost of R&D or putting together two nutty geniuses in the

12

same room or whatever it is.

13

to innovate, one ought to be worried about that.

14

But if they have incentives

On the other hand, obviously, there are

15

situations, I suppose, where an incumbent monopolist

16

might buy up a potentially disruptive innovator in order

17

to shut it down.

18

on the formality of market definition and shares, we

19

ought to be asking simply the question of, what do you

20

think this transaction does to incentives?

21

ought to be a prime driver of the analysis.

22

But it seems to me that relevant focus

MR. RILL:

Maybe that

Doug picked up on a point, also,

23

that I was concerned about in thinking about innovation

24

and its inclusion in the guidelines.

25

with Tim that it’s probably not quite ready for prime

I think I agree
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time if the guidelines are indeed considered to be prime

2

time because the learning is still on the way.

3

One has to look not only at, from the parties’

4

standpoint, the plus side of including innovation

5

analysis and the calculation of efficiencies, but also

6

the minus side of looking at the possible anti-

7

competitive effect analysis that will result from over-

8

inclusion of innovation output functions, innovation

9

firms in a merger case.

10

There’s literature that pointed out -- a good

11

bit of literature out there, but some of the literature

12

is, I think, a little bit terrifying in the sense of

13

looking at the very broad-based possible inclusion in a

14

“market” of R&D functions that may be only functioning in

15

very distant, but nonetheless, theoretically related end

16

product categories with end products that became, for

17

example, treatment of a particular condition, or even a

18

related condition.

19

Some of the literature would include that in

20

looking at the possible anti-competitive effect of a

21

transaction between firms whose R&D capacity seemed to

22

be, at least on first analysis, going on quite different

23

tracks would put them in the same market and look to a

24

possible challenge to the merger on that basis.

25

So, I think great care has to be taken to
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distill some of the literature and see how fundamentally

2

sound it is and how it would play in court and go back to

3

the principle of, is this an understandable standard that

4

would be tractable and flexible enough to make sense in

5

the guidelines?

6

literature and possibly with the cases, certainly on the

7

competitive effects side and possibly not so much so on

8

the efficiencies side.

9

MR. SHAPIRO:

10
11

I think more has to be done with the

second bite here.

We have two panelists who want a

Bob?

MR. PITOFSKY:

Very briefly.

The implication

12

seems to be if you had an innovation market, the result

13

would be findings of anti-competitive effect and,

14

therefore, a decline in innovation.

15

should also incorporate the notion that quite often,

16

mergers between firms that are engaged in innovation are

17

going to be very efficient, that they’re going to be able

18

to combine technologies.

19

with a related area which is R&D joint ventures.

20

was found illegal for the first hundred years.

21

The guidelines

That’s the history that we had
Not one

It seems to me that the guidelines ought to set

22

out the pros and the cons of consumer effects of

23

innovation markets.

24

MR. SHAPIRO:

25

MS. GARZA:

Briefly.

Very briefly.

The AMC had not
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actually recommended that there be focus on innovation

2

markets in the guidelines.

3

and Tim have said, it seems to me that there’s -- about

4

the state of the learning, it seems to me that there is a

5

sufficient consensus and, in fact, the agencies do look

6

at things like the effect of a transaction on incentives

7

to innovate.

But notwithstanding what Jim

8

Our proposal would be that in the competitive

9

effects discussion, one should at least articulate that

10

when you have a merger that is being driven by or

11

involves significant issues of innovation, here’s the way

12

we’re going to look at it.

13

that we’re going to be concerned about, like how it’s

14

going to affect an incentive to innovate.

15

flip side, indicating that the agencies will recognize

16

innovation-related efficiencies and how so, and to make

17

clear that two years is not a hard and fast rule and that

18

fixed cost efficiencies related to research and

19

development may have a real role to play.

20

MR. SHAPIRO:

Here’s the kinds of things

And then the

Well, let me push this a little

21

bit further before we move to another topic.

22

strikes me as -- if we focus on incentive and ability to

23

engage in innovation, there’s a pretty clear trade-off

24

such as we get in unilateral effects, which is if the

25

merging firms are -- if one firm’s success would take a
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lot of business away from the other, we have some rivalry

2

there that might be diminished by the merger that could

3

retard innovation.

4

On the other hand, they might be able to get

5

synergies or efficiencies.

6

without invoking any notion of innovation market and

7

simply explain the same type of analysis you would do,

8

perhaps with a longer time frame, that we do, to some

9

degree, for innovation and do routinely for other

10

dimensions of competition.

11

MR. MELAMED:

That could be articulated

Reactions to that?

Very briefly.

Doug?

I think that makes

12

sense, but it does seem to me and those who know the

13

literature better than I, correct me if I’m wrong, that

14

the trade-off between diminished rivalry and diminished

15

incentive to innovate is a lot less direct than is the

16

trade-off between diminished rivalry and higher prices.

17

If I’m right about that, it seems to me that the agencies

18

-- the guidelines ought to note that rather than just

19

lead people to believe that, well, gee, a three-to-two

20

must be anti-competitive.

21

MR. SHAPIRO:

Okay.

So, your homework

22

assignment is to submit supplemental comments on why it’s

23

less direct.

24

to agree.

25

He’s pulling the microphone away from you

MR. MURIS:

It’s not just a lot less direct.
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It’s that when you look at the literature, there are lots

2

of models that say it’s better to have fewer firms

3

because you can capture the benefits to innovation.

4

I think there’s a very good paper by Katz and Shelanski

5

which I think does a good job.

6

taken the insight that I’ve just said and said,

7

therefore, all mergers ought to be approved and

8

innovation is king and I think the Katz and Shelanski

9

paper does a good job of debunking that view.

10

Now,

There are people who have

It doesn’t mean that we’re dealing with the

11

same kind of insights that we have in product markets.

12

What it means is that if you are going to write anything

13

that reflects a consensus, it’s going to be awfully

14

short.

15

looking -- just as we did with that data release, I mean,

16

I was surprised, I think everybody was surprised a little

17

bit where the numbers came out.

18

got enough experience now in this area with the drug

19

mergers that I think it would be useful to collect it and

20

publish it.

21

But, I think there would be great value to

MR. SHAPIRO:

Let’s look -- the FTC’s

So, if we noted the importance of

22

appropriability, which is underlying, I think, your point

23

as part of incentives, would that assuage your concerns

24

or do you still think it’s just too murky?

25

MR. MURIS:

Well, fine, you add that, you’ve
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got a few sentences.

2

don’t think it tells us a lot and it’s not on a par with

3

what Jim said, you know, in terms of the prime time.

4

you still haven’t addressed the issue that, I mean,

5

outside of the drug mergers, it’s a real murky issue --

6

unbelievably murky about trying to even identify who the

7

relevant parties are.

8
9

I don’t mind saying that.

MR. SHAPIRO:

Okay.

But I

And

Let me move to a different

topic that’s also been brought up by a number of you,

10

which is, I would say, the decline of the structural

11

presumption, Jim, you referred to the flawed market share

12

paradigm.

13

which, you know, is still using the paradigm, of course,

14

and we’ve already signaled that we’re not departing --

15

planning to depart, if we do update the guidelines, from

16

the use of market definition and HHIs.

17

Tim, you mentioned adjusting HHI thresholds,

But given that there’s -- it’s not a consensus,

18

a lot of voices saying structural measures should get

19

less weight and we should do a more holistic approach, if

20

we move in that direction, which downplays the role of

21

market concentration as an indicator of competitive

22

effects and focus more on other ways of assessing the

23

facts, how can this be done without weakening merger

24

enforcement?

25

presumption is an important tool that the agencies use in

To the extent that the structural
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2

court, how do we do that?
MR. PITOFSKY:

I don’t think we can do it.

I

3

agree that some structural presumption is not everything.

4

I know I’ve described it as a launching pad.

5

started and then you look at a lot of other factors.

6

to say that 20 percent market share and 80 percent market

7

share are pretty much the same thing is going to diminish

8

the ability to enforce the antitrust laws.

9

MR. RILL:

It gets you
But

I think there’s a lesson to be

10

learned from Europe here.

11

certainly one.

12

with market structure levels indicate that they’re a

13

starting point for further analysis.

14

developed in the United States, that’s probably what they

15

are now, a starting point for further analysis.

16

the notion of presumption in the ‘92 guidelines is, at

17

most, a very weak presumption.

18

decisions very obviously bear that out, certainly at

19

levels other than, for example, two-to-one.

20

There’s not many, but

The European 2004 guidelines in dealing

I think as it has

I think

I think the court

But does it weaken antitrust enforcement that

21

one needs to go on and look at competitive effects, other

22

measures of competitive effects, other empirical evidence

23

that would indicate that a merger might have adverse

24

competitive effects once a certain threshold for further

25

analysis has been cleared?

I don’t think the evidence
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2

will bear that out.
I think that commensurate with the decline of

3

the power of the structural presumption, if you will,

4

there has not been a decline in merger analysis and

5

merger review.

6

remains in effect.

7

Heinz decision, but it seems to me that if one accepts

8

the analysis of the decision, one can’t argue with the

9

notion that if the facts were as stated, that there would

At certain levels, the presumption
I think there were flaws in the H. J.

10

have been a very high level of proof shown to overcome

11

the fact that they allege this is a three-to-two merger.

12

You could argue with that finding, but

13

nonetheless, I think that shows there was not particular

14

a weakening of merger enforcement and a whole range of

15

decisions, such as Swedish Match and others, show that I

16

don’t think there’s been a weakening in either the

17

enforcement vitality of the agencies or of the courts’

18

decisions properly designed.

19

presumption is there to necessarily add vitality to

20

antitrust enforcement in the merger area.

21

MR. SHAPIRO:

22

MR. MURIS:

So, I don’t think the

Tim?

Well, two points.

The success or

23

failure of the government in court I don’t think has

24

turned one way or the other on the structural presumption

25

and, indeed, parties are so reluctant to take the
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agencies to court, it happens very infrequently.

2

Second, and this is a point when I was

3

Chairman, I thought, do we want to redo the merger

4

guidelines?

5

consensus, but I believed we ought to lay the groundwork

6

for future visions by doing two things.

7

have to address the numbers, but what are the numbers?

8

So, we did the data release and then the commentary on

9

actual agency practice.

10

And I said, “no”, because I believed in

Any revisions

Obviously, you’re going to need to confront the

11

data and either accept it or explain it away in revising

12

the numbers.

13

MR. MELAMED:

Just a brief final thought.

You

14

know, the guidelines are not a statute.

You can write

15

all the guidelines you want describing how the agencies

16

go about merger analysis.

17

a world in which the law says that there’s a structural

18

presumption that we, the prosecutors, are going to tell

19

you how we’re going to exercise our prosecutorial

20

discretion and you could have a world in which you don’t

21

undermine the structural presumption except by the force

22

of an analysis that suggests that maybe courts, in their

23

wisdom, shouldn’t give too much weight to the

24

presumption.

25

questions on what the law is and what the agencies’

They could be reconciled with

But I think there are two separate
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preface ought to be.

2

MR. RILL:

I’d just respond one second to that

3

point.

True, the guidelines are not statutory.

In fact,

4

I think Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson once described them

5

as an admission against interest by the government.

6

the courts increasingly and you can cite cases, myriad

7

cases, where the courts have treated the guidelines,

8

noting that they’re not law, but nonetheless enormously

9

persuasive by the expert agencies and follow the

10

guidelines as though they were almost stare decisis

11

precedent.

12

MR. SHAPIRO:

But

So, it seems to me that the

13

reality is that to the extent the guidelines continue to

14

downplay the importance of market shares or Herfindahls

15

and say it’s a starting point, but you don’t get much

16

from that, it’s very hard, isn’t it, for the agencies if

17

they go to court than to put a lot more weight on that

18

measure?

19

Doug, were you saying otherwise?

20

MR. MELAMED:

No, no, no, I’m saying you could

21

write around this problem if you were worried about it.

22

I actually think, in the spirit of what Jim was saying,

23

that if you articulate a tractable and sensible way to

24

analyze mergers at the agency, you shouldn’t be worried

25

about the fact that it will weaken your litigation hand.
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You ought to assume courts can apply it, too.

But if you

2

wanted to draft around that, you know, you could try to

3

do it.

4

MR. MURIS:

This is full rule of reason

5

analysis, especially in court.

6

a damning admission in some ways.

7

of doing mergers and studying mergers, you could think

8

maybe we could come up with some better shortcuts.

9

reason I mention the facts is I think there are

And I think that might be
After all these years

The

10

occasional factual shortcuts.

11

when in Section 1 cases they’re always talking about

12

nobody does full rule of reason analysis.

13

are full rule of reason analysis and that’s reality.

14

happy with that myself.

15

MR. SHAPIRO:

But the reality is is that

Well, mergers
I’m

Well, the guidelines right now,

16

they have a disclaimer saying this is how we do things,

17

but it’s not necessarily how we’ll conduct litigation.

18

Should we drop that disclaimer and encourage the courts

19

exclusively to rely on the guidelines or just keep it the

20

way it is?

21

MR. MURIS:

I don’t think that --

22

MR. MELAMED:

Option A.

23

MR. SHAPIRO:

Drop it?

24

MR. MELAMED:

Yeah, Option A, drop it.

25

MR. MURIS:

I agree with that.
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MR. PITOFSKY:

I’m sorry, what is the

2

consequence of dropping it, that the courts are told not

3

to pay any attention to it?

4

MR. RILL:

No, it’s a gratuitous footnote that

5

was trying to get away from actually trying to align

6

burdens of proof and other technical litigation

7

strategies in the guidelines.

8

useful purpose now.

9

weaken or strengthen the force of the guidelines.

I don’t think it’s for any

I don’t think the effect is to

10

MR. PITOFSKY:

11

MR. RILL:

12

MR. PITOFSKY:

Vis-a-vis the courts.

Right.
I’ll go back to the original

13

here.

14

enforcement intentions of the enforcement agencies were.

15

I don’t believe the courts should be bound by them.

16

Maybe a little interest, but very little interest.

17

more bound by precedent, although there isn’t an awful

18

lot of precedent.

19

I think the guidelines tell you what the

MR. RILL:

But the fact of the matter is that

20

the courts are feeling very much influenced by the

21

guidelines.

22
23

Much

Read the cases.

MR. PITOFSKY:

A few of them have.

Not that

many.

24

MR. RILL:

There aren’t that many cases.

25

MR. PITOFSKY:

I stick by what I say, still not
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that many.

2

But you’re right, that’s the reason.
I think the judges should do their jobs.

The

3

guidelines are for the purpose originally intended, to

4

give people an idea of what the enforcement agencies are

5

likely to do.

6

MS. GARZA:

Carl, can I just -- I don’t know

7

about dropping the footnote, keeping it.

The fact of the

8

matter is what the agencies will look at and how they

9

assess a merger is one thing and how courts try merger

10

cases is another, and I don’t think the guidelines should

11

worry about things like the allocation of burdens and the

12

various tools that the courts will use to help them

13

assess the evidence and, frankly, I know that there is

14

always a concern and has been a concern by the agencies

15

about how the guidelines might affect their litigation

16

success.

17

government to make its case in court under the rule of

18

reason.

19

merger guidelines to rule against you, chances are you’ve

20

already lost him or her on the merits of the case.

But to be frank, I think it’s incumbent on the

And, frankly, if the judge is reaching for the

21

MR. SHAPIRO:

Tim, you mentioned the commentary

22

that was released in 2006 and there’s a lot of good stuff

23

in there.

24

were parts of it that might be incorporated into the

25

guidelines themselves.

We asked in our public questions whether there

I guess I want to ask you not so
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much to mention specific parts of the commentary, any of

2

you, but what is the role of these adjunct documents and

3

should we take parts where there is a consensus, for

4

example, and move it into the guidelines?

5

view that commentary which is the latest, you know,

6

systematic statement as we undertake this project?

7

MR. MURIS:

Sure.

How should we

Well, when we -- at least

8

for myself, I envisioned the commentary as the purpose of

9

it was to reflect the actual practice.

10

Multi purpose for

when somebody sat down to revise the guidelines.

11

Also, I think the commentary does something

12

that’s quite useful and probably wouldn’t work in the

13

guidelines.

14

know, occasionally doing that in whatever form is

15

helpful.

16

commentary will agree with this, is cooperation between

17

the two agencies can sometimes be strenuous.

18

for a delicate word here.

19

think that something like the commentary can be done more

20

frequently with relative ease than revising the

21

guidelines.

22

to substitutes, although partly again I think any

23

revision should reflect some of the consensus that’s in

24

there.

25

All the case examples.

And I think, you

Although the people who worked on the

I’m looking

I guess that wasn’t one.

I

So, I think they’re complements as opposed

MR. SHAPIRO:

Doug?
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MR. MELAMED:

I’m not sure I disagree with Tim,

2

but just a note of concern about the last point he made.

3

It’s precisely because the commentary can be published

4

with less angst that one has to wonder whether if we get

5

too accustomed to commentary, we don’t simply have the

6

whim of the current, you know, senior staff at an agency,

7

rather than something that is more considered and more of

8

an enduring reflection hopefully both agencies use.

9

MR. SHAPIRO:

Okay.

Tim, again, you mentioned

10

there are a lot of examples in the commentary.

11

the question whether or not -- let’s say not real world,

12

but hypothetical examples might be valuable in the

13

guidelines.

14

about ten of them.

15

collaboration guidelines.

16

rather helpful as a pedagogical tool.

17

change for the merger guidelines.

18

perhaps note?

19

We posed

They’re in the IP licensing guidelines,
There’s about ten in the
As a professor, I find them
That would be a

A good change or

Comments?

MR. RILL:

I’ll try.

There are, to be sure,

20

one or two examples in the 1992 guidelines.

21

think they’re very happy examples.

22

there’s some merit to what Tim suggested and that is that

23

joint effort is very strenuous.

24

what you’d like.

25

I don’t

I will only say that

You can read into that

In the merger area -- and I’ve read the IP
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guidelines and the international guidelines carefully and

2

I think the examples are quite good.

3

area and its companion rule of reason analysis makes it

4

much less amenable to examples that are particularly

5

useful because the rule of reason analysis is so specific

6

that a slight change in some of the underlying and

7

factual basis, empirical basis for the analysis could

8

change the outcome of the answer to the question that

9

might be posed in the examples.

10

I think the merger

I think examples are much more appropriate for

11

speeches and possibly commentary than they are in the

12

guidelines because there are too many variables that

13

could go into the production of the example that could

14

make a slight change in the variables so that you come

15

out with a different answer.

16

MR. SHAPIRO:

17

MR. MURIS:

Okay.

Do others want to comment?

Well, as an academic, I generally

18

like examples, but examples here seem odd given the

19

hundreds of actual examples of cases you’ve got.

20

want to pull an example, you do what the commentary did.

21

People don’t want to do that to protect the innocent or

22

whatever.

23

If you

Second, it would fundamentally change the

24

nature of the guidelines in the sense that given so many

25

different points in the guidelines, I don’t think you
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could just sprinkle them through.

2

lot.

3

mean, maybe that’s a good thing.

4

precedent probably say it’s not, but I suppose I could be

5

persuaded otherwise.

6

You’d have to have a

It would change the document significantly.

MR. MELAMED:

I

I think inertia and

Let me try to start persuading

7

you otherwise or at least suggest this.

I thought Tim’s

8

comment about there are so many mergers and how can you

9

have examples is odd because there are examples in the

10

non-merger guidelines where there are vastly more actual

11

transactions and litigated cases and, nevertheless,

12

examples were workable there.

13

That’s thought one.

Thought two, yes, if the agencies can’t agree

14

on a set of examples, then you shouldn’t scuttle the

15

whole project, just get rid of the examples.

16

sure it would be a bad idea or definitely I think it

17

might be a good idea only if you only had a handful of

18

examples rather than an example illustrating every

19

important analytical point.

20

But I’m not

To put into the guidelines examples drawn upon

21

some very illuminating things the agencies have done in

22

years, such as the explanation of the Genzyme and cruise

23

line cases, which are extremely valuable, and perhaps

24

could be brought in at a key point when you’re talking

25

about certain kinds of data or incentives in innovation
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or whatever.

2

actually only had a half a dozen, I think it might be

3

illuminating.

4

Even if you didn’t have 40 examples, you

MR. SHAPIRO:

Okay.

Let me just give each of

5

you a chance for a minute or two if there’s some last

6

remark you want to make, having heard this discussion.

7

I’m surprising you with this perhaps, but reactions

8

overall.

9

MR. RILL:

Well, I will simply start and say

10

that the entire process that you’re undergoing right now

11

provides an enormously beneficial perspective and it

12

seems to me that panels such as this, and perhaps even

13

more so the panels which will be following on, are going

14

to, in themselves, I think, add significantly to the

15

learning that’s going to be evolving around the

16

discussions that are taking place, regardless of whether

17

there’s a revision or not.

18

indicated and the other panelists have indicated, there

19

are areas that are ripe for revision.

20

And I think that, as I’ve

I look particularly towards the unilateral

21

effects panel at the close of the day.

22

process.

23

if nothing more comes out of it than the learning that

24

could be extracted from the panels.

25

So, I applaud the

I think it’s worthwhile in and of itself even

MR. SHAPIRO:

Thank you, Jim.

Tim?
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MR. MURIS:

Well, maybe you’ve already done

2

this or have a sense of doing it, but the questions that

3

you’ve asked are very open-ended and could lead to a

4

fairly wholesale revision.

5

should communicate publicly, you know, before you

6

actually write whatever you’re going to write that you’ve

7

decided for X, Y, Z reasons to focus on, you know, A, B

8

and C.

9

praiseworthy, but immense and, to use the word again,

10

At some stage, I think you

You have embarked on an effort that is

potentially strenuous.

11

MS. GARZA:

Just echo what others have said.

I

12

think as you go forward, I think it’s going to be

13

important not to try to make the guidelines carry too big

14

a load.

15

I think that what they should do is mainly to communicate

16

to those who are subject to government enforcement what

17

the rules of the road are to the extent possible, provide

18

certainty, provide transparency.

19

about trying to move the courts and, so therefore, don’t

20

load too much into the guidelines.

21

have said here, it’s not regulation; it’s really just an

22

articulation of the general way in which the agency will

23

look at certain factors and what factors it will look at.

24
25

You can’t make them do more than they should do.

MR. SHAPIRO:

Don’t worry so much

Remember, as others

Well, thank you all.

Let me just

set up a little bit of what’s to come the rest of the day
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in the context of what we just heard.

2

consciously steered clear of some of the more specific

3

issues, such as, how are we going to deal with unilateral

4

effects or the market definition, the algorithm and the

5

SSNIP test because those are going to be treated later

6

today and some of the other topics we didn’t have time

7

for, such as much on efficiencies will be addressed in

8

other workshops.

9

We sort of

The very next panel is on direct evidence.

I

10

think that fits very nicely with one of the themes -- I

11

attempted to say consensus here -- that as we put less

12

weight on market shares alone and do the more full

13

analysis, perhaps starting the way Doug described it,

14

that there are a variety of different types of evidence

15

we look to and the guidelines, while sound in structure,

16

don’t say much about how we do that.

17

So, please stick around to hear that and other

18

panels.

We’re going to take a 15-minute break.

19

join me in thanking this panel.

20

(Applause.)

21

(Panel 1 concluded.)

22
23
24
25
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PANEL TWO:

2

DIRECT EVIDENCE OF COMPETITIVE EFFECTS

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

Welcome back.

We’re

3

going to turn now to the topic that was touched upon in

4

the first session and that is the use of direct evidence

5

of competitive effects in merger analysis.

6

familiar with the much quoted line in many a judicial

7

opinion that says, almost invariably, that the starting

8

place for analysis in a Clayton Act Section 7 merger case

9

is the definition of a relevant market and the

10

We’re all

measurements of market shares.

11

A great deal of theory and applied work,

12

certainly in the last 20 years or so, has turned back to

13

the possibility, recognized in principle from the very

14

beginning of experience with the Sherman Act, that it

15

would be ideal, instead of using proxies, to directly

16

assess the likelihood or the fact of anti-competitive

17

effects.

18

number of cases outside of the Section 7 area and touched

19

upon in the FTC’s administrative proceedings and in

20

Evanston, and we’re going to look in more detail at the

21

use of direct effect evidence of competitive effects as a

22

way to assess mergers.

23

And that possibility has been recognized in a

We’re going to have basically 10-minute

24

presentations by each of our panelists and then time for

25

discussion.

We have a terrific mix of folks who have not

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

78
1

only had opportunities as academics and practitioners to

2

deal with these issues, but have done so inside of the

3

public enforcement community as well.

4

Judge Doug Ginsburg, the Judge on the U.S.

5

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and

6

formerly the head of the Antitrust Division; Leslie Marx

7

from the Duke Business School at Fuqua and also with

8

Bates White; Leslie, formerly Chief Economist of the

9

Federal Communications Commission; Rich Parker with

10

O’Melveny and Myers, a partner there, also formerly the

11

Director of the Bureau of Competition at the Federal

12

Trade Commission; Mark Popofsky, now a partner at Ropes

13

and Gray, but also past holder of several key management

14

positions at the Department of Justice Antitrust

15

Division; and Bobby Willig, Professor at the Wilson

16

School at Princeton, Principal of Compass Lexecon and

17

also formerly the head of the Economic Analysis Group at

18

the Department of Justice, who had a little bit to do

19

with the 1992 guidelines as well.

20

So, a fantastic combination of not simply

21

enforcement experience, but also practice outside the

22

agencies.

23

both sides and will be addressing this dimension of it.

24

And if I could ask Doug please to get us started.

25

They’ve looked at the merger guidelines from

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Thank you, Bill.

I’m pleased
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to be here and to know that the Division and the

2

Commission are proceeding in such an openly, scholarly,

3

informed way to the question of whether and how to revise

4

the guidelines.

5

I am here in my capacity, as Bill said, as a

6

Judge, not at all as an economist.

So, I ask you to

7

forgive any misstatements that may be made.

8

disclaimer whenever there’s a real economist in the room.

9

And, also, in my capacity as a collector of tidbits in

I make this

10

films that lampoon government agencies.

So, if anyone

11

has suggestions, I hope they’ll let me know later on.

12

Perhaps my favorite relevant to this morning is from

13

Ghostbusters.

14

in the bedroom with -- was it Susan Sarandon?

15

Weaver, pardon me.

16

the context, which some of you will know, says, The EPA

17

has a rule against sleeping with the possessed.

18

Actually, it’s just a guideline.

19

(Laughter).

20

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Toward the end, Bill Murray finds himself
Sigourney

Sigourney Weaver, and putting aside

Now, I haven’t yet seen The

21

Informant, but having read the book, I trust that some of

22

us in the room may have been lampooned in that effort.

23

So, I look forward to that.

24
25

I have a couple of messages and I hope they’re
clear and simple.

The first is this, in talking about,
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thinking about direct evidence of competitive effects in

2

a merger context at least, the order of the day should

3

be, in my view, simplicity.

4

about this with an eye to how it’s going to be played out

5

in court, which often it won’t be, but that seems to be

6

the failsafe assumption, the best direct evidence is

7

empirical, historical evidence from which you can readily

8

extrapolate.

9
10

That is to say, in thinking

Darren Tucker, who I think is here at the FTC,
right?

11

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

12

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Yes.

And may be here today, I don’t

13

know.

In a recent article said, examples of direct

14

evidence include a natural experiment showing the effect

15

of a change in concentration or number of competitors,

16

documentary or other evidence showing an acquiring

17

company’s post-merger plans and changes in prices are

18

output from a consummated merger.

19

desiderata, of course, much to be desired, but going to

20

be available only in select cases.

21

to be necessary to do something well beyond that.

22

One such case, of course, was mentioned

Now, these are all

So, it’s often going

23

earlier, I think was Evanston Hospital.

But that

24

happened to be a consummated case and, so, there was

25

price experience about which the Commission and the
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parties could argue in light of the elapsed time, I think

2

four years, between the consummation of the deal and the

3

challenge.

4

Commission could define the market based on econometric

5

evidence, but the econometric evidence was, in turn, an

6

analysis of empirical price data.

7

But the question there was whether the

In the recent airline filings, the Continental

8

request for immunity from the Department of

9

Transportation in switching from Sky Team to Star

10

Alliance, the data suggested that nonstop service is a

11

separate product market and the Department, using cross-

12

sectional analysis of fare data, showed that fares paid

13

by nonstop passengers increased typically, on average, 15

14

percent in two-to-one transactions and 6 and two-thirds

15

percent when nonstop carriers went from three-to-two.

16

As for whether the nonstop trans-Atlantic

17

market is a separate market, I can hardly imagine that

18

there’s much of a market for service that stops while

19

going across the Atlantic.

20

entail.

21

(Laughter).

22

JUDGE GINSBURG:

23

I’m not sure what it would

Maybe just as you’ve described

elsewhere, departures without arrivals.

24

(Laughter).

25

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Staples is, in a way, the
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prime example, especially since it’s been ventilated in

2

the District Court, where, of course, there were

3

excellent data available.

4

the quality and meaning of the data, but the cash

5

register data were, I thought, compelling and showed the

6

effect of whether Staples was facing two or one other

7

similar office supermarkets.

8
9

The parties could argue over

Now, when this kind of data are available, it
seems to me quite clear that one ought to avoid the more

10

laborious methods of defining a market and try to do so

11

in this rather more analytical data intensive way when

12

it’s possible.

13

and even when you have data, you’re going to be drawn

14

into using econometric models, and that’s where the

15

difficulties really start to ensue.

16

To the extent that there are limitations,

I don’t know if Greg came back after the break.

17

He did.

But Greg Werden and Luke Froeb and David

18

Schefman had an excellent piece called a Daubert

19

Discipline for Merger Simulation in one of the antitrust

20

journals recently and I’m just going to quote a few

21

sentences.

22

when I read them.

They’re not connected on the page as they are

23

“The basic economic theory underlying

24

unilateral effects from horizontal mergers is deceptively

25

simple, but behind this simple story is a complex game
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theoretic model replete with assumptions about how

2

consumers, retailers and manufacturers behave and

3

especially about how competing manufacturers interact

4

with each other and with retailers.

5

particular model, it is possible to make quantitative

6

predictions of the price effects of branded product

7

mergers.

8

these predictions, yet there is scarce empirical evidence

9

on their accuracy in predicting actual price effects of

10
11

By specifying a

It is important to assess the reliability of

mergers.”
Now, what the authors have done is approached

12

this all through the lens of Daubert and what constitutes

13

admissible expert testimony, which I think is a very

14

sensible perspective, one of several that one should take

15

in thinking about guidelines along these lines.

16

important point that they make is, “Any model used to

17

predict the effects of a merger must fit the facts of the

18

industry in the sense that the model explains past market

19

outcomes reasonably well.”

20

Now, of course that’s all going to be subject

21

to adversarial testing.

22

that that criterion be met.

23

And the

So, it’s all the more important

There are at least two cases in which courts

24

have essentially rejected expert opinion based on the

25

kinds of models that we’re talking about here, both in
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the Eighth Circuit.

2

should not have been admitted because it did not

3

incorporate all aspects of the economic reality of the

4

sterndrive engine market and because it did not separate

5

lawful from unlawful conduct.”

6

In Concord, “The expert opinion

And from California Northern in the American

7

Booksellers case, “The expert’s model contains entirely

8

too many assumptions and simplifications that are not

9

supported by real world evidence.”

10

I think these are fair indications of the

11

threshold that Daubert sets for this kind of evidence in

12

court.

13

Now, something that may be less obvious is, it

14

seems to me, that there’s some utility to be derived.

I

15

have not done this, I leave it to the agencies’ concern.

16

But I think there’s some utility to be derived from

17

looking at the experience of the courts, and I’m familiar

18

with some of the cases in the D.C. Circuit, in accepting

19

and rejecting conclusions based on models other than in

20

antitrust cases, sometimes other than economic models.

21

lot of these come up, both economic and other models, in

22

environmental cases.

23

attacking the results by attacking the model on the

24

ground that some allegedly important phenomenon was not

25

factored in.

And you see arguments about
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There are a number of cases in which

2

proceedings have gone for years through the Environmental

3

Protection Agency, and have been, at the end of the

4

process, thrown out because of this kind of flaw in the

5

model, and other cases in which the tolerance of the

6

courts for the fact that a model is inherently a

7

simplification, inherently is going to disregard certain

8

data as inessential, is also accepted before the courts.

9

So, trying to do a typology of those cases I think would

10

inform one’s judgment on approaching anything to put into

11

the guidelines on direct evidence.

12

Finally, a couple of procedure comments.

As I

13

said, I think these workshops are an excellent way to

14

begin, considering whether to and how to revise the

15

guidelines.

16

those revisions to solicit comment on proposed changes.

17

I’m not sure whether that’s been done in the past in

18

revisions of our guidelines.

19

jurisdictions, most recently perhaps in China, which went

20

through several rounds, both in statutory drafting and

21

then in drafting regulations of soliciting and analyzing

22

public comment.

I think it’s also important before making

It’s been done in other

23

I think I should leave it at that.

24

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

25

Thanks for getting us

off to a great start, Doug, both with respect to
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suggestions about the substantive approach, but how to go

2

about this as well as a matter of process.

3

If I could turn now to Leslie, please.

4

MS. MARX:

I appreciate the opportunity to

5

participate in the panel and thank the organizers, Carl

6

Shapiro and Rich Feinstein, for putting together today’s

7

workshop, and I commend the FTC and DOJ for opening the

8

debate about possible revisions to the horizontal merger

9

guidelines.

10

The questions for public comment that were

11

issued by the FTC and DOJ raise issues related to the

12

unilateral effects portion of the guidelines, and the

13

last panel today is devoted to unilateral effects.

14

Although coordinated effects do not get much

15

play in the request for comment, I believe coordinated

16

effects require and deserve attention.

17

be that coordinated effects are the more significant

18

concern, particularly if coordination involves a

19

suppression of rivalry among a much larger group of firms

20

than simply those involved in a merger.

21

does not make sense for competition authorities to

22

emphasize their success in cartel enforcement, while at

23

the same time ignoring coordinated effects in merger

24

reviews.

25

In fact, it may

It certainly

The FTC lost a case based on coordinated
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effects arguments in Arch Coal in 2004 and, to the best

2

of my knowledge, has not gone to trial with another case

3

based on concerns about coordinated effects since then.

4

The FTC needs to be secure in its ability to

5

take action against mergers where coordinated effects are

6

a concern.

7

gains for a merger due to coordinated effects are going

8

to pursue those mergers to the detriment of consumers and

9

competition.

10

Otherwise, firms that think there would be

Coordinated effects were included in the

11

horizontal merger guidelines because they were believed

12

to be an important issue.

13

be a disparity between the analytical thinking that is

14

expected from a unilateral effects analysis and what goes

15

into the typical coordinated effects analysis.

16

But, overall, there appears to

The guidelines ask for arguments about the

17

likelihood of post-merger coordination.

18

deficiency in the current guidelines.

19

revision to the guidelines approach to coordinated

20

effects that focuses on how merger affects the pay-offs

21

to coordination.

22

standard economic techniques and give us an indirect

23

measure of likelihood given the presumed positive

24

relation between the two.

25

I view this as a

I would propose a

Pay-offs can be quantified using

How can we quantify a merger’s effect on the
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pay-offs to coordination?

2

that I’ve worked on and I have published work with

3

coauthors that supports my comments today.

4

This is a research problem

Merger analysis tends to focus on unilateral

5

effects, so presumably there would be a model of

6

competition allowing the measurement of the unilateral

7

effect of a merger.

8

techniques are used to measure the effect of a merger

9

between two firms in an industry can be extended to

Generally speaking, whatever

10

measure the effects of additional or alternative

11

consolidation involving the other firms in the industry.

12

Thus, we can use standard unilateral effects models to

13

quantify the change in pay-offs to coordination that

14

results from a merger.

15

This type of measurement would give you the

16

pay-off associated with coordination that is sufficiently

17

well organized to be tantamount to a merger.

18

sense, this type of quantification provides an upper

19

bound on the pay-off from coordination.

20

In that

One could argue that it does not provide a

21

quantification of the merger’s effect on the pay-off from

22

say a slight increase in tacit cooperation or something

23

else falling short of perfect explicit collusion.

24

it’s more informative than what’s done now.

25

bound on the merger’s effect when the pay-off from

But

If the upper
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coordination is small, then there’s no need to worry

2

about the merger’s effect on incentives for tacit

3

cooperation.

4

more room for thinking about other contributors.

5

If that bound is large, then there’s a lot

The machinery for this line of analysis is

6

immediately available to any economist who has conducted

7

a unilateral effects study.

8

augment whatever’s currently being done and could be done

9

at relatively low cost because it just extends analyses

10

The analysis would only

already conducted.

11

Let me give a quick simple example.

12

there are four firms in an industry cleverly labeled A,

13

B, C and D, and we can let D be small.

14

proposes to acquire B, but there are concerns about

15

coordinated effects involving C.

16

a bound on the incremental pay-off from coordination

17

prior to the merger by contrasting the pay-offs in the

18

pre-merger market with those predicted by the unilateral

19

effects model applied to a merger of A and C.

20

Suppose

Suppose A

First, we can calculate

Next, we can calculate a bound on the

21

incremental pay-off from the coordination after the

22

merger by using the unilateral effects model for the

23

merger of A and B and contrasting that with the

24

unilateral effects model applied to the merger of A, B

25

and C.

Comparing these two bounds, we have a

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

90
1

quantification of the change in the incremental pay-off

2

from coordination as a result of the merger.

3

The questions for public comment ask about the

4

possible role of evidence of head-to-head competition.

5

This would be pertinent to, for example, the recent JBS-

6

National Beef and CSL-Talecris cases, and any merger

7

involving a so-called maverick firm.

8

guidelines raise the notion of a maverick firm saying

9

coordinated interaction can be effectively prevented or

The current

10

limited by maverick firms, firms that have a greater

11

economic incentive to deviate from the terms of

12

coordination than do most of their rivals.

13

The guidelines seem to view a firm’s status as

14

a maverick as some exogenously given and unchangeable

15

characteristic of a firm.

16

behavior is a strategic decision of a firm, not an

17

exogenous characteristic.

18

if a maverick’s behavior is that of a wild animal.

19

(Laughter).

20

MS. MARX:

But so-called maverick

The guidelines are written as

Rather than the behavior of a

21

profit-maximizing firm in the marketplace.

22

remember that maverick-like behavior might be a strategic

23

decision by a firm designed to improve its position in a

24

post-merger cartel.

25

We must

By using the approach of extending a unilateral
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effects analysis, no additional data or information is

2

required, assuming the unilateral effects analysis has

3

the flexibility to be extended to other potential

4

mergers.

5

something special about the model used for unilateral

6

effects that means it can only be used to examine a

7

merger between the two firms being considered and cannot

8

be extended to consider other potential mergers.

9

We would expect this to be true unless there’s

Furthermore, the approach I discussed can

10

incorporate an array of different aspects of a merger and

11

post-merger coordination.

12

quantification of pay-offs associated with the inclusion

13

or exclusion of various firms in the post-merger cartel,

14

allowing the identification of the profit maximizing

15

cartel membership, which would be of most concern to the

16

agencies.

17

For example, it allows the

It allows the quantification of the pay-offs

18

associated with deviations for inclusive behavior,

19

providing information about the stability of various

20

post-merger cartels.

21

efficiency gains that would be required to offset the

22

potential loss in consumer surplus from coordinated

23

effects.

24

required divestitures might mitigate a merger’s effect on

25

the pay-offs from coordination.

It allows the calculation of the

And it allows the quantification of how
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I’m not alone in advocating for more rigorous

2

coordinated effects analysis.

3

in a 2003 law review article, argues in favor of more

4

rigor.

5

coordination in an industry, and it’s not clear what

6

analytic tool one would bring to bear in this case.

7

For example, Andrew Dick,

But his focus is on the constraints that prevent

I propose a different guiding question.

8

Instead, I would ask, how does the merger change firms’

9

incentives to overcome whatever constraints on

10

coordination might exist, including how the merger

11

changes incentives for an apparent maverick to behave as

12

a maverick?

13

In recent articles by Davis, and Sabatini, and

14

Davis and Hughes, authors have proposed quantifications

15

using a particular model of tacit collusion.

16

another approach that also provides valuable information.

17

It’s a different approach in that it produces an estimate

18

of the pay-offs associated with a particular type of

19

cooperation where one might argue about whether or not it

20

is feasible or likely for that type of arrangement to be

21

implemented.

22

That’s

Our approach avoids the issue of likelihood

23

completely and focuses on what level of profits are

24

available to the firms should they find a way to overcome

25

whatever obstacles they face in organizing coordinated
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behavior.

2

greater should be our concern that creative minds focused

3

on profit maximization will find a way to achieve those

4

profits.

5

The greater the available pay-offs, the

The opposition to the merger in Arch Coal,

6

based on coordinated effects, may well have been correct,

7

but the arguments presented in that case were not

8

compelling to the courts.

9

authorities and the European Commission have successfully

Yet, since Arch Coal, U.S.

10

pursued many price fixing conspiracies.

11

the agencies remain vigorous enforcers of Section 1 of

12

the Sherman Act, recognizing the ongoing threat to the

13

competitive process from cartels and collusion.

14

important that the agencies be able to map this concern

15

into merger reviews.

16

In other words,

It’s

To conclude, I think it would be valuable to

17

recognize in the guidelines that the discipline of

18

economics has much to say about post-merger pay-offs from

19

coordinated conduct and that thus we have much to say

20

indirectly about likelihood since it is reasonable to

21

believe that likelihood of post-merger coordination

22

increases with the pay-off from such conduct.

23

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

Thank you, Leslie.

In

24

many ways, when we think about the topic of direct proof,

25

it often comes up in the context of unilateral effects
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analysis and your presentation very usefully focuses on

2

the possibilities of thinking about coordinated effects

3

as well and that’s a very valuable part of the session.

4

Rich?

5

MR. PARKER:

I want to thank everyone for

6

inviting me, the organizers, and I’m certainly going to

7

try to say something from my own perspective and

8

experience that I hope will be helpful.

9

I think it is very important that the merger

10

guidelines reflect actual agency investigational

11

practice.

12

turn, has to be calibrated to turn out cases that can be

13

tried successfully because we all know that only a

14

federal judge in the United States can stop a merger from

15

closing and, ultimately, these cases have to be

16

presented.

17

agency practice that makes a winnable case and that the

18

guidelines set forth what that practice is.

19

Actual agency investigational practice, in

And I think what’s important is that there be

My experience in trying cases in Federal

20

District Court, merger cases both for and against the

21

government, is that the district judges are concerned

22

about effects.

23

customers are going to be hurt and they are concerned

24

about the mechanism by which they’re going to be hurt.

25

And the government has to explain that, whether there’s

They are concerned about whether
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going to be coordination or whether it’s going to be some

2

form of a unilateral price increase simply because

3

they’re so big or because they have some close substitute

4

type issue.

5

The government has to explain that.

The best evidence of that is direct evidence.

6

And what I call direct evidence is anything other than a

7

presumption for market shares.

8

course, in my opinion, is a natural experiment.

9

generals always fight the last war.

The best evidence, of
And

So, I mean, in

10

Cardinal Health, which I tried back in 1998 with Mike

11

Antallics and others, we had a couple of instances that

12

showed what happened when the merging parties entered

13

California and we saw prices go down.

14

merging party is going to be out.

15

what’s going to happen when that merger closes.

16

And now that

It’s pretty obvious

Staples is probably the best example where we

17

have evidence of what happens where two stores are across

18

the street from one another and what happens when they’re

19

not.

20

almost all of whom are not antitrusters, as to what’s

21

going to happen.

Pretty obvious, it seems to me to a federal judge,

22

That’s the most important evidence.

I think party documents are extremely

23

important.

Those of us who represent large companies

24

know that they spend a lot of energy with a lot of very

25

bright people trying to figure out what’s going to happen
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when this merger closes before they invest a gazillion

2

dollars of their shareholders’ money in this, and so,

3

those documents can be very instructive.

4

many of them, obviously, are not going to help the

5

government.

6

think those are very important expressions of what is

7

likely, under the standard, to occur after it closes.

8
9

And by the way,

They’re going to help the parties.

But I

There are also other kinds of documents.

Many

of you may remember that I once had a document where a

10

senior executive said that would-be pricing synergies of

11

this merger we should be able to get an immediate 15

12

percent price increase.

13

party, very good for the government, but pretty doggone

14

good evidence as to what is going to happen.

15

that is what is important in trying a case.

16

I think that is very bad for the

And I think

I want to talk about two things and where does

17

the structural presumption fit in and where do all the

18

economics fit in.

19

presumption, I think it’s very important for the

20

government that it have that because it gets you off to a

21

good start.

22

federal judge is going to be moved by the structural

23

presumption alone.

24

whether, in reality, somebody is going to get hurt.

25

defense always has the argument -- and trust me, I’ve

Starting with the structural

But I don’t believe, for one minute, that a

They’re going to want to know
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made it before -- that the government, they’re talking

2

presumptions and they can have every presumption under

3

the sun, but I’ve got the facts.

4

And when trying a case for the government, you

5

ought to say, you know, Your Honor, we do have this

6

presumption.

7

Absolutely.

8

like it’s not there.

9

to happen to these people.

That’s what the Supreme Court says.
But I’ll tell you something, let’s pretend
I’m going to show you what’s going
I’m going to show you why

10

there’s something the matter with this merger and why

11

people, the customers, who we’re supposed to protect, are

12

going to get hurt.

13

So, I think you want the presumption just

14

because it’s in the law and because it’s modestly

15

helpful, but don’t anybody think that it’s all that

16

helpful to the government and that you somehow need it to

17

win a case.

18

impressed with it.

19

I don’t think the judges are all that

The economics.

I respect the economics

20

profession, I respect the scholarship that goes into all

21

these tests.

22

didn’t have PhD on my side say that other side’s test

23

isn’t any good or the data isn’t any good or something

24

and there’s a better test that should have been applied

25

and it comes the other way.

But I’ve never been in a case where I
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Of course that ought to be part of a case, but

2

in my opinion, if I’m the government, the way I want to

3

end my case is I want to say, I have presented direct

4

evidence, I’ve presented natural experiments, I’ve looked

5

at the parties’ documents, I’ve looked at this, that and

6

the other thing, I’ve got customers who say how they

7

benefit from the competition among these parties, and by

8

the way, we’ve done the best economics can do with some

9

tests and they corroborate the direct evidence.

Now,

10

that’s a case that’s going to win.

11

obviously, I’d make the same point.

12

is on my side and this test we’ve run corroborates it.

13

But I think that’s where they fit in.

14

And on the defense,
The direct evidence

All right, this is an exercise in revising the

15

guidelines.

16

I find myself agreeing with a speech that Commissioner

17

Tom Rosch gave a few weeks ago -- I think it was last

18

month -- where he said that market shares and HHIs and

19

whatever and however you revise them should not be set up

20

as a gating issue the way they are in the guidelines now

21

because I don’t think they are, in practice.

22

deals with the agency knows they’re not.

23

says they’re not.

24
25

What are the practical implications of this?

Anybody who

The commentary

They shouldn’t be set up that way.

I would set up and I would start the guidelines
off by saying the fundamental question -- they say it
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fancier than this -- but the fundamental question is

2

whether customers are going to get hurt and we’re looking

3

for evidence about whether or not they’re going to get

4

hurt and here are some examples of the kind of stuff we

5

look for.

6

Next point, markets, yes, we define markets.

7

Yes, we look at concentration.

But please note they’re

8

going to be more important in some cases, that is

9

coordinated cases, than in other cases.

And, so, that

10

would be the way that -- that would be my own practical

11

suggestion as to how to deal with the guidelines.

12

mean, it’s not a huge revision.

13

work was already done in the commentary.

14

I

I think a lot of this

You simply talk about we’re looking first and

15

foremost about direct effects and talk about the kinds of

16

things that -- the kinds of evidence, maybe examples or

17

something, of what you want and then talk about where

18

market concentration comes in.

19

but as basically another form of analysis that I said is

20

going to be more important in some cases or other.

21

Not as a gating issue,

I think if you do that, you would have some

22

output that would be helpful to parties trying to

23

understand what happens down here and, frankly, would be

24

at least helpful to courts in understanding basic

25

antitrust analysis.
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COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

Thank you.

Thank you

2

very much, Rich, for, again, tying together your own

3

experience in the courtroom, but also thinking about how

4

things went when you were bringing the cases yourself and

5

how that might actually affect the recasting of the

6

guidelines themselves.

7

I’d turn to Mark, please.

8

MR. POPOFSKY:

9

Thanks, Commissioner, and thanks

to the organizers and it’s a pleasure to be here.

10

I start from the same position as Brother

11

Parker to the left, that direct evidence covers a broad

12

array of stuff.

13

than the structural presumption in establishing a prima

14

facie case of illegality.

15

really the heart of the merger guidelines.

16

panels later today, we’re going to explore particular

17

facets of it, but this is a great bio-diversity of

18

antitrust here.

19

I mean, it’s essentially anything other

This is a vast topic and it’s
Several

We had Professor Marx talk about a model as

20

part of direct evidence.

We had Judge Ginsburg talk

21

about the sort of evidence in Evanston and Staples/Office

22

Depot as part of direct evidence.

23

Parker here talk about how it’s really everything you’re

24

going to persuade a federal judge with.

25

topic.

We had Litigator

This is a vast
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And what I want to suggest in linking that vast

2

topic to practical revisions to the guidelines and

3

something that’s going to persuade generalist judges,

4

which I think is a very important point here, that the

5

agencies should proceed with some caution.

6

With that said, let’s talk about how direct

7

evidence can be relevant to merger analysis generally,

8

and I approach this in part as a litigator and counselor,

9

in part as a poor part-time academic.

10
11

But, nonetheless,

this is how I’m approaching it.
It’s uncontroversial, direct evidence, putting

12

aside market definition and the structural presumption

13

can make a case for a merger being illegal.

14

Court has said that market share and market definition

15

are mere surrogates for anti-competitive effects for

16

Section 1, a little weaker proposition along those lines

17

for Section 2.

18

Posner tell us that the tests substantively under Section

19

1 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 have converged.

20

being the case, why can’t direct evidence, one asks,

21

create a presumption itself of illegality in certain

22

circumstances in place potentially of an analysis of

23

market share and concentration.

24

starting point.

25

The Supreme

We’ve had no other authority than Judge

That

That’s sort of a

And then one thinks about the different types

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

102
1

of settings where that could arise.

2

analogy for that, I believe, is a case like Evanston

3

where you have a consummated merger and there’s where the

4

analogy to what the Supreme Court said in Indiana

5

Federation of Dentists about market share and market

6

power being mere proxies is more powerful.

7

conduct.

8

effects.

9

The most obvious

You have

You’re trying to look at its actual past

What would be the more logical thing to ask

10

than what the merger did?

11

persuasive case of showing what it did.

12

question of proof.

13

play that out in a court.

14

econometric analysis isolating all the variables except

15

the change in number of players.

16

least, a consummated merger is where the idea of using

17

direct evidence in lieu of the structural presumption is

18

most powerful.

19

Assuming you can create a
An important

Parker has talked about how you might
It wouldn’t just be some fancy

But intuitively, at

And then the question is, how you deal with the

20

diversity of evidence.

Trickier.

And I think this is

21

the real key question for revising the merger guidelines,

22

is what one does in the case of unconsummated mergers.

23

And here’s the $64,000 question I submit, it’s not where

24

direct evidence can be relevant, but where it tentatively

25

can be dispositive.
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You can think about how day-to-day direct

2

evidence is used by the agencies in analyzing mergers.

3

One way that certainly fits within the more general

4

inherited legal landscape we have in Section 7 is

5

exculpatory direct evidence.

6

In a unilateral case, the parties are not close

7

competitors.

There’s been a history of entry.

In a

8

coordinated case, the nature of the products, marketing,

9

pricing, et cetera, is such that coordination is just

10

implausible.

11

perspective of trying to decide which mergers one is

12

going to take into a second request or even to court,

13

exculpatory direct evidence is clearly important and

14

something that the merger guidelines should, I think,

15

discuss how it is being used.

16

You can see how from a law enforcement

The question of what granular level to do it,

17

given the diversity, is a question I’ll leave for the

18

discussion.

19

So, that’s the exculpatory side.

I think the hardest question at all -- and I’ll

20

be brief so we can get to Professor Willig and leave

21

plenty of time for discussions -- is when direct evidence

22

can be inculpatory, and not just that, can itself

23

substitute for the structural presumption and basically

24

create a prima facie case of illegality by itself.

25

Of course, there have been noted efforts to
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suggest frameworks for doing that.

2

Director of the Bureau of Economics at the FTC and the

3

current and one-time again Deputy Assistant Attorney

4

General for Economics have proposed such a test.

5

want to suggest here is that one should proceed with

6

caution in suggesting and revising the guidelines, that

7

direct evidence, by itself, can carry today in the sort

8

of simple level that I think Judge Ginsburg laudably says

9

we would like to have in litigation.

10

Of course, the

What I

The reason for that is that it’s not clear to

11

me at all that the simple test of direct evidence is

12

inculpatory or going to tell enough of the story to be

13

persuasive to the courts.

14

legal landscape that says we want to look at what the

15

definition of the market is, not just because the Supreme

16

Court in Philadelphia National Bank told us it’s useful,

17

but there’s an intuition behind that.

18

more about that -- more than just the relationship

19

between these particular parties.

20

likely to happen with repositioning.

21

intuitive sense for how much price might rise to the

22

extent you’re saying look at just these insiders.

23

want to look at a lot of things.

24
25

The courts have inherited a

We want to know

We want to know what’s
We want to have an

And I think if you say there’s a simple
category of direct evidence that’s going to be a
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humdinger, that’s enough to establish illegality, whether

2

it’s the price increase in Staples, which I think,

3

interestingly enough, was cleverly used by the government

4

to establish the relevant market, or some of the tests

5

for unilateral effects that are going to be proposed,

6

you’re risking three dangerous things.

7

One is you’re going to risk having a method for

8

how the agencies operate that’s out of step potentially

9

with what generalist judges will accept.

And I know that

10

was a subject of earlier panels today.

11

be a subject of later panels.

12

of an intra-agency analysis that is not going to be

13

persuasive to the courts.

14

to get there, but, of course, those decisions that get

15

written are influential.

16

which the parties act and the agency acts in the merger

17

review process.

18

I’m sure it will

I think there’s a danger

It may be a few transactions

It creates the incentives by

It’s important.

The second, if these tests for direct evidence

19

are relatively weak, it’s enough to have evidence like

20

Staples/Office Depot, it’s enough to have diversion ratio

21

times margins, that’s enough, rebut it.

22

going to be potentially risking some false positives that

23

might outweigh false negatives.

24

a possibility.

25

I think you’re

I suggest that might be

And if you believe that in that you’re
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basically saying, okay, we can split the burden, the

2

parties now have to rebut something.

3

this simple test forward, I suggest that it might not be

4

good not just for merger enforcement but for the role

5

merger enforcement plays in the economy.

6

Now that we’ve put

Finally, and this links back to the diversity

7

point, tests for establishing a prima facie case with

8

direct evidence we might want to be simple, but the

9

rebuttal is going to be diverse, the point I started

10

with, and complex.

11

So, I think the challenge in revising the

12

guidelines is to mediate between those positions.

Add

13

clarity potentially to the factors to go into this great

14

space of what do you do beyond a structural presumption,

15

but recognize that a simple answer may not always be

16

there.

17

that antitrust divorced from economic principles were the

18

last sound moorings, we should also remember that

19

antitrust is part of the legal system where parties must

20

be able to predict their conduct and we must have

21

transparency and a rule of law as well.

And although the Supreme Court in Sylvania said

22

Thanks.

23

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

Thanks, Mark.

You and

24

Rich, again, drawing on your experience from both sides

25

of the enforcement process have done a nice job here, I
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think, of laying out the menu of possibilities, different

2

types of proof that can be brought to bear and we can

3

come back on that in a moment.

4

Bobby, please.

5

MR. WILLIG:

Thank you.

You know, direct proof

6

of competitive effects sounds so powerful.

7

like such a marvel.

8

nasty work that we always do under the guidelines or any

9

other analytic frame.

10

It sounds

What a great thing to skip all this

It’s my bottom line view that direct evidence

11

is almost never a magic bullet that obviates the need to

12

do a real competitive effects analysis.

13

is not, and I’ve hardly ever seen it be, a bypass of

14

competitive effects analysis, but it can be a terrific

15

and powerful source of data for a competitive effects

16

analysis.

17

Direct evidence

I’m hedging my language here because Rich is on

18

the panel.

I say almost never -- almost never due to the

19

occasional board document that Rich will have uncovered

20

in his old role, which asserts to the board that the

21

merger will enable prices to rise almost surely and

22

significantly due to the taming of our most powerful

23

competitor.

24

and maybe that means, with a smoking gun in hand, there’s

25

no need to do anything else.

And I know some of us seek those documents

I’m not one to say that
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that’s not right or not occasionally the truth of the

2

case.

3

But, more usually, there is no magic bullet.
Jim, you’ll recall 20 years ago we were sitting

4

in the front office looking at the evidence, talking

5

about direct evidence.

6

directly bidding against each other for the business of

7

their many customers.

8

other.

9

elements of direct evidence that maybe should be

The merging parties were clearly

Directly bidding against each

It’s one of the examples on the set-up list of

10

incorporated in the new guidelines.

11

showed them directly bidding.

12

The direct evidence

But still more direct evidence that you

13

instructed the staff to look for indicated that the

14

customers chose two or three rivals to go head-to-head

15

and bid directly against each other out of the five

16

players in the marketplace and the customers did not

17

really care very much which two or three they drew out of

18

the five in the marketplace.

19

through a merger, there would be no diminution of

20

competition.

21

So, if the five became four

Direct evidence first said, oh, my god, they’re

22

bidding against each other, stop all analysis.

23

the guidance of Mr. Rill -- I hope I’m not

24

mischaracterizing, too, my memory is rosy -- of course,

25

you get more direct evidence from a search in competitive
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analysis showing that that first direct evidence would

2

have been misleading if it had been viewed as a magic

3

bullet.

4

On the other hand, I’ve seen firms making

5

commodities that were very close substitutes to each

6

other and they never bid against each other.

7

looked and looked and there’s no evidence of them bidding

8

against each other.

9

exculpatory.

We’ve

And you say, oh, magic bullet,

I think if we’re going to change the

10

guidelines, we’ve got to keep that language out.

11

does exculpatory mean?

12
13
14
15
16

MR. POPOFSKY:

What

You had to look it up, Bobby,

you told me.
MR. WILLIG:

I did and I sort of remember, but

I didn’t see inculpatory in the other hand.
So, maybe that’s exculpatory or something, but

17

a deeper analysis, a more complete analysis showed that

18

when one of those two firms that never bid against the

19

other had an output cutback, it raised prices in the

20

industry for everybody, including the other proposed

21

merging party.

22

against each other.

23

the market.

24

analysis, full of pitfalls for the foolish looking for

25

magic bullets, I would say.

It’s not necessarily about bidding
Sometimes it’s about total output in

Direct evidence without a competitive
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How about a proposed merger of retail category

2

superstores, not Office Depot/Staples, but some others

3

that I’ve encountered in my life as a consultant and an

4

analyst and a simple data analysis showed, absolutely,

5

prices are higher in areas where there are fewer of the

6

outlets of the big three chains in this marketplace.

7

higher prices correlated with fewer players among these

8

big superstore chains.

9

So,

Is this a natural experiment which we all

10

crave?

11

that would shrink the three down to two in some areas or

12

the two down to one?

13

yes, but only a fool would reach that conclusion without

14

a deeper competitive analysis.

15

particular instance and we found that the company’s own

16

guidelines for where to enter local markets keyed on

17

certain market factors, the desirability of the local

18

market.

19

they weren’t going in and, likewise, their rivals weren’t

20

much either.

21

Does this prove competitive effects from a merger

Well, maybe in some circumstances,

We ran those data in this

If the market stank from their point of view,

And those same competitive factors that made

22

entry stink also raised the cost of doing business on

23

average and intended to raise prices.

24

correlation between concentration and price which “direct

25

evidence,” the marvelous natural experiments that we all

So, a spurious
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crave would have misled us into finding.

2
3

Of course, in Office Depot/Staples, the

4

evidence turned out to be right of that kind, not

5

econometrically, but because the smoking gun documents

6

showed that.

7

Right, Rich?

So, I think it was that that ultimately

8

persuaded the court.

The company said, yeah, we charge

9

higher prices when there’s no competition around.

10

wasn’t the econometric standoff that led to the

11

conclusion.

12

MR. PARKER:

13

have won any case in the world.

14

MR. WILLIG:

It

I don’t think the econometrics

Well, how about prosecutorial

15

decision-making?

So, sometimes that direct evidence is

16

actually indicative and sometimes it’s not.

17

I’ve looked at a situation where the

18

transaction cost had risen for futures contracts on LIBOR

19

interest rates.

20

kinds of interest rates, whatever they are, I’ll tell you

21

later.

22

fell off.

23

hourly, minute-by-minute.

24

that in the data.

25

to see a corresponding volume rise on futures contracts

These are futures contracts on those

And when the transaction cost went up, volume
Sure enough, the data are collected daily,
It’s easy to see tracks like

But at the same time, when one looked
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at another exchange, based on treasury bond interest

2

rates, there was no corresponding rise in volume there,

3

as volume fell off on the contracts on LIBOR interest

4

rate scored futures contracts.

5

substitution in the data.

6

Evidently, no

Well, I think I’m with you about this

7

exculpatory stuff because sometimes the absence of a

8

finding of substitution actually requires less analysis

9

than the opposite finding where there could be all kinds

10

of confusing factors.

11

conclusion, and ultimately the merger went through, that

12

at least in this particular area of possible market

13

definition, there was no relevant market that included

14

both of those futures contracts and, therefore, no

15

competitive concerns.

16

And, so, we reached the

MR. POPOFSKY:

17

perfectly, Professor.

18

MR. WILLIG:

See, you used exculpatory

I’m getting there.

19

being educated by you, Mark.

20

should be friends.

21

(Laughter).

22

MR. WILLIG:

It’s so good

Lawyers and economists

I’ve seen natural experiments

23

showing impact of market ups and downs on the demand side

24

leading the episodes of entry and exit.

25

providing all kinds of fruitful evidence about the

Definitely
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character and height of entry barriers, exit barriers,

2

the timing of entry, how long would it take for entry or

3

exit to react to changes in the market.

4

connection between entry and exit from evidence like

5

that, to the real issue of whether entry should alleviate

6

competitive concerns over a merger in that same space, as

7

we all know, would require deep competitive analysis.

8
9

But the

The natural experiment is the beginning of the
evidence, it’s not the end.

It actually doesn’t provide

10

the answer, but it provides enormously valuable evidence

11

for an ordinary competitive effects analysis.

12

So, with all of these examples, and there’s

13

tons more that will be coming to your minds, I’m sure, I

14

come back to my conclusion.

15

competitive analysis, it should be part of it, but it

16

can’t supplant it.

17

of central data and input into a true competitive

18

analysis of mergers.

That direct evidence can aid

Direct evidence is often a provider

19

So, those of you who are rewriting the

20

guidelines, please have the guidelines say this.

21

nothing like some good direct evidence to help inform a

22

proper competitive analysis.

23

goes along with the guidelines can have endless examples

24

of the kind that I was just recalling for the sake of

25

this presentation.

There’s

And the commentary that

Sometimes the examples say, yes,
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direct evidence can be quite persuasive, and a lot of

2

examples say, caution, caution, you’ve got to go on and

3

ask further questions before you regard that direct

4

evidence as a magic bullet.

5

In other words, showing both the power of

6

direct evidence and the need for caution in interpreting

7

it should be part of, if not the guidelines, the

8

commentary, and that will bring the state of the art of

9

any such analysis along in a beneficial way.

10

you can do that with part of this revision.

11

bullet, no.

12

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

And I think
But magic

Thanks, Bobby.

And your

13

comments draw attention back, as all of you have, to what

14

specific kinds of approaches might be built into the

15

guidelines.

16

have addressed and pose a question based on that.

17

I’d like to take one theme that all of you

In thinking of casting the guidelines, do you

18

think it is either wise or necessary to have at least

19

some attempt in the presentation of the case, to sketch

20

out what the boundaries, using a traditional approach of

21

a relevant market would be?

22

can you imagine the time would come, or should come, when

23

you would see a complaint that would not include the

24

words “relevant market” or “market share” at all?

25

MR. PARKER:

To think of it another way,

I can see a time when that is part
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of a complaint, that is a theory in a complaint.

But

2

somewhere you’ve got to have -- maybe in a different

3

count -- you got to have a market because that’s what’s

4

called for under the case law.

5

Sherman Act, and I think this is an antitrust crowd, the

6

Republic Tobacco Case and Indiana Federation of Dentists

7

have started to talk about pulling away from actual

8

market analysis in the Sherman Act cases.

9

to me, in some cases, nudging the courts in that

Note that under the

And, it seems

10

direction is not a bad idea and I think there’s a lot to

11

it.

But you got to nudge them.

12

Right now, you can’t go into Federal Court or

13

Part 3, in my opinion, without defining the relevant

14

market.

15

think I talked about previously.

16

MR. WILLIG:

How important that becomes in the litigation, I

I would like to see relevant

17

market remain a critical part of the court case, I

18

suppose.

19

discipline exercised by the agencies in making

20

enforcement decisions.

21

But, to me, even more importantly, of the

However, I would also like the agencies to

22

articulate publicly the current practice, which is to

23

make inferences about relevant market and delineations of

24

relevant market based on the best available evidence, and

25

that evidence may arise from the kinds of analyses that
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we’ve been talking about or so-called direct evidence or

2

more inferentially from consumer interviews or from

3

marketing studies, whatever is the best evidence.

4

assortment of lines of evidence, obviously, is

5

complementary, one part to the next.

6

discipline should be part of the agency’s review process

7

to articulate at the end of the day what is the inferred

8

but chosen definition of the relevant market.

9

MR. PARKER:

An

But still the

Can I just make one point?

10

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

11

MR. PARKER:

Sure.

Somebody ought to go back and look

12

at the complaint that the agency filed -- and I wish

13

Molly Boast was still here because she was handling it --

14

in the BP/Amoco/Arco deal where we were saying that there

15

was a problem in Alaska, and I think we had two theories

16

there.

17

involving sales to California refineries.

18

think we had a count based simply on direct evidence that

19

one of the parties was already exercising monopoly power

20

there and that the party they were buying was the only

21

potential anecdote.

22

in that complaint because that’s the theory we were going

23

to proceed on.

One, there was a price discrimination market

24
25

But I also

I think that may actually have been

It was never tried because the transaction was
abandoned.

But somebody ought to look at that in the
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course of this because it goes directly to your point,

2

Bill.

3

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

4

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Doug?

It may be hard to imagine the

5

complaint that doesn’t have it, but one can more readily

6

perhaps imagine the proceeding that doesn’t get to it.

7

I think, Bill, Jim Rill will know, 35, 40 years

8

ago, didn’t William Schwartzer write an article on the

9

efficiency sequencing of questions in trying an antitrust

10

case?

11

what he said is so much the practice in terms of motions

12

to dismiss and summary judgment starting with basically

13

the least evidence intensive questions, although he

14

didn’t put it quite that way.

15

I think people aren’t familiar with it now because

So, I can imagine it being in the complaint,

16

but I can readily imagine cases in which that’s just not

17

necessary to litigate it to death.

18

UNIDENTIFIED MALE:

That’s a good point.

19

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

One debate that comes up

20

in the discussions about direct proof is that some have

21

said that it’s a juris prudential prerequisite coming out

22

of the language of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the

23

discussion of effects in a line of commerce, that it’s

24

indispensable.

25

ultimately might be willing to import the approach that’s

Others have said that the courts
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been developed in Section 1 and Section 2 cases that

2

suggest that certain types of direct proof of effects by

3

itself might be sufficient.

4

But I gather, in part, that what -- at least a

5

comment that’s been mentioned a couple of times here is

6

that at least by way of providing a familiar frame of

7

reference for an approach to beginning to think about

8

actual likely effects, that some discussion of a relevant

9

market is a useful internal analytical discipline and a

10

good element of guidance and a good element of the

11

presentation of the case in court.

12

MR. POPOFSKY:

13
14
15
16
17

Yes, I would agree with that

entirely.
JUDGE GINSBURG:

Would you say that equally

with respect to the geographic market?
COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:
question to pose in that --

18

JUDGE GINSBURG:

19

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

20

JUDGE GINSBURG:

21

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

22

MR. PARKER:

23

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

24

MR. PARKER:

25

I suppose that’s a fair

I think it’s a test of -Yes, yes.

You would?
Yes.

I agree with that.
Yes?

But what I was saying was that

that ought to be in the guidelines, that discipline to go
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through.

I think you can simply say it’s not a gating

2

issue.

3

important in some cases than in others, the market

4

analysis.

You can simply say that it is probably more

5

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

One basic question is,

6

again, to think of who the audience for the guidelines is

7

and what their purpose is.

8

the internal decision-making calculus of the agency and

9

its approach?

Is it principally to reveal

And by making that evident, to enable

10

parties to come forward with arguments that will assist

11

in the assessment of the case?

12

their own terms to guide the courts towards the

13

acceptance of certain analytical techniques and

14

methodologies?

15

Are they designed on

Is there ultimately expected to be what the

16

agencies will do inside the house and what they do in the

17

courtroom and that the guidelines might make clear that

18

there are certain things we are explaining to you for the

19

purpose of saying, here are analytical approaches we will

20

use on the inside, but we won’t necessarily try cases

21

this way?

22

another approach.

23

econometric analysis inside because we have the capacity

24

to do it, we have experience doing it and we welcome

25

that.

We’ll use another vocabulary, we’ll use
We will welcome the more detailed

But when it comes time to try the case, maybe in
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2

the way that Rich was just saying, we won’t do that.
There’s the famous interview that Judge Hogan

3

gave after the Staples case in which he was asked in Ken

4

Auletta’s book on Microsoft, how much did the

5

econometrics matter to you, and he said, not at all; that

6

is, I relied on the documentary evidence.

7

audience for this document?

8

taking -- is it to take two approaches, one to say for

9

parties who come before us, this is evidence we’ll use to

Who is the

And is the document really

10

decide to prosecute, but when we go to actually proceed

11

to bring a case and lay it out, we won’t necessarily use

12

the same techniques or methodologies that led us to

13

decide to go ahead.

14

MS. MARX:

I mean, I view the guidelines as

15

giving some structure for how the agencies are going to

16

go about figuring out whether a particular -- a

17

quantification of whether a particular merger is going to

18

increase or decrease consumer surplus and whether it will

19

affect the nature of competition.

20

to say about quantifying whether a merger might increase

21

or decrease consumer surplus, but essentially nothing to

22

say about proper legal strategy.

23

Economists have a lot

So, I could imagine a guidelines that were

24

geared toward analysis that’s going to guide you toward

25

the correct policy decision and might be quite divorced
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from what you would expect the agencies to go forward

2

with as their legal strategy.

3

MR. PARKER:

Can I say one point about the

4

audience here?

I don’t overlook the client.

You got

5

somebody who wants to do a billion dollar transaction and

6

cannot understand why he or she has to wait all this time

7

in Washington.

8

mean, I always tell them, I say, look, we may disagree

9

with how the agency comes out, but I always say, these

As counsel, it is really helpful to -- I

10

are good people who know what they’re doing.

11

example, take home the merger guidelines and you will see

12

exactly what they’re going to look at and you will see

13

that it makes sense.

14

For

So, I think that a document that lays out what

15

you’re going to do in terms and that holds together and

16

is coherent actually is very good for the agency’s role

17

in the broader economy and, most certainly, helps outside

18

counsel who are trying to explain why it is they can’t

19

close their deal for ten months and they may have to go

20

to court to do it or whatever.

21

I just think the business community -- you

22

know, it’s important to communicate that you folks know

23

what you’re doing.

24

it’s important to communicate that.

25

guidelines are one way to do that, in my opinion.

You do know what you’re doing, but
I think the merger
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2

MR. POPOFSKY:

Let me pile onto that for just a

second.

3

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

4

MR. POPOFSKY:

Mark and then Bobby.

Because I could not disagree

5

more strongly with Professor Marx here.

You know, I

6

don’t think anyone said it better than Judge Breyer in

7

Barry Wright and again in his Leegin dissent.

8

is not a mere applied economic exercise.

9

of law enforcement.

Antitrust

It is a system

It is something that very much, as

10

Rich said, affects businesses in the real world.

And the

11

weaker the link between the methodology the guidelines

12

lay out and the principles that are applied in court and

13

the principles by which primary actors, you know, are

14

guided in their conduct, I think the more disastrous it

15

is.

The link should be tight and it should be strong.

16

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

17

MR. WILLIG:

18

MS. MARX:

Bobby?

Defend yourself, Leslie.

No, my point is that the type of

19

procedures that you would expect an agency to go at in

20

evaluating the effects of a merger are not necessarily in

21

the order or of the presentation you would want to make

22

in a legal case.

23

MR. POPOFSKY:

I’m making even a deeper point,

24

I guess than that.

I don’t think that what the agency

25

should do should be a mere applied economic exercise to
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calculate consumer surplus.

2

said, it’s a competitive effects analysis.

3

Baker once wonderfully wrote, when a piano drops on a

4

sidewalk and hits someone, you don’t ask was there

5

negligence, you ask who was negligent.

6

going through everything we do as a disciplining matter,

7

you know, market definition, calculating shares, all the

8

things the guidelines lay out as a way of thinking about

9

is wonderful for that because it structures the analysis

10

I think, as Professor Willig
As Jonathon

You know, in

of deciding who dropped the piano.

11

But I think when you get farther away from that

12

and say, you know, let’s engage in some mathematical

13

modeling exercise of how the piano got dropped, I think

14

there’s a danger in many respects.

15

come from on this.

16

MR. WILLIG:

It’s just where I

Okay, let’s imagine a common sort

17

of thing, assume a can opener.

18

whose leadership is really integrated and works well as a

19

team, and I think this is sometimes a reasonable

20

approximation of reality, not always to be sure.

21

agency --

22
23
24
25

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

Let’s imagine an agency

So, the

It’s been known to

happen.
MR. WILLIG:

So, the agency decides to bring a

case against the merger and suppose that the econometric
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analysis, call it that or call it the piano tuning if you

2

like, but the deeper analysis, call it econometrics, was

3

actually necessary for the agency to make up its

4

collective mind.

5

the lawyers say, oh, that’s crap, and the economists say,

6

you’re full of crap, not that sort of agency, but where

7

the parties -- the leadership actually listen to one

8

another.

9

Now, I’m not in an environment where

Judge, you mentioned the airlines case, the

10

alliance situation.

11

there’s obviously competing considerations and maybe we

12

actually do need to look at the data to find out whether

13

the efficiencies or the anti-competitive effects are

14

stronger.

15

saw weren’t really the right ones.

16

that are different.

Maybe.

That may be a situation where

And maybe those econometrics that you

17

(Laughter).

18

MR. WILLIG:

I’ll send you some

So, the agency decides to bring

19

the case.

The econometrics were crucial to the agency’s

20

decision.

That won’t always be the case.

21

just amuses the economists.

22

to a search for evidence that will be persuasive to

23

everybody, covering the same ground, but is not

24

econometric.

25

Office Depot, I don’t know.

Sometimes it

Sometimes it tends to lead

And maybe that was the case in Staples/
But imagine the econometrics
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were really salient to the agency.

2

really saying that when you go to court, you shouldn’t

3

use those econometrics because you’re going to run into a

4

well informed other side that will rebut all of your

5

evidence, and the same way that the agency wasn’t

6

persuaded, why should the court be persuaded unless the

7

trump card of the econometrics is played in an

8

understandable way in court?

9

MR. POPOFSKY:

Now, are you all

I just don’t get it.

Well, I certainly wasn’t

10

advancing that proposition.

11

than Brother Parker.

12

with, it’s a piece of the whole analysis.

It’s confirmatory, it’s consistent

13

MR. WILLIG:

14

MR. POPOFSKY:

15

MR. WILLIG:

16

MR. POPOFSKY:

17

You’re saying it’s not needed.

But what if it is needed?

You were posing a hypothetical

where for a decision to be made, it was needed.
MR. WILLIG:

19

MR. POPOFSKY:

Yes, exactly.

That’s the catch.

You know, and that is how the

decision maker was acting.

21
22

I’m not -- it may not be needed.

Okay.

18

20

I can’t say it any better

MR. WILLIG:

So, what do you do with that case,

sir?

23

MR. POPOFSKY:

What you do with that case is

24

it’s important and it’s a tipping factor, sure.

25

don’t --
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MR. WILLIG:

Then do you show it in court?

2

MR. POPOFSKY:

I don’t think you would bring a

3

merger case without my Bobby Willig by my side, putting

4

up my calculations, my data, my equations.

5

negligent to my client.

6

MR. WILLIG:

I would be

And we’ll beat the pants off the

7

other side, believe me.

8

MR. POPOFSKY:

9

MR. WILLIG:

Okay.

10

MR. PARKER:

This is getting good, guys.

11

MR. WILLIG:

As long as we have it on the

12

record, we’re fine.

13
14

We would.

MR. POPOFSKY:

What I object to is the notion

that merger analysis is a quest for econometric truth.

15

MR. WILLIG:

Yes.

16

MR. POPOFSKY:

17

MR. WILLIG:

18

MS. MARX:

That is what I was objecting to.

That’s true.

Certainly, my proposition is that

19

it is a quest for the truth, and if the truth comes to us

20

in a board memo, that’s one thing.

21

to -- the whole nature of what we’re worried about here

22

are competitive effects in mergers.

23

That’s how the market is going to be affected by the

24

merger.

25

think the economic evidence ought to be primary in these

But I think we need

That’s economics.

We need to be looking at economic evidence.
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cases.

2

Maybe once in the presentation of the legal

3

case, maybe it’s easier for your audience to understand a

4

board memo, but I think the fundamental quest of the

5

agencies should be the economic truth.

6

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

7

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Doug?

Well, I just want to point out

8

that this whole discussion takes place in the context for

9

which we’ve convened, of thinking about merger cases.

10

So, there’s no occasion in any imaginable merger case for

11

worrying about direct evidence as an economizing device,

12

all right?

13

So, it’s not like a Polygram situation.
The government’s going to bring this case

14

that’s going to use whatever resources it has.

15

worth challenging, it’s worth defending.

16

something where economizing on the proceedings is an

17

important value.

18

evidence may well spill over into private non-merger

19

cases.

20

background as revision goes forward.

21

It’s

It’s not

However, the handling of direct

So, it’s a concern that ought to be in the

There have been two articles in the last year,

22

one by Professor Stuckey’s that’s been published,

23

questioning or arguing that merger law in the United

24

States does not meet rule of law standards because of

25

problems of predictability and transparency.
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more recent manuscript, I think on SSRN that has not yet

2

been published, very recent, taking a similar view of the

3

law of the European Commission on mergers.

4

I think that is an important concern.

If that

5

becomes a widespread perspective, I think it’s very

6

deleterious to the agencies and, to a lesser degree, the

7

world of law itself.

8
9

So, I think the answer to the question I think
you posed at one point, Bill, about whether the

10

guidelines should reflect whatever they can about the

11

agencies’ internal process has to be yes, even if it

12

doesn’t always carry over into the presentation of

13

evidence.

14

MR. PARKER:

There’s a sense of which -- I

15

mean, that is extremely important.

16

folks.

17

spending most of my time right now trying to figure out

18

whether prices were fixed at a meeting that occurred

19

three years ago in a certain place at a time.

20

a merger case, you’re not doing that.

21

figure out what’s going to happen in the future.

22

Just think about it,

I mean, I don’t do just mergers.

I mean, I’m

You’re in

You’re trying to

So, I can’t think of any other kind of case

23

that I’ve ever been involved in, maybe there is somewhere

24

in the law where you’re trying to predict the future and

25

nobody really knows.

What I’m suggesting -- I’m not
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suggesting you just look at board memos or anything else.

2

I’m suggesting that things from the past like that,

3

natural experience, other kinds of things, are really

4

going to be the most persuasive.

5

the agency goes to court without doing the econometrics

6

or doing the best it possibly can given the current

7

economic capabilities of the day.

8

MR. POPOFSKY:

9

that.

That does not mean that

You do both.

Just one further comment on

I think mergers is actually an area where the

10

agencies have a particular responsibility to think about

11

the link between how they are approaching transactions

12

and what the legal principles are.

13

sequencing issues, I know another panel will probably

14

address whether one starts with, as I said, maybe

15

exculpatory evidence or very inculpatory evidence.

16

not talking about sequencing.

17

ultimate analysis.

18

Putting aside the

I’m

I’m talking about the

And the reason for that is the reality that

19

very few cases, of course, get to Judge Ginsburg.

It’s

20

rare they go to District Court.

21

to the Court of Appeals.

22

since General Dynamics or Citizens, whichever you want to

23

believe is really a merger case, that they’ve been the

24

Supreme Court.

25

business, how the legal system works and other factors,

It’s even rarer they go

And it’s, of course, not been

It’s an area, given the realities of both
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that the agencies really are acting in a law enforcement

2

role where, in some sense, they’re both judge and jury,

3

and I think that creates a special responsibility for

4

that type market.

5

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

We’re just about the end

6

of the session and to close up, I wondered if I could go

7

back to the panelists, if you had a thought that you’d

8

like to close with for a minute or so.

9

something maybe that you haven’t drawn on or another

10

point you want to drive home.

11

Bobby and come back this way.

12

MR. WILLIG:

Why don’t we pick

And maybe we’ll start with

Thank you.

One question mark in

13

my mind, and I call it a question mark, but I think I

14

have a leaning, is in view of the plethora of kinds of

15

direct evidence, and I agree with all of us when we make

16

the point that there’s tons of different kinds, when we

17

think about different kinds of analytics that are

18

necessary to handle different kinds of direct evidence to

19

test their salience and their veracity, whether their

20

superficial look is actually sufficient to be taken

21

seriously, should we really put all that stuff in the

22

guidelines?

23

Because, in a way, we’re worried about

24

checklists on the coordinated side.

This will be an

25

infinitely long checklist of different kinds of direct
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evidence and ways to test different kinds of direct

2

evidence.

3

the guidelines, as opposed to having laundry lists like

4

that and examples off in the commentary and keeping just

5

the principles in the guidelines, to which we hope direct

6

evidence may go once that direct evidence is properly

7

tested through the analytics.

8
9
10

What a burden for the reader, for the user of

It’s a question, but I think I know my answer
to it, yeah.
MS. MARX:

One of the other things that was

11

raised in some of the questions for comments is whether

12

the presence of buyers with significant market power

13

should be viewed as something that might deter fears

14

about coordinated effects in a merger.

15

be cautious about putting something like that into the

16

merger guidelines because there are a number of examples

17

like in vitamin C where Coca Cola was an important buyer

18

of vitamin C and the cartel, although that made them pay

19

attention, they had to have special meetings to deal with

20

Coca Cola, the presence of the buyer -- the significant

21

buyer there did not deter the cartel.

22

I would want to

In food flavor enhancers, -- that’s a cartel

23

where there were four cartel members and only three large

24

buyers in Europe -- it’s a problem for the cartel to

25

divide up those buyers, but they used counter-purchasing
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agreements and managed to work things out where cartel

2

members would buy a requirement from each other.

3

So, I would be cautious about including

4

language in the guidelines that suggests that significant

5

buyers necessarily reduce the threat of coordinated

6

effects.

7

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

8

MR. POPOFSKY:

9

Thanks, Leslie.

Mark?

Since Bobby spoke and it’s safe

to speak, but I’m going to echo his theme.

You know,

10

there’s a tension between what businesses would like,

11

which is something of a checklist -- I mean, how many

12

clients, Rich, come to you and me and say, we’d like to

13

know can we do this, can we not do this, show us where

14

they say can we do this or not.

15

there’s virtues in being modest, virtues in keeping one’s

16

options open.

On the other hand,

17

I suggest in this quest for finding nice, neat

18

answers that help make the law predictable in the merger

19

area, in finding potential substitutes for the

20

Philadelphia National Bank presumption, that the agencies

21

be relatively modest and recognize there’s a lot that one

22

still doesn’t know.

23

evidence as a surrogate for that, there’s a lot of

24

trouble one can get into if one wants to basically flip

25

the burden to the other side.

And then when one is using direct
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COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

2

MR. PARKER:

Rich?

Those of you who know me as

3

somebody who talks often and a lot are going to be

4

surprised, but I think I’ve already said what I think.

5

hope it was clear and unambiguous and I most certainly

6

hope it was helpful.

7

JUDGE GINSBURG:

I

Just following up on Professor

8

Willig’s last observation, principles only in the

9

guidelines, illustration, checklists and so on on the

10

commentary, that’s probably a good organizing principle.

11

I’m not sure of a practical difference it makes because I

12

don’t -- unless things have changed, the commentary isn’t

13

amended any more frequently than the guidelines.

14

that changed?

15
16

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

Has

The commentaries were

the first of the type.

17

JUDGE GINSBURG:

Okay.

18

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

So, they were sometimes

19

called guidelines on the guidelines.

20

JUDGE GINSBURG:

I think it’s worth -- this is

21

a perennial, but I hope you might find occasion to

22

revisit it at the agencies in connection with this

23

project, and that is doing something more by way of

24

closing statements when cases are not brought, that would

25

supplement the guidelines in a meaningful way.
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something that can be very brief and suggestive rather

2

than detailed and then, certainly, you have to be

3

concerned with trade secrets and so on.

4

give some ongoing guidance.

5

But that would

In my far outdated experience, every potential

6

merger case involved a story or two stories and parties

7

came in and told us their story and the staff came in and

8

told us why that story was not right or why, in fact, it

9

checked out later on.

And a lot of those stories are

10

totally unique, but like common law cases, the cumulation

11

of unique cases enables people to triangulate their

12

position and to steer accordingly.

13

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

I want to thank everyone

14

for addressing what will be a fundamental focus of

15

concern for the revision process as it takes place.

16

There is, again, a traditional framework that everyone is

17

familiar with.

18

get the countless number of cases that begin by saying we

19

always begin the Section 7 case inevitably by defining a

20

relevant market, measuring market shares and going on

21

from there.

22

experience that says, in a number of instances, that’s

23

not strictly necessary and it can even be a source of

24

confusion.

25

If you plug in the relevant language, you

Yet, there’s been another literature body of

I think today there’s been an excellent
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discussion of how those two views might be reconciled in

2

a new drafting effort here.

3

helping us see theory meet practice in talking about the

4

topic.

I’m grateful for all of you

Let me ask you to thank our panel.

5

(Applause.)

6

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

7

And I think the Panel 3

on market definition starts at 2:00.

8

(Panel 2 concluded.)

9

(Luncheon recess taken.)

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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PANEL THREE:

2

MR. FEINSTEIN:

MARKET DEFINITION
Why don’t we get started with

3

the next session.

4

I’m Rich Feinstein.

5

Director of the Bureau of Competition.

6

I’ve already learned just from coming up to this table is

7

that the Bureau of Competition has these very cool pens,

8

which I didn’t know about until this morning.

9

have gotten something out of today.

10

For those of you who don’t know me,
I’m privileged to serve as the
One thing that

So, I will

In any event, the first two panels this

11

morning, I think, set the bar pretty high.

12

very distinguished group which we hope will not

13

disappoint the afternoon audience.

14

will.

15

definition.

16

pretty much the same as it was done this morning, which

17

is to say that I’ve asked each of the participants in the

18

panel to make an opening statement of five to ten

19

minutes, and I will enforce that.

20

will be kicking around some questions.

21

But we have a

I don’t think we

We’ve got an interesting topic, which is market
And the way we’re going to organize this is

And after that, we

If any members of the audience have questions,

22

the same rules apply.

23

and get them up to me and then we will see if we can get

24

into those.

25

Please write them down on a card

I also want to mention that Larry White has
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brought a handout.

2

the table in the back of the room, as well as on the

3

table in the hallway outside the room.

4

outline.

5
6
7
8
9

There are copies of it, I believe, on

MR. WHITE:

It’s a one-page

A one-page outline that you’ll be

hearing.
MR. FEINSTEIN:

So, let me just very briefly

introduce our four speakers and then we’ll get started.
To my immediate left is Eduardo Perez Motta,

10

and we are very, very pleased to have him with us today.

11

He, since 2004, has served as the Chairman of Mexico’s

12

Federal Commission on Competition.

13

him participating in today’s workshop.

14

long and distinguished career in public service in Mexico

15

and also has a background in economics and we’re looking

16

forward to hearing his remarks today.

17

We’re honored to have
Eduardo has a

To Eduardo’s left is Jonathan Baker who is well

18

known to many people in this room, I’m sure.

19

currently a Professor at American University’s Washington

20

College of Law and was formerly a Director of the Bureau

21

of Economics at the FTC.

22

He is

To Jonathan’s left is Larry White who is

23

currently a Professor of Economics at the Stern School of

24

Business at NYU where he’s also the Deputy Chair of the

25

Economics Department, and Larry served as the Director of
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what was then known as the Economic Policy Office in the

2

Antitrust Division back in the early eighties when I was

3

actually working there as a staff attorney and assistant

4

section chief.

5

And we’re delighted to have Larry here.

And then I’m not sure Joe has ever been to the

6

left of anyone, but at the far end of this table is Joe

7

Simons who is well known to many people here.

8

course, served as the Director of the Bureau of

9

Competition from 2001 to 2003, is a very accomplished

Joe, of

10

antitrust counselor and litigator, and is currently the

11

co-Chair of the Antitrust Group at Paul, Weiss.

12
13
14

So, with that, let’s begin the presentations
and we’ll begin with Eduardo.
MR. PEREZ MOTTA:

Well, thank you very much.

15

It is a privilege for me to be here with you in this

16

discussion.

17

the idea to organize these hearings as something quite

18

positive and this is something that we should do, frankly

19

speaking, we should do in Mexico as soon as possible.

20

Let me start by saying that I find this --

The Mexican law specifies and the rulings

21

specify how we have to do this, but it’s always quite

22

useful to put an outline or guidelines publicly so that

23

all the operators and the -- the economic operators or

24

economic agents and lawyers and economists can understand

25

what’s the methodology, the methodology that is used by
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the authority to take these decisions.

2

So, first of all, I think it’s a very good idea

3

to have these guidelines.

4

come from 1992.

5

guidelines, but I think it’s always a good idea to have a

6

check and to have this review publicly in these kind of

7

hearings.

8
9

I know that your guidelines

There -- more recent commentary on the

I think it’s a good idea.
So, let me thank you for inviting me and also

recognize that this is a very important exercise, and

10

this is an exercise that we are going to -- actually, we

11

are going to follow very soon in Mexico.

12

This topic, the topic that we are discussing in

13

this panel, is market definition.

14

have been in the competition authority in Mexico, I

15

frankly find that this might be one of the most

16

contentious and maybe one of the most difficult issues

17

always.

18

the relevant market?

19

not only for mergers, but also for investigations on

20

abuse of dominance.

21

and it’s always important to give a discussion on this

22

concept.

23

From the years that I

What’s the relevant market?

How do you define

This is a major issue and it goes

So, I think this is a major problem

I’m going to use less than my ten minutes.

24

me explain to you, very briefly, how we work on merger

25

analysis and what’s the basic element that we use in
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Mexico, according to our law and our rulings.

Our law is

2

-- let’s put it this way, the Competition Commission, the

3

Mexican Competition Commission, the Federal Competition

4

Commission is basically empowered by the federal law of

5

economic competition and also has its regulations that

6

are the ones that allow us to challenge something and to

7

impose sanctions on any merger whose aim or effect --

8

this is the important point -- the aim or effect is to

9

reduce, lessen or prevent competition and free market

10

access to products and services that are equal, similar

11

or substantially related.

12

says.

13

This is exactly what the law

So, the competition is going to sanction those

14

measures that lessen, harm or impede competition

15

basically when they approach one of these three elements.

16

We consider that they lessen or harm or impede

17

competition when they first confer the ability -- the

18

ability to the company or to the companies that is going

19

to come out from the merger to unilaterally set prices.

20

That is the first point, the first element.

21

The second is to unduly displace or restrict

22

access to competitors or the third element, which is to

23

facilitate anti-competitive conduct and anti-competitive

24

conduct could be either a collusion or a unilateral anti-

25

competitive conduct.

So, those are the elements that
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could allow us to sanction a merger.

2

Now, the elements that we consider for a merger

3

analysis are basically five elements.

The first is the

4

definition of the relevant market.

5

issue.

6

market power which is basically the market share or the

7

ability to set prices, to restrict input by (inaudible),

8

position, conduct, access to inputs and imports.

9

this case, what we basically use is the Herfindahl-

That’s the main

The second is the market concentration and the

So, in

10

Hirschman Index and another index that we have developed

11

that we call the dominance index.

12

the Official Gazette basically how we handle those

13

measures and this is information that is very public.

14

We have published in

The third element is the merger effect on

15

competitors, clients, related markets or agents.

16

fourth element is basically cross ownership.

17

fifth and last element is something that was introduced

18

recently in the reform of the law three years ago, is an

19

efficiency defense.

20

a merger basically have to or they can justify, on

21

efficiency grounds, the impact that this merger is going

22

to have.

23

The

And the

So, the companies that are notifying

So, this is basically our legal framework.

24

That’s how we make these analysis.

And I would like to

25

stop here just to start this discussion.

Thank you very
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much, Richard.

2

MR. FEINSTEIN:

3

MR. BAKER:

Jonathan?

Thank you.

I want to thank Rich

4

and Carl for inviting me, and I’m delighted to be back to

5

the FTC.

6

didn’t put it in your introduction, but I’m actually

7

right now at the Federal Communications Commission, but

8

I’m not speaking for them, just for me.

9

And I think I probably ought to add that, you

I have two points I’d like to make about market

10

definition.

11

important for analyzing coordinated effects than for

12

unilateral effects.

13

then I’ll go on to my second point.

14

The first is that market definition is more

So, let me explain that first and

In a coordinated effects case, the key question

15

is whether the merger changes the nature of the rivalry

16

among the firms.

17

order to figure out what firms to think about.

18

the market participants?

19

market to compute market shares, which we might want to

20

use to determine how market concentration changes or if

21

we’re not going to use that route for identifying

22

coordinated effects, we still might want to know market

23

shares perhaps to identify who the maverick is.

24

reasons and the nature of the coordinated effects

25

analysis that would lead us to want to define the market.

Now, we need to define the market in
Who are

And we also need to define the
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In a unilateral effects case -- and here I’m

2

going to talk about unilateral effects involving

3

localized competition among sellers of differentiated

4

products, which is the most common setting -- the key

5

question is different.

6

substantial fraction of the customers of one of the

7

merging firms views a product of the other firm as their

8

second choice.

9

words, turn most importantly on the nature of the buyer

10

substitution between the products of the merging firms,

11

not on the way sellers interact.

12

The key question is whether a

And unilateral affects cases, in other

Now, you know, it’s not that you wouldn’t get

13

into how sellers interact.

But the key initial core

14

question has to do with buyer substitution and, in

15

particular, buyer second choices from the buyers of one

16

product, what their second choice is and whether it’s the

17

product of the merging firm, the partner -- the merging

18

firm’s partner.

19

often contain very little information about buyer’s

20

second choices.

21

unilateral effects.

Market shares and market concentration

So, they don’t help much in identifying

22

There’s other kinds of evidence that might be

23

more probative, you know, for example, how price varies

24

with market structure, like we did in Staples, or

25

diversion ratios or other things that one would want to
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2

look at that would be more probative than market shares.
And, also, it may be hard to determine market

3

shares reliably in differentiated product industries

4

where market boundaries can be difficult to draw, with a

5

densely packed space, that kind of thing.

6

So, that’s my first point.

Market definition

7

is more important for analyzing coordinated effects than

8

unilateral effects.

9

My second is that market definition needs to

10

focus on one economic force only, namely buyer

11

substitution.

12

much, it’s easy to get confused.

13

an economic proposition; this is a how to make it work in

14

practice proposition.

15

don’t ask this analytical step to account for supply

16

substitution as well as demand substitution or least why

17

it makes sense for them not to.

18

will account for supply substitution in defining markets

19

in -- at least in monopolization and other exclusionary

20

conduct cases.

21

If you ask market definition to do too
So, this is not quite

And that’s why the guidelines

In contrast, some courts

And it’s also why it’s a bad idea to try to

22

account for the significance of demand complementarities,

23

including those associated with two-sided platforms,

24

which is, you know, a topical issue in the market

25

definition step of the analytical process.

By all means,
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we have to think about that and think about the

2

significance of complementarities in order to evaluate

3

the competitive effects of the merger, but let’s do it in

4

the step of analyzing competitive effects, not market

5

definition.

6

In fact, if you think about the structure of

7

the merger guidelines, they sensibly allocate the

8

economic forces to different steps of the analysis.

9

buyer substitution analysis is what we’re talking about,

So,

10

but supply substitution is mainly handled in the entry

11

step, although there’s also some aspects of it that are

12

taken into account in figuring out who the market

13

participants are.

14

and, in the context of unilateral effects, repositioning.

15

And the rivalry among sellers is addressed in the

16

competitive effects analysis and some other things are

17

addressed there as well.

18

That would be the uncommitted entrants

Now, this allocation breaks down in unilateral

19

effects cases, though.

20

analyze buyer substitution twice in a unilateral effects

21

case.

22

later, in determining diversion ratios or whatever we’re

23

going to do in the competitive effects analysis.

24
25

Because the guidelines ask us to

First, in defining the market and then, once again

Now, there are technical differences between
the two analyses.

So, for example, if we thought that

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

146
1

the merged firm would raise price but not by as much as

2

the SSNIP, say only by 4 percent, we might catch the

3

problem in the competitive effects SSNIP, but not catch

4

it when defining the market.

5

well make more sense to analyze buyer substitution only

6

once in unilateral effects cases.

7

going to do that, I would do it in competitive analysis

8

rather than the market definition step.

9

MR. FEINSTEIN:

But, in general, it may

And if we’re only

Thank you.

Thanks.

And my apologies

10

for leaving out your current duties at the FCC in the

11

introduction.

12

MR. BAKER:

Oh, that’s fine.

13

MR. FEINSTEIN:

14

MR. WHITE:

Larry?

Okay.

Again, my thanks to Rich and

15

Carl for inviting me and shepherding this whole

16

operation.

17

I think it’s a very, very valuable effort.
I do want to talk about the hypothetical

18

monopolist market definition paradigm.

19

test of time.

20

was first enunciated.

21

why it has stood the test of time.

22

It has stood the

It’s now been 27 years since 1982 when it
And I think there are good reasons

First, it’s a conservative approach.

It

23

basically asks, as a general matter, although there are

24

exceptions, what is the smallest group of producers that

25

if they colluded; i.e., acted as a hypothetical
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monopolist, could succeed in exercising or enhancing

2

market power?

3

the heart of the matter, a relevant market is, in

4

essence, one that can be monopolized.

5

very useful framework, a useful just world view of

6

thinking, you know, what are we trying to find here?

7

Or equivalently, and this really goes to

I think that’s a

And then, of course, the remainder of the

8

guidelines, as John just indicated, provide the means for

9

determining the likelihood that either market power will

10

arise initially or any existing market power could be

11

enhanced because of the structural and/or behavioral

12

characteristics of the market.

13

There’s another very important aspect of the

14

paradigm, its flexible use.

15

participants in the market are already exercising market

16

power is irrelevant.

17

while, but it’s irrelevant because the paradigm is

18

basically asking, could this merger make things worse?

19

And that’s really the relevant question.

20

merger make things worse?

21

First, whether the

That hung up a lot of people for a

Could this

Further, though the paradigm focuses on

22

producers, and properly so because it’s producers that

23

might collude post-merger and, so, you want to be

24

focusing your attention on them.

25

price discrimination markets, you’ve also got to identify

But in the case of
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relevant consumers.

2

there.

3

And, so, there’s that flexibility

Further aspect of flexibility.

The paradigm

4

was developed in the context of a world view that was

5

basically all about coordinated effects.

6

the way the men and women of the Antitrust Division of

7

the U.S. Department of Justice thought about what were

8

the problems for mergers.

9

view.

In 1982, that’s

It was a coordinated effects

However, the paradigm is applicable for unilateral

10

effects, has been used in these kinds of cases.

But I

11

want to ask the question -- John has addressed it to some

12

extent, I’ll address it in just a minute -- is it really

13

necessary for unilateral effects cases?

14

So, as I think about the strengths of the

15

paradigm, why it has stood the test of time, it’s a

16

relatively conservative approach, and I think that’s a

17

healthy approach.

18

flexibility.

19

And it’s got these nice aspects of

All right, what are the limitations?

Well, now

20

I’m going to come back to the unilateral effects

21

analysis.

22

page handout that’s available, I screwed it up and

23

mistakenly wrote coordinated effects where I really meant

24

unilateral effects in this part of my outline.

25

As Joe Farrell’s sharp eye noticed in my one-

The market definition -- I’m going to go more
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strongly than John on this point -- I think it’s

2

potentially confusing, a confusing afterthought in a

3

unilateral effects analysis.

4

example of that, I urge you to read Vaughn Walker’s

5

decision in the Oracle case.

6

And if you want a good

I have increasingly come around to the view

7

that basically says if you have found significant

8

unilateral effects, you’ve got a market.

9

be a market because you found something where there are

That’s got to

10

going to be post-merger significant price increases.

11

That’s what we’re concerned about.

12

market.

13

That’s got to be a

Now, how that gets phrased, I don’t really

14

care.

15

the issue.

16

basically saying, you know, hey, we found the effect,

17

that must mean there is a market here.

18

But you don’t want the market definition confusing
You want it in unilateral effects cases

The other thing I want to point out -- and this

19

is not strictly a merger guidelines issue, but I’m going

20

to be using the inspiration of Rahm Emanuel, as you know,

21

his maxim is never let a good crisis go to waste.

22

never let a good opportunity go to waste.

23

Well,

And the other thing I want to mention about the

24

hypothetical monopolist market definition paradigm is

25

that its application to monopolization cases is severely
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limited.

2

monopolization actions.

3

come up, but that’s not the typical monopolization case.

4

The typical monopolization case is where the defendant is

5

being accused of bad acts and an essential feature is to

6

argue that the defendant already has market power.

7

if that’s so, you cannot use the hypothetical

8

monopolization market definition paradigm, because trying

9

to use it in that context really is committing the

10

It can only be used for prospective

cellophane fallacy.

Every once in a while that may

And

So, let me stop there.

11

MR. FEINSTEIN:

12

MR. SIMONS:

Thanks, Larry.

All right.

Go ahead, Joe.

Thanks, Rich.

Good

13

afternoon, everyone.

14

me and I guess Joe and Carl as well.

15

colleagues are to be highly commended, I think, for

16

initiating this enterprise.

17

comes out, it’s going to be extremely beneficial to the

18

antitrust community.

19

I want to thank Rich for inviting
You and your

I think no matter how it

So, let me start out by echoing some of the

20

things that Larry said and what some of the folks this

21

morning said as well, which is, that the existing

22

guidelines are very, very good, have very deep bipartisan

23

support and have clearly withstood the test of time.

24

a result of that, my own view would be that I would be

25

very cautious in making major changes, and I think if it
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were up to me, I’m not sure that I would change very much

2

at all.

3

But having said that, I’d like to cover four

4

points today, one kind of a general comment on the

5

guidelines and then three points about market definition.

6

On the overall point, as currently drafted, the

7

guidelines are very general in nature.

They don’t go

8

into a huge amount of detail trying to anticipate every

9

factual situation that might come up in a merger.

And I

10

think that’s the right approach.

11

mistake to inject a lot of detail into the guidelines

12

rather than having them focus on broad principles, which

13

Larry did a terrific job of laying out in terms of the

14

market definition.

15

I think it would be a

So, my sense would be let’s focus on the

16

broader principles and let’s have the applications to the

17

specific facts flushed out over time through experience.

18

That flushing out process has been and can continue to be

19

made transparent to those outside the agencies through

20

speeches, closing statements, commentaries and the like.

21

I think the method of applying the guidelines has

22

developed very substantially over time in different ways

23

with respect to different parts of it, and I just think

24

it’s not possible to account for every factual situation.

25

So, my sense would be to kind of stick with the broad
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principles along the lines of the current form.

2

So, since our panel is discussing market

3

definition, let me try to make three points on that

4

score.

5

think market definition needs to remain as a key part of

6

the analytic framework for the merger guidelines.

7

statute and case law require it.

8

least my sense is certainly among the lawyers, getting

9

rid of the market definition in the guidelines would not

First, something very basic, which is that I

The

And I think that, at

10

have a lot of support.

11

talking to economists and certainly from what Larry and

12

John have said just moments ago, that that type of

13

approach is much more popular with the antitrust

14

economists.

15

why.

16

I understand, you know, just from

And, you know, I think you can understand

A lot of that is based on -- the unilateral

17

effects analysis is based on economic modeling and

18

simulations.

19

get their arms around, much less so for the lawyers.

20

think the lawyers are going to have some concern as to if

21

you really rely on that, how it’s going to play out in

22

court.

23

That’s much easier for the economists to
I

I think there is one circumstance, in

24

particular, I think it’s pretty rare, where you’re going

25

to be able to prove direct effects of a merger, and in
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that case, the market definition pretty much falls out of

2

your proof of direct effects.

3

what Larry was just saying.

4

merger caused the prices to go up -- an example of that

5

was FTC’s case involving Evanston Hospital -- then pretty

6

much there has to be a market there someplace.

7

This is consistent with

So, if you prove that the

In fact, a kind of interesting sidelight, I was

8

at the Bureau when that case was being developed.

9

the economics -- econometrics actually drove that

And

10

investigation because that showed that there was a price

11

effect.

12

of hard to define a market here.

13

issues.

14

community hospital; one hospital was a teaching hospital.

15

And, so, there was a little bit of confusion about how

16

should they approach the market definition.

17

The intuition of the lawyers was, gee, it’s kind
You had geographic

You had issues about one hospital was a

And what really drove that for the staff, I

18

think, and for me was the economics, showing that there

19

was an effect.

20

there should be a market there.

21

pretty rare case and to kind of take the market

22

definition out of the guidelines based on that I think

23

would be a mistake.

24
25

So, if we knew there was an effect, then
But I think that’s a

Second, I’d like to address a couple of points
relating to critical loss and diversion analysis.
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would not recommend putting the details of how to do

2

critical loss into the merger guidelines.

3

critical loss or something like it is going to,

4

oftentimes, be necessary when you’re defining a market

5

under the merger guidelines.

6

really obvious and it doesn’t take a brain surgeon or any

7

kind of serious analysis to figure out what the market

8

is, you’re going to have to get some sense of how much

9

volume is necessary to make the price increase

10

I think

So, unless the market is

unprofitable.

11

Now, you can do that through critical loss and

12

maybe there are other ways to do that, too.

13

or another, you’ve got to get some sense of what that

14

number is, what the range is.

15

Is it 70 or 80 percent?

16

today, they would tell you it was kind of towards the

17

lower end.

18

loss was done in any kind of serious way, you look at the

19

NAAG merger guidelines, for example, who say the number

20

should be 75 percent.

21

going to have to do that.

22

But one way

Is it 10 or 20 percent?

I think if you asked most folks

But if you went back 20 years before critical

So, one way or another, you’re

The details are going to vary depending on the

23

factual circumstances.

I think if you try to put that

24

into the guidelines, you’re going to create more problems

25

than you’re solving.

Similarly, I wouldn’t want to put
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anything in the guidelines that discussed estimating what

2

I refer to as the actual loss from the margin data via

3

the Lerner Index or the inverse elasticity rule, however

4

you want to characterize it.

5

I think some economists as well, this would be highly

6

controversial.

7

successfully in court.

8

times and not done very well.

9

At least among lawyers and

As far as I’m aware, it hasn’t been done
I think it’s been tried a couple

And then the other thing is the necessary

10

implication of using the Lerner Index to underlie your

11

analysis is, at least from what I know, virtually all

12

horizontal mergers raise price and that is something that

13

I think the lawyers will have an issue with.

14

Regarding diversion analysis, I think that

15

that’s something that is much more relevant for

16

unilateral effects, and really if you’re going to discuss

17

it, it should be in the unilateral effects section.

18

I don’t really think that’s really useful for the

19

guidelines and the market definition.

20

And

And the third point I wanted to make relates to

21

what type of SSNIP we should talk about or use in the

22

guidelines.

23

at the FTC and talking to folks at the DOJ, I have never

24

seen -- and the folks I’ve talked to can only think of

25

once or twice -- where a merger was investigated using

Based on my own experience, talking to folks
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something other than an across the board SSNIP.

2

guidelines, as they’re written currently, would allow a

3

market to be defined based on a SSNIP relating to just

4

one firm.

5

firm raises the price and you can define a SSNIP on that

6

basis.

7

it’s misleading to do it that way and my recommendation

8

would be to take it out.

9

The

So, you have five firms in the market, one

I think that’s not done in practice.

I think

And then the final thought I have is just to

10

recommend adherence to the Hippocratic Oath, Rich, which

11

is particularly appropriate for him since he was head of

12

the health care shop.

13

set of guidelines here with a huge bipartisan consensus

14

behind them.

15

becomes really important, you know, above all else, do no

16

harm.

17

You’ve got a very well respected

And, so, in that circumstance, I think it

Thanks.
MR. FEINSTEIN:

Well, I think I can probably

18

speak for all six of us who are working diligently in

19

this effort that that is our goal, to do no harm.

20

you very much, Joe.

21

Thank

What I’d like to do first, I guess, for those

22

of you who were here this morning, there was a very

23

lively debate, particularly I guess on the second panel,

24

relating to the use of direct evidence on anti-

25

competitive effects or competitive effects, not
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necessarily anti-competitive effects.

2

some degree, on how the availability of direct effects

3

might bear on market definition.

4

approach it from -- you know, sort of the same question

5

from a little bit different perspective.

6

They touched, to

What I’d like to do is

And, Joe, you eluded to a circumstance where we

7

had a consummated merger and it appeared, based on the

8

econometrics, that the direct effects were fairly clear.

9

That may not always be the case.

Even in a consummated

10

merger that may not always be the case.

11

even less likely to be the case directly, as opposed to

12

by analogy or by example, in an unconsummated merger

13

where you’re trying to make a prediction.

14

It’s probably

So, the first question I’d like to solicit the

15

group’s thinking on is, given the fact that the purpose

16

of market definition is to identify the context in which

17

likely or actual competitive effects are to be assessed,

18

are there circumstances where the existence of direct

19

evidence of competitive effects reduces the need for a

20

precise market definition?

21

should they be specifically addressed in the guidelines?

22

MR. WHITE:

And if so, what are they and

All right, I’ll leap out.

Yes,

23

yes, yes.

I’ll say it again, if you found direct effects

24

in a unilateral effects case, you have a market and you

25

don’t need to go any further.

Anything more risks
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confusing Vaughn Walker.

2

how to say it more directly.

3

there.

4

MR. FEINSTEIN:

I guess that’s -- I don’t know
And so, I would just stop

John, why don’t you go.

Since

5

Joe’s had the floor more recently, let’s give John a

6

chance.

7

MR. BAKER:

That’s fine.

Although I’m going to

8

agree with Larry.

Joe might come out the other way.

So,

9

there are two different kinds of direct evidence that are

10

worth talking about.

11

ultimate question of anti-competitive effects which I

12

think of as let’s say a price market structure kind of

13

study like we did in Staples.

14

evidence of something from which you then infer that

15

there’s harm to competition.

16

evidence about demand elasticities and diversion ratios

17

and things like that.

18

One is direct evidence of the

But there’s also direct

Like, for example, direct

And if you are using market shares as the basis

19

for proving harm to competition, you are making an

20

inference, also.

21

all kinds of evidence might be probative in different

22

kinds of settings.

23

direct evidence that the merger is going to raise price

24

is totally convincing and the other evidence won’t help

25

you much.

It’s just based on market shares.

So,

And there will be cases where the

Even if it came out the other way, you

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

159
1

wouldn’t believe it.

2

you’ll have some of the other kinds of evidence and the

3

market shares and market concentration will help you.

4

And so, in the first setting, you don’t need to worry

5

about market definition as much.

6

early about how that’s more likely to be so in the

7

unilateral context than in the coordinated effects

8

context.

9

And there will be cases where

And I guess I talked

I do want to say something since Larry brought

10

up Vaughn Walker twice.

I don’t view that as a confused

11

judge.

12

was doing.

13

effects in that case.

14

be a mistake to rewrite the merger guidelines purely in

15

response to what Judge Walker had to say because he’s

16

very different from most judges.

17

expert who had a strong point of view is my take.

18

most federal judges are not antitrust experts who are

19

trying to sell us on their perspective on unilateral

20

effects and merger analysis, and so wouldn’t respond in

21

the same way as he did.

I think that Judge Walker knew exactly what he
He just didn’t want to find unilateral
And to be honest, I think it would

22

MR. FEINSTEIN:

23

MR. SIMONS:

He’s an antitrust
And

Joe?

Right.

So, following up on that

24

point from Jonathan, I couldn’t agree more on the Vaughn

25

Walker point, which leads right into the point I was
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going to make, which is that I think for most, at least

2

for me, a good case is one in which all the evidence

3

points in the same direction.

4

case, the odds are good that the evidence is all going to

5

flow in that one way.

6

evidence of a direct effect, I would want to look at the

7

other evidence as well.

8

judge you’re most likely to get in front of is not going

9

to be the Vaughn Walker type of judge.

And if it really is a good

So, even though you might have

I think in terms of a judge, the

The judge you’re

10

most likely to get in front of doesn’t know anything

11

about antitrust.

12

you know, the more stuff you’ve got going in the same

13

direction, the more likely you are to convince him.

14

And the way to convince that judge is,

MR. WHITE:

I’d like to leap back in because

15

I’ve been really chewing on something that Joe said in

16

his earlier remarks and I think is relevant here.

17

talked, at the very end, what type of SSNIP.

18

said, suppose you have a market with five firms but only

19

one firm raises its price.

20

MR. SIMONS:

Yes.

21

MR. WHITE:

Okay.

22
23

He

And he

Am I --

I assume you’re talking

post-merger.
MR. SIMONS:

Yes, it was the hypothetical

24

monopolist controls the five firms and the hypothetical

25

monopolist only raises the price of firm one.
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MR. WHITE:

And I would say you’ve been led

2

astray by market definition that really -- if you’ve got

3

the one firm that’s going to be able to raise its price,

4

you know, there is a market right there.

5

go any further.

6

And stop, don’t

You’re going to confuse somebody.

And so, think in terms of what’s the goal here.

7

It’s to prevent the raising of price either in a

8

coordinated manner, in which case market definition is

9

terrifically important, echoing what John said earlier.

10

Or unilaterally, in which case, stop, don’t go any

11

further.

You’re going to confuse somebody.

12

MR. SIMONS:

Can I follow up on that point?

13

MR. FEINSTEIN:

14

MR. SIMONS:

Sure.

So, I probably was not clear in

15

the example I was trying to -- at least I had in my mind.

16

So, here’s what I had in my mind.

17

situation where there are ten equally situated firms and

18

you have a merger of firms one and two and we assume for

19

the example that they can’t raise the price of both their

20

products or either one of them.

21

firms one through five, if they’re monopolized, they

22

can’t profitably impose an across the board SSNIP either.

If you think of a

We further assume that

23
24
25

But let’s suppose we then assume that if the
hypothetical monopolist of firms one through five could
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impose a profitable SSNIP by just raising the price of

2

firm one’s product.

3

currently written, you could define a market that way,

4

except that wouldn’t tell you very much.

5

hypothetical, we’ve assumed that you can’t have a

6

unilateral effect.

7

coordinated effect, the only way that the compliant firm

8

raises price is to get a side payment from firms three,

9

four and five.

And under the guidelines as

The only way you can have a

So, if that’s the only way can you have a

10

problem, then why are we looking at that?

11

had on my mind.

12

Because by

MR. BAKER:

That’s what I

Well, there’s sort of an answer to

13

that, which is maybe that you think -- well, you sort of

14

say side payment.

15

that is you want to rule out tacit collusion, too.

What you’re trying to do when you say

16

MR. SIMONS:

17

MR. BAKER:

No, no, no.
But in the market you describe, in

18

principle, there could be a coordinated effects problem.

19

Maybe this particular merger, you know, changed the

20

market structure in a way that made it possible for the

21

post-merger firms to raise price and the other firms

22

would kind of go along and permit it in a way they

23

wouldn’t before.

24

I’m not sure this is a real, real thing.

25

principle, it’s exactly right.

I mean, it’s all kind of hypothetical.
But in

And the guidelines are
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conceptually correct, I believe, in saying what you’re

2

referring to, that, the hypothetical monopolist could

3

raise the price of any or all of the additional products

4

under its control.

5

If you insist on what you want to insist on,

6

the way it was in the ‘84 guidelines before -- this got

7

changed in the ‘92 guidelines.

8

back to the way it was in the ‘84 guidelines at this

9

point, you run a different risk that there’s going to be

If you insist on going

10

a situation -- think about your example where there

11

really is a unilateral effects problem.

12

prove a market in your view of how to write the

13

guidelines.

14

problems and sell it to the court, let’s say, in a market

15

that has five firms in it.

16

across the board SSNIP, you would add an additional 20

17

firms, there’s no way you’d convince anybody that there’s

18

a problem.

19

You could get at the unilateral effects

But if you had to do an

So, I think it’s correct to keep this in and

20

sensible besides.

21

appropriate.

22

You want to

It’s rarely used, but it’s

MR. SIMONS:

See, my view is, and I think -- I

23

think Whole Foods had this problem.

You start to look

24

like you’re gerrymandering a market so you don’t have to

25

prove a competitive effect and you’re going to rely on a
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presumption.

2

market the way it’s originally been done.

3

want to prove a unilateral effects, you prove that.

4

if you do that sufficiently, you win.

5

going to be defining very narrow markets.

6

So I would rather -- let’s define the

MR. BAKER:

Okay.

And when you
And

Otherwise, you’re

But you’re running against

7

the usual litigation dilemma in unilateral effects cases

8

when you say that, which is that maybe the -- you know,

9

if the market shares aren’t particularly meaningful and

10

the two merging firms have products that are fairly close

11

substitutes, but they are sort of in a little corner of a

12

bigger market, but you don’t want to define a narrow

13

market, well, then you have low shares and it’s hard to

14

convince anybody that there’s a problem.

15

But then if you want to go the other route and

16

define the narrow market and say it’s merger to monopoly

17

or near monopoly, then you run into the people who say,

18

well, narrow markets are gerrymandered and they’re those

19

evil sub-markets and they’re just -- they’ve got too many

20

adjectives.

21

this trouble.

22

You end up missing the problem because of

MR. SIMONS:

Well, no, you’re trying to fit

23

your case into a structural presumption when you really

24

have a different case.

25

benefitted if they would actually say something about

I think the guidelines would be
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1

this circumstance where you can have a unilateral effect

2

in a broad market.

3

Because what tends to happen is -- and I think

4

it has something to do with the way it’s litigated,

5

usually, is you go in and you try to say the market is

6

narrow and then you run into a problem when you lose on

7

the market definition.

8

said, okay, here’s the market, it’s defined the normal

9

way it’s defined and we have a unilateral effect and

Whereas, if you just kind of

10

here’s the evidence we have for that, I think you might

11

have a different situation.

12

guidelines that that’s what you’re doing and that’s

13

appropriate to do, maybe you do better.

14

MR. BAKER:

If you clarified in the

Well, I kind of agree with you

15

because the real problem in the story is that you’re

16

trying to create a presumption of harm to competition in

17

this unilateral case based on market shares when they’re

18

not particularly good indicators of anything in most

19

unilateral effects cases.

20

have an alternative basis for creating a presumption of

21

competition that a court could get its arms around that

22

would be based on something else that would be more

23

probative and then that would take the pressure off the

24

market definition in just the way you described and,

25

also, have the benefit of having a framework for

And it would be very useful to
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1

describing the harm to competition that you can explain

2

to the court that connects up to the source of the

3

evidence you’re using to try and get that presumption.

4

So, it’s --

5
6

MR. WHITE:

and you’ve just given into the devil.

7
8

John, I thought you were an ally

UNIDENTIFIED MALE:

We’ve got you surrounded,

Larry.

9

MR. WHITE:

You know, come back to the basic

10

idea of relevant market is something that can be

11

monopolized, something where the price can go up if some

12

structural things change.

13

bother me in saying that’s a market.

14

point, it’s de minimis.

15

de minimis, small, narrow?

16

there’s an effect.

17

bigger market, but, oh, there’s something going on here,

18

but we’re not going to call this a market.

19

relevant market is something that can be monopolized.

20

MR.

21

agree with you.

22

market.

And narrow, small.

It doesn’t

You know, at some

I understand that.

But beyond

Hey, if there’s an effect,

Why confuse it by saying there’s this

BAKER:

Again, a

That’s not what I was arguing.

It’s perfectly fine to have a narrow

23

MR. WHITE:

Well, both of you are the devil.

24

MR. BAKER:

Neither one of you is the devil.

25

(Laughter).
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MR. BAKER:

No devils over there.

My boss is

2

really an angel here.

3

definition paradigm for analyzing unilateral effects and

4

are going to have to argue it that way in court, there

5

are advantages to both approaches.

6

with narrow markets.

7

markets when I can define them.

8
9

If we’re forced into the market

I have no trouble

I don’t have trouble with sub-

But what we were talking about before was
what’s the best way of creating a presumption of anti-

10

competitive effects?

11

without market definition entirely in unilateral effects

12

cases or at least downplay it.

13

market definition in unilateral effects cases, the more

14

you want to look for something else than market shares to

15

base your presumption on, the more important it is to

16

have some alternative and, frankly, the more sensible it

17

is because market shares are often not very good

18

predictors of harm in unilateral effects cases.

19

Maybe you even want to do it

The less you care about

So, what I was saying before about the

20

presumptions was essentially independent of market

21

definition, not buying into either the large market or

22

the small market.

23

MR. FEINSTEIN:

So, just to follow up real

24

quickly, if you don’t define the market in a way that

25

allows you to estimate shares, if you focus on
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competitive effects and don’t get to the point where

2

there are presumptions, I suppose, what implication does

3

that have for the safe harbor analysis that currently

4

exists given certain HHI levels?

5

Anybody?

6

MR. SIMONS:

7

really a safe harbor.

8

on the market definition.

9

one way, okay, you’re safe.

10

What happens to it?

It’s not clear to me that there is
In real life, everything depends
So, if the market is defined
If the market is defined

another way, you’re not.

11

UNIDENTIFIED MALE:

(Off microphone) Does that

12

mean if the market’s defined very broadly, you shouldn’t

13

be safe?

14

of office consumables so that Office Depot and Staples

15

would have had 5 percent of the market, you’re perfectly

16

comfortable saying that that merger is anti-competitive

17

and you think that’s the way it should be litigated.

18

You said even if the market had been all sales

MR. SIMONS:

No, here’s what I’m trying to say.

19

What I’m trying to say is that the market definition

20

under the way it’s currently structured comes with a

21

presumption if you get the shares high enough.

22
23
24
25

UNIDENTIFIED MALE:

Right?

(Off microphone)

(Inaudible).
MR. FEINSTEIN:

I was focusing more on where

the shares were low enough.

But go ahead.
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MR. SIMONS:

Usually people rely on a

2

presumption to prove a case and then you lose on the

3

shares.

4

effects.

Right?

5
6

And your story about competitive

MR. FEINSTEIN:

John wants to say one more

thing and then I want to move on to a different issue.

7

MR. BAKER:

This little conversation is related

8

to a point that I think Joe made before, Joe did it in

9

the context of talking about the Lerner Index.

But the

10

unilateral effects analysis involving differentiated

11

products, if you’re just looking at the substitution

12

across the firms and you’re not thinking about other

13

aspects of the analysis, it will look like all mergers

14

will, at least initially, have a tendency to raise price.

15

And this was -- you know, we knew this in 1992 when we

16

put that section in the guidelines.

17

But the answer is that’s not true, I mean, in

18

the sense that there’s more to merger analysis than just

19

-- the full competitive effects analysis goes beyond the

20

buyer substitution and the first and second choice

21

products.

22

presumption, you can rebut it.

23

repositioning and you can think about efficiencies.

24
25

And when you get to the -- beyond the
You can think about

Now, when Carl and Joe wrote their recent paper
about how to use diversion ratios and margins to create
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something that could be sort of like the basis of a

2

presumption, they built in an efficiencies assumption in

3

there.

4

certain amount or after a standard deduction, I think was

5

the phrase that came -- or was it Larry, maybe? I don’t

6

know.

7

So, essentially the price has to rise more than a

That’s one way to handle it.
So, going down this route of proving unilateral

8

effects without a market definition or at least building

9

in a presumption through a route that doesn’t require

10

market shares and market concentration isn’t the same

11

thing as saying all mergers are going to lead to higher

12

prices, because you can set it up in a way that

13

incorporates some assumption about efficiencies or

14

repositioning that would limit the cases to the ones

15

where the concern is the greatest about a price rise.

16

MR. SIMONS:

But that strikes me as kind of

17

artificial because you then recognize that the underlying

18

process produces a price increase for every horizontal

19

merger and you realize that’s not right.

20

of using the efficiencies as a standard deduction to

21

calibrate it down.

22

close to being properly calibrated?

23

So, you’re kind

But how do we know that that’s even

MR. BAKER:

Well, we have to do better than the

24

35 percent safe harbor in the current guidelines or even

25

the low HHI safe harbor in the current guidelines when it
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comes to unilateral effects because the market shares

2

aren’t very helpful in analyzing unilateral effects in a

3

lot of cases.

4

So, this has got to be a better route.

MR. SIMONS:

Well, the problem is if you use

5

this, though, you’re going to end up challenging mergers

6

at much lower concentration levels than you’re -- you

7

know, you’re going to be challenging lots of mergers you

8

never would have challenged before.

9

MR. BAKER:

Would you view the Staples/Office

10

Depot merger as a merger at a lower concentration level

11

or do you view it as a merger at a high concentration

12

level?

13

the market definition, and that may or may not be helpful

14

here.

15

The concentration level that you get depends on

MR. SIMONS:

Well, I guess it depends on which

16

market definition you have in mind.

17

to do the variable SSNIP or whether you’re going to do

18

across the board SSNIP.

19

MR. FEINSTEIN:

Whether you’re going

Let me shift slightly, although

20

we’re going to stay on the topic of SSNIP for a minute.

21

I think there’s a fairly broad consensus that that’s a

22

useful tool in the market definition process.

23

connection with the possibility of revising the

24

guidelines, I’d be interested in hearing the panel’s

25

views on the question of whether the level of the SSNIP
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1

should either be revised to the general proposition or

2

should be made more variable depending upon particular

3

circumstances.

4

issue?

5

of SSNIP ought to be used and when.

6

How, if at all, would you address that

That is the possibility of selecting what level

MR. PEREZ MOTTA:

Yes?

Actually, my impression is

7

that this should have some flexibility.

In our case, our

8

Commission does not apply this formally.

But we normally

9

consider a range between 5 to 10 percent that follow

10

basically the U.S. and the E.U. parameters.

11

could have some cases, for instance, when the size may be

12

substantially smaller in markets with low price cost

13

margins, for instance.

14

there.

15
16
17

But you

So, I think flexibility should be

MR. FEINSTEIN:

Anyone else want to comment on

that?
MR. SIMONS:

I would go back to Larry’s kind of

18

first principle on market definition, certainly for the

19

unilateral cases.

20

want to identify a market that is being cartelized.

21

you might have a situation where probably on average, 5

22

to 10 percent is probably good.

23

in which, you know, a 5 to 10 percent price increase

24

won’t work, but a 20 percent price increase might.

25

if you come across that, well, you should use it.

And that is, you’re worried about you
So,

But there might be cases
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On the lower end, my view is a little more

2

ambiguous, I guess, because I’m not really sure that once

3

you start to get down to 1 or 2 percent, whether that’s

4

really something that you can really apply with any kind

5

of confidence just because there’s so much noise at that

6

level.

7

MR. FEINSTEIN:

8

MR. BAKER:

9

Yes, John?

Well, I have no objection to a

variable SSNIP and it might make sense, but I want to

10

take a step back, also, in sort of the way Joe and Larry

11

were doing.

12

which transactions can be analyzed. There are markets

13

that are overlapping with each other. That is to say, if

14

there’s any market in the sense that Larry was

15

emphasizing, that would be one that would be profitable

16

monopolizing, which this particular merger presents a

17

problem, the agency ought to challenge it.

18

I think there are all sorts of markets in

And if it doesn’t look like you get one with a

19

small SSNIP, but you get a different market with a larger

20

one, that’s one where it looks like there’s a problem or

21

vice versa, you ought to challenge it in either one of

22

those that you see.

23

SSNIP -- that’s really only an imperfect substitute for

24

getting rid of the smallest market principle which is the

25

real underlying problem.

But the real problem is not with

Because there’s no reason to
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1

tie yourself to some smallest market when, you know, if

2

there’s a competitive problem in a larger one, why not

3

analyze it in that?

4

there’s a problem and challenge bad mergers, not to have

5

finality to an arbitrary smallest market that can get in

6

the way of doing that.

7

The goal is to figure out where

MR. FEINSTEIN:

You’ve anticipated what I was

8

coming to next, which is the smallest market principle

9

and the methodology which adds products in the order of

10

next best substitutes.

11

would agree with, John, are good candidates for

12

modification or are as they should be now?

13

MR. WHITE:

Are those areas that the panel

Well, the way I read the guidelines

14

is there’s enough generality there, that it’s sort of

15

generally the smallest, but it encompasses the kinds of

16

possibilities that John just described.

17

any need for big change there.

18

much confusion and so there needs to be a little bit of

19

clarifying language.

20

MR. FEINSTEIN:

21

MR. SIMONS:

So, I don’t see

Unless there’s just too

Joe?

Yeah, just to me it’s not really

22

clear why that was ever put in there.

23

could get clarified, maybe that would be helpful and keep

24

it in, or if it can’t, then maybe take it out.

25

MR. FEINSTEIN:

So, I mean, if it

So far our entire discussion
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has been, at least implicitly, focused on product market

2

issues.

3

on the general topic of geographic market.

4

a relevant market obviously includes both components, but

5

we’ve really been, at least implicitly, focusing on

6

identifying the products.

7

geographic market in the guidelines call for modification

8

in your opinion or your opinions?

9

I’d like to solicit the thoughts of this panel

MR. WHITE:

The notion of

Does the current treatment of

I don’t think so.

You’re right,

10

especially in unilateral effects, we tend to be thinking

11

in terms of -- the phrase I use, you know, customers

12

trapped between two -- their first and second choice

13

products, but you can think of customers trapped

14

geographically just as well.

15

both dimensions, both product space and geographic space,

16

I don’t see any need for greater clarification there.

17

MR. FEINSTEIN:

18

MR. SIMONS:

So, I tend to generally in

Joe, John, Eduardo?

The only thing that occurred to me

19

was that if the product is being sold on a deliberate

20

basis, then you might have a geographic price

21

discrimination and then maybe you want to define it by

22

the customers.

23

MR. BAKER:

Well, I gather the context of this

24

question is the way that the geographic market definition

25

section talks about the hypothetical model says the only
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present or future producer of the relevant product at

2

locations, and that the issue is when you think about

3

buyer substitution, the buyers aren’t substituting to the

4

location where the producer produces; it’s the location

5

where the producer sells.

6

right thing to do would be to -- I think that must be

7

what’s meant and to change it from producer to seller.

8

But it’s really the -- I think everyone does it that way

9

in practice.

10

MR. FEINSTEIN:

And I think that would be the

We’ve got three economists and

11

two lawyers on this panel, the second lawyer being the

12

moderator.

13

non-economic evidence.

14

with the point that was made earlier about dealing -- you

15

know, judges are typically generalists and may not be as

16

conversant in some of the topics that we’ve been talking

17

about.

18

your views on the role of non-economic evidence, in

19

particular, things like customer statements or internal

20

documents which reflect business people’s assessment of

21

the competitive landscape.

22

evidence play in the market definition exercise that

23

we’ve been discussing?

24
25

But I want to ask a question about the use of
It ties in a little bit, I think,

I’d be interested in hearing from each of you

What role should that kind of

Eduardo?

MR. PEREZ MOTTA:

I think you should use it.

Not only to use the non-economic evidence, but also when
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-- I’m just looking at this problem on the authority

2

side.

3

that is going to judge your resolution is a non-

4

economist.

5

more general.

6

to be open to use non-economic elements.

7

we are -- in Mexico, we are pragmatic in that sense,

8

especially when you find a merger with direct evidence --

9

this goes to your first question as well.

10

direct evidence, you don’t see a problem.

You have to understand that in the end, the person

11

So, the problem, I think, is a little bit
It’s not only the use or the possibility
In this case,

With the

If it’s clear that there is not a problem with

12

that case, you have to stop there.

13

further.

14

evidence on markets, which is important.

15

You don’t have to go

And there you include non-economic or direct

Now, if you have to go to the economic analysis

16

and you have to define the relevant market and then to

17

follow all the five steps that I was describing at the

18

beginning, I think the challenge that you have as an

19

agency, a competition agency, is something that is fairly

20

obvious.

21

you can explain all the sophisticated analyses that you

22

are using in very simple terms, strong and very well

23

articulated, but simple so that judges could understand

24

easily your analysis and could evaluate and judge not

25

only your procedures, but the substance of what you are

But sometimes it’s not easy to do.
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doing.

2

MR. FEINSTEIN:

3

MR. BAKER:

John.

Well, so I approach this question

4

this way.

5

buyer substitution in defining markets and, more

6

precisely, the way the question has been refined in the

7

context of the guidelines, how buyers would substitute in

8

response to a price increase.

9

We’re interested in the economic force of

I think of the evidence that one might bring to

10

bear in answering that question as falling into five

11

different categories.

12

responded to changes in the relative prices in the past?

13

It’s something one could think about.

14

what do buyers say -- you know, you survey them or

15

whatever -- about how they would likely respond today if

16

prices were to change?

17

The first is, how have buyers

The second is,

The third is inferring something about likely

18

buyer responses to changes in prices from characteristics

19

of the products and locations that are known to matter to

20

buyers.

21

might be you work out the engineering study of the

22

switching costs in geographic market definition and would

23

it be profitable to go a little bit further in the amount

24

of price rise to get your product or not?

25

do this on the product side as well.

So, what I have in mind there, for example,

But we could
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The fourth category is inference about buyer

2

substitution from the conduct of sellers.

3

experts on their buyers.

4

monitoring price changes at certain rival firms, certain

5

rival products and responding to them, then you’re

6

learning actually about buyer substitution from that

7

because you’re making an inference -- you’re learning

8

what these experts think about buyer substitution.

9

Sellers are

So, if the sellers are

Then the fifth category is the views of other

10

industry experts, you know, more broadly than the

11

sellers.

12

association folks or sellers of complementary products

13

who know about the market they sell into or buy from.

14

So, consultants or former executives or trade

So, there are five categories of evidence.

15

Each of those categories you could have evidence that is

16

systematic and quantitative or that’s anecdotal or

17

qualitative.

18

price changes in the past, you might think, well, you’re

19

talking about measuring demand elasticities.

20

I am, but you might also just be asking the firms’

21

executives who have -- I remember a consulting thing I

22

worked once where the company said, well, yeah, we tried

23

raising price in Milwaukee, you know, on our product and

24

we got hammered.

25

response of buyers to changes in prices in the past.

So, even for the response of buyers to

Well, maybe

Well, that’s evidence about the
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all of these types of evidence can, in different cases,

2

be probative.

3

And, so, what you are really looking for is the

4

type of evidence and the style, the form, you know, the

5

qualitative, quantitative, whatever, that happens to be

6

most probative in the particular facts of the case.

7

you rely on that or you put it all together.

8

think there is any general preference for any type of

9

evidence or any form in which it comes.

And

So, I don’t

10

MR. WHITE:

11

what John just said.

12

categories one and two, which I would paraphrase what did

13

consumers do in the past in response to price changes of

14

which the sophisticated version is working out demand

15

elasticities and diversion ratios, et cetera, versus a

16

consumer survey, what would they do in the future in

17

response?

18

Okay, I’m really intrigued with
I was going to stop with just his

Now, empirical economists’ bias is to trust

19

more the category one rather than category two because,

20

gee, you know, can they really imagine all the full

21

circumstances?

22

“did” so long as can you do the appropriate controlling

23

for other things, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

24
25

The “would” feels much weaker than the

I started thinking about, though, his third
category.

All right, you get engineering studies

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

181
1

inferring switching costs.

But where did those data come

2

from?

3

You know, where else have the engineers come up with the

4

parameters for that estimate?

Either they came from “what did” or “what would.”

5

Now, category four, gee, that’s pretty strong.

6

I mean, I absolutely endorse John’s insight here that the

7

sellers revealed behavior here telling you something

8

about “what did.”

9

information about “what did.”

10

And then category five, use of other industry

11

experts.

12

their information?

13

would.”

14

two categories.

15

I mean, sort of strong, strong

Well, again, you’re back to where did they get
It’s either from “what did” or “what

So, I think it’s really useful to focus on the
“What did,” “what would.”

As an economist, I like “what did” better.

And

16

I like John’s extra insight, look at, whenever you can,

17

past seller’s behavior, but it’s going to be based on

18

“what did.”

19

MR. FEINSTEIN:

20

MR. SIMONS:

Joe.

So, the funny thing about the

21

discussion so far, at least from my lawyer’s perspective,

22

is that if you looked at the guidelines, those things are

23

kind of listed in the guidelines already.

24

that’s not listed in the guidelines is econometrics.

25

I don’t know, maybe you want to put that in there.

But the thing
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2

not.
But the only point I would make is that it’s --

3

this non-economic evidence is the most important because

4

you can win a case, you can have a case without the

5

econometric evidence.

6

evidence, I don’t think you’re going to win a case if

7

that’s all you have.

8

everything points in the same direction.

9

If you just have the econometric

Like I said, the best case is

MR. FEINSTEIN:

We are right at our end point,

10

but I’m going to ask the audience’s indulgence to give us

11

two more minutes.

12

would like, in 30 seconds, to offer a final observation,

13

now’s your opportunity.

14

our way back.

15
16

There are four of us.

MR. SIMONS:

If any of you

Let’s start with Joe and work

I think I’ve said everything I

would say, so I don’t need to take up your time.

17

MR. FEINSTEIN:

18

MR. WHITE:

19

One, I didn’t add --

Okay, not required.

Okay, I want to make two points.

20

MR. FEINSTEIN:

21

MR. WHITE:

You can take Joe’s time.

Okay.

Which was, you know, there

22

may be times when you don’t have any “what did” evidence

23

and, so, the best you can do is use the survey “what

24

would” and you just do the best you can with it.

25

don’t want to rule out “what would”, but you have to

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

So, I

183
1
2

understand its limitation.
The other thing, I’m really glad you mentioned

3

econometrics, Joe.

4

just statistics, guys.

5

And you can understand the idea that, you know, means

6

might be different.

7

slightly more complicated version of that where you’ve

8

got to try to start controlling other things.

9

Econometrics gets a bad rap.

It’s

And you understand means okay?

Well, econometrics is just a

The fact that you may not have a lot of

10

training in econometrics, if you were dealing with a

11

traffic accident case, you might have engineers coming in

12

to try to tell you about whether the brakes failed or

13

didn’t fail or the skid properties of asphalt when it’s

14

wet to this degree and maybe you need to bring a

15

meteorologist in.

16

expertise that you may not have.

17

again, it’s just another set of expertise.

18

dealing with means and averages, only a little more

19

complicated.

And there’s going to be all kinds of

20

MR. FEINSTEIN:

21

MR. BAKER:

22

It’s like

John.

I just thought I’d add that my

engineer has another source of expertise, too.

23

MR. FEINSTEIN:

24

MR. PEREZ MOTTA:

25

Sorry, econometrics is,

econometrics discussion.

Eduardo.
Let me just touch on the

I think in the end the
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challenge that we have is how to explain the econometric

2

results in such a way that you can make something that is

3

easy to understand.

4

can make them work in the same direction.

5

need a sophisticated econometric analysis to protect your

6

decision and you have to use it, and I think it’s better

7

to use it.

So, I think both things go in -- you
Sometimes you

8

But the challenge is how you can put that you

9

in words that could be understandable for a person that

10

is going to judge your decision, that is going to be a

11

lawyer.

12

MR. FEINSTEIN:

I guess the final observation I

13

would make -- maybe the first observation I would offer

14

is picking up on Larry’s distinction between “what did”

15

happen and “what would” happen.

16

about a consummated transaction, at the end of the day,

17

we are always trying to figure out what will happen.

18

And, therefore, I think both “what did” and “what would”

19

are probative.

20

Unless you’re talking

Please join me in thanking this panel, and

21

we’ll reconvene at 3:30 for the final panel of the day

22

which will address unilateral effects.

23

much.

24

(Applause.)

25

(Panel 3 concluded.)

Thank you very
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PANEL FOUR:

2

MR. SHAPIRO:

UNILATERAL EFFECTS

Let us resume here for our last

3

panel of the day.

4

at the Justice Department, one of the people on the

5

working group.

6

sticking around until the last panel.

7

interest.

8
9

I’m Carl Shapiro, Chief Economist over

Thank you, guys, for being here and for
I appreciate the

Before I introduce the panel, I came with my
copy of the merger guidelines; I never go anywhere

10

without the canary yellow merger guidelines.

11

one doesn’t have the ‘97 revisions.

12

guidelines. See, this is why you need to learn more about

13

efficiencies, okay?

14

could benefit from that, I’m sure.

15

The blue

See, this is the ‘92

We’ll talk about that.

Your clients

Yellow is ‘97, okay?

But little did I realize the FTC version with

16

the beautiful picture of the FTC that was going to be

17

available for everybody today -- now, I suppose I’ll have

18

to assign some of my staff to make sure there’s no

19

additional things here that are not in the joint version.

20

So, everybody, this is a big opportunity to get your own

21

copy of the guidelines with the -- get them while they’re

22

still in force.

23

Okay, let me very briefly introduce the

24

panelists.

The topic is unilateral effects.

25

touched on that and it’s come up a number of times
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earlier today, probably, in fact, on all the panels to

2

some degree.

3

perspective, Alison Oldale is a Chief Economist at the UK

4

Competition Commissioner.

5

to her for coming so far to speak with us today,

6

particularly given the UK’s experience with their own

7

merger guidelines and unilateral effects analysis.

8

thank you, Alison.

9

So, on the right-hand side, from my

We’re especially appreciative

So,

Next to her is Renata Hesse, a partner at

10

Wilson Sonsini.

11

the Antitrust Division -- in fact, that’s when we first

12

met -- as well as now in private practice.

13

forward to that dual perspective.

14

Renata has quite a bit of experience in

So, I look

The same thing could be said of M. J.

15

Moltenbrey, who is a partner at Howrey, also many years

16

of experience in the Antitrust Division and now in

17

private practice.

18

So, that’s extremely valuable.

On my left, Steve Salop, my longtime friend.

19

We were consultants together at Charles River.

20

Professor of Economics and Law at Georgetown University

21

Law Center across the street and a senior consultant at

22

Charles River Associates.

23

He’s a

And at the end, Marius Schwartz, Professor of

24

Economics at Georgetown University, Senior Academic

25

Affiliate of Bates White, also a great friend of the
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Antitrust Division.

Thank you, both.

2

As we’ve been doing in the other panels today,

3

I want to give each of the panelists five to ten minutes

4

to make some opening statements and then we’ll have

5

discussion.

6

Let me just very quickly frame what I see as

7

one of our goals.

We had one detailed question in our

8

questions for public comment on unilateral effects.

9

happens to be question number ten, where we pointed out

It

10

that unilateral effects were introduced in the guidelines

11

in ‘92.

12

then.

13

it there -- should the guidelines be updated to reflect

14

this experience and the learning that’s taken place in

15

the intervening 17 and 18 years, and we list the number

16

of ways in which that might happen.

17

There’s been a lot of experience gained since

The overall question here, I think, is -- we put

It’s pretty clear from earlier panels today,

18

there are a set of issues around how unilateral effects

19

interacts with the market definition.

20

example, Larry White, and I think perhaps Jonathan Baker

21

as well, in the previous panel saying, well, if you’ve

22

identified an effect, maybe a unilateral effect, raising

23

of the prices of the products sold by the merging firms,

24

that there must be market around that and that maybe you

25

could short-circuit or back out market definition.

We heard, for
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So, there’s an intersection with market

2

definition.

There’s clearly an intersection as well with

3

what generally we’re calling direct evidence; that is to

4

say, evidence that’s not based on inferences from market

5

structure.

6

Willig say, well, you should look at a variety of

7

evidence, maybe you don’t want to have particular pieces

8

of it and get carried away about that.

9

talk about what would be the most probative and

And earlier we heard, for example, Bobby

But we’d want to

10

convincing evidence regarding unilateral effects and

11

could the guidelines say more about that because they

12

don’t get into any detail on what lines of inquiry are

13

followed.

14

unilateral effects, but don’t go beyond that.

15

question.

I mean, they explain the basic logic of
It’s a

Would it benefit if they did so?

16

So, with that framing, let’s start with Alison.

17

MS. OLDALE:

Hi.

I want to start by thanking

18

the FTC and the DOJ for inviting me here to participate

19

in the debate about the U.S. guidelines.

20

mentioned, in the UK, we are in the middle of revising

21

our own merger guidelines.

22

can be to look back over recent practice and learning and

23

to try to capture all of that in a clear way in

24

guidelines and how much more challenging it is to take on

25

board the often passionately expressed views of

As Carl

So, I know how challenging it
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commentators, practitioners and others.

Challenging, but

2

hopefully leading to better guidelines.

And I commend

3

the FTC and the DOJ for organizing these workshops.

4

I’m going to make some opening remarks about

5

the UK’s experience of unilateral effects analysis in

6

merger controls, focusing on differentiated products

7

markets.

8

unusual at all about the UK experience.

9

at the case where we think there might be unilateral

In one very important sense, there’s nothing
If we’re looking

10

effects, we will be focusing very much on trying to work

11

out what effect the merger has on the pricing incentives

12

of the parties, we’ll be trying to understand how they

13

compete with each other, what other constraints there are

14

that might effect what their behavior will be after the

15

merger and generally how the market operates.

16

We do think about market definition, but it

17

doesn’t dominate or determine or drive our analysis.

18

I understand that’s pretty much the way the agencies here

19

in the States actually do their cases.

20

unusual in the UK is how explicit we are that this is

21

what we’re doing.

22

ways.

23

And

Perhaps what’s

And that comes through in a number of

Our existing guidelines stress that market

24

definition and unilateral effect analysis interact.

25

not just a sequential process of doing one and then the
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other and that both of them often rest on very similar

2

analysis on a very similar fact base.

3

If you look through our decisions, it’s very

4

rare that you will see a huge amount of emphasis on

5

concentration measures and it’s very unusual that we will

6

put a huge amount of weight on them.

7

recent decisions are becoming quite explicit that high

8

margins and high diversion ratios are pretty good

9

evidence that a merger will lead to a big change in the

In particular,

10

pricing incentives of the merging parties.

11

often captured in a measure of -- some measure of the

12

pricing pressure, the upward pricing pressure that a

13

merger creates.

14

price rise.

15

to make all this even more explicit.

16

And this is

The version we use we call additive

And we are currently revising our guidelines

So, the draft that was put out for consultation

17

in the summer also notes the evidential value of high

18

margin and high diversion ratios for thinking about the

19

change in pricing incentives of merging parties when

20

we’re looking at unilateral effects and differentiated

21

products markets.

22

It’s also worth noting in the context of some

23

of the debates that have been going on earlier our

24

existing guidelines.

25

analysis as a framework for thinking about how to apply

We already mentioned critical loss
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the hypothetical monopolist test.

2

we’re a bit more explicit that margins can tell you

3

something about elasticities and you might want to use

4

that in your critical loss.

5

In the new guidelines,

How have parties and practitioners responded to

6

all of this?

Well, there have been three main comments.

7

The first comment is, come on, guys, this is all too easy

8

for yourselves, all you’re doing is looking at the

9

relationship between the two parties.

What about all of

10

those other constraints that market definition process

11

highlights and forces upon you?

12

this perception, I think.

13

in some of the decisions.

14

We do need to address

And we are trying to do that

So, the points I think that we’re trying to

15

make is to stress that unilateral effects analysis uses

16

all of the information about all of the other

17

constraints.

18

looking at unilateral effects.

19

diversion ratio is a ratio.

20

just the diversion between the merging parties.

21

the bottom, you’ve got the whole world.

22

the diversion to everything else that might be acting as

23

a constraint.

There’s no lack of discipline involved in
For example, the

On the top, you may have
But on

So, you’ve got

They don’t get lost in the analysis.

24

And, also, in order to implement some sort of

25

unilateral effects analysis, you really do need to know
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quite a lot about the nature of competition and the

2

intensity of competition on the market.

3

margins and the elasticities come in.

4

That’s where the

You still have to think about entry,

5

repositioning and buyer power once you’ve done your

6

initial analysis of whether there’s the upward pressure

7

on pricing, just as you do if you start with market

8

definition and concentration measures.

9

So, we’re hoping to stress that nothing gets

10

lost in what we’re doing.

11

decisions we are more explicit that high margins and high

12

diversion ratios not only suggest a big change in the

13

pricing incentives of the merging parties, but also

14

suggest that the merging parties form a big part of the

15

defined market, if not a market unto themselves.

16

Again, in some very recent

To use a phrase that one of my colleagues at

17

the OFT, Chris Walters, who’s been injecting a lot of

18

energy into the process of getting these things into our

19

practice, he uses the phrase “back into market definition

20

from the unilateral effects analysis,” which I think Carl

21

mentioned earlier as well.

22

So, that’s the first comment.

The first

23

comment is, guys, you’re making life too easy for

24

yourselves, you’re losing discipline.

25

is, hang on, this is all too difficult and onerous and

The second comment
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requires far too much information.

2

think we need to address this.

3

believe, is to stress in our decisions the commonality

4

between market definition and unilateral effects, as I’ve

5

just mentioned.

6

similar the question is.

7

question.

8
9

Well, again, I do

And the way to do it, I

But in particular in this case, how
It is a really similar

So, the question for the -- the unilateral
effects question is, would a hypothetical monopoly

10

supplier of the party’s products raise their prices?

11

the question for the market definition exercise is, would

12

a hypothetical monopoly supplier of the party’s products,

13

plus a bunch of other stuff, raise prices?

14

very, very similar question.

15

reasons for thinking that either of them is more or less

16

difficult than the other.

17

And

So, it’s a

There’s no particular

So, that’s the first question.

It’s all too

18

easy.

The second question, it’s all too difficult.

But

19

to be honest, the most common comment that we get is,

20

okay, if you’re going to do it, please tell me how.

21

of these cases are in retail mergers where the parties

22

just want to know where they’ve got to make divestments.

23

Most of the debate that we have with parties and their

24

practitioners is about the details of how to do it,

25

rather than the principles.

Lots

And I confess, this is all a
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work in progress.

2

questions that we are working on through our casework,

3

but they’re not closed yet.

4

There are quote a lot of practical

A biggie, margins and how to measure them.

5

It’s going to be increasingly important that we really

6

understand how to do that.

7

get them from.

8

is the measure of upward pricing pressure that we should

9

use?

Diversion ratios and where to

Can we rely on surveys and so on?

What

I said that we have been using a particular one,

10

but there are questions, what to do when you have multi-

11

product firms.

12

do you deal with asymmetry?

13

model or should you see some variance?

14

the sensitivity to the demand function?

15

continue looking at these things.

Do you use the same sort of model?

How

Again, do you use the same
What about all of
We need to

16

And then, finally, materiality.

If we’re going

17

to start getting indications of some sort of upward

18

pressure on prices, then how much is too much?

19

like the approach of trying to link this pricing pressure

20

to some sort of measure of required offsetting

21

efficiencies, following Werden, Farrell and Shapiro.

22

to me, it’s the end game of a clearer focus on unilateral

23

effects, it’s a clearer focus of thinking about

24

efficiencies and materiality, then I, for one, would

25

think that was a good thing.

Thank you.
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MR. SHAPIRO:

Thank you very much, Alison.

2

Before I go to our next speaker, I may put you on the

3

spot a little bit and could you just take another minute

4

to tell us where you are in your process?

5

a bunch of comments filed on your own proposed merger

6

guidelines review.

7

I know you had

What’s the next step?

MS. OLDALE:

The next step will be to revise

8

the draft guidelines in light of those comments and then

9

put them out there, hopefully the beginning of next year.

10

MR. SHAPIRO:

11

MS. OLDALE:

12

MR. SHAPIRO:

13
14

Okay, well, good luck.
Thank you.
And thank you.

Next, M. J.

Moltenbrey.
MS. MOLTENBREY:

Let me start with what I think

15

is probably, at least on this panel and perhaps in

16

general, a relatively noncontroversial position that,

17

yes, the unilateral effects section of the current

18

guidelines should be revised.

19

disagreement about exactly how that should be done.

20

There may be a little more

As many people have mentioned and Carl

21

mentioned in his introduction, the unilateral effects

22

portion of the guidelines, as a separate and distinct

23

analytical exercise in merger review, was introduced in

24

the ‘92 revisions of the guidelines.

25

was a staff attorney at the Department of Justice.

And at the time, I
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can say that those guidelines and the introduction of

2

those guidelines did have a significant impact on the way

3

I and my colleagues looked at mergers and thought about

4

competitive effects analysis when looking at a merger.

5

Not that no unilateral effects analysis had been done

6

prior to the guidelines, but it really did kind of

7

institutionalize and discipline the process quite a bit.

8
9

I don’t have any statistics.

I haven’t tried

to do this statistically, but if you do a kind of cursory

10

review of recent cases brought by both the FTC and the

11

DOJ, it’s clear that unilateral effects theories of

12

competitive harm have been increasingly important and

13

prevalent, and more and more, there is a unilateral

14

effects theory pled either on its own or in addition to a

15

coordinated effects theory, which, again, is something

16

that is fairly different from when I first started

17

practicing antitrust law.

18

If you’re an antitrust lawyer or an economist,

19

unless have you been in the cave for the past couple of

20

years, you’re going to be familiar with some of the work

21

that Carl and Joe Farrell have done on trying to develop

22

models for measuring unilateral effects in mergers,

23

looking at division ratios and margins and trying to

24

develop an index to measure the effects of a merger and,

25

basically, abandoning reliance on concentration as an
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indicator of likely competitive effects.
I recognize this is done in their private

3

capacity not in their capacities as the heads of the

4

economic teams at the two agencies.

5

example of some of the thinking that’s going on and some

6

of the more sophisticated economic analysis that is out

7

there and available to people to use when looking at

8

unilateral effects -- potential unilateral effects cases.

9

And that’s only one

Another observation I will make, though, is

10

that while the agencies seem to be looking at unilateral

11

effects and people are thinking a lot about unilateral

12

effects, it seems that the courts have not been quite as

13

enthusiastic in terms of adopting or following or

14

accepting the theories that had been posited by the

15

agencies, certainly not in some of the litigated cases.

16

Just a couple of examples, I would point to the

17

baby foods case, the Whole Foods/Wild Oats merger and

18

Oracle/PeopleSoft, examples where, at least at the trial

19

court level, the court seemed to struggle with the

20

agency’s use of a unilateral effects theory and the

21

evidence that the agencies were relying on.

22

And then even at the appellate court level,

23

where the government has prevailed, for example, in the

24

Wild Oats case, whether you agree with the outcome of the

25

decision or not, it’s hard not to see some significant
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flaws in the reasoning of the court and the court’s

2

ability to take some pretty complicated economic concepts

3

and apply them, again, dealing with a court that was very

4

much a generalist judge and not an antitrust specialist.

5

And, so, it seems to be that there’s a clear

6

need or a clear potential benefit of clarifying and

7

expanding the merger guidelines to incorporate some of

8

the agency’s learning, to explain better what the

9

agencies are doing.

I am going to leave, I guess, for

10

the discussion period because I don’t want to take up too

11

much time, some of the more detailed suggestions that I

12

might make, but I do want to make a couple of

13

observations where I think changes might be warranted.

14

It has come up several times today and Carl

15

mentioned it again in his introduction, that it’s hard to

16

talk about unilateral effects analysis and not talk about

17

market definition issues.

18

as written, there’s a lot of clumsiness in the way the

19

unilateral effects portion of the guidelines talks about

20

market definition and tries to incorporate it.

21

time they were written, I’m sure there were a lot of

22

efforts to kind of make this seem like not such a

23

dramatic departure from what had been going on and what

24

had happened under the prior guidelines.

25

unilateral effects section references things like the

But in the current guidelines

At the

So, the
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safe harbors of the HHI

2

percent market share.

3

a lot of cases, when you actually try and apply, there’s

4

just really a logical disconnect.

5

numbers and references 35

In a lot of cases, not all, but in

If you are dealing with a merger involving two

6

companies that are their closest substitutes and you

7

apply product market definition, so you start with

8

product A and you add the next best substitute, by

9

definition it’s product B and the merging party’s

10

product, and ask whether a hypothetical monopolist could

11

raise price.

12

case, the answer is, yes, they could raise price and,

13

therefore, that is your product market.

14

Well, if you have a unilateral effects

To then turn around and say, and then we look

15

at whether or not you are above the HHI thresholds or

16

whether or not you have a 35 percent market share is a

17

bit tautological because almost by definition you have

18

just decided that you have 100 percent combined market

19

share for those two combined products.

20

In other circumstances, let’s take a market

21

where you have products A, products B, and products C,

22

and in the event of a price rise of 5 percent or more in

23

product A, most customers would shift to B but a

24

significant number would shift to product C.

25

consequence of this merger, you believe that when A can

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

As a

200
1

capture those increased sales that would shift to C,

2

suddenly a price increase that would not have been

3

profitable beforehand, would become profitable.

4

If you actually do the merger guidelines’

5

current product market definition exercise, you start

6

with A, you add B, because that’s the next best

7

substitute.

8

whether the monopolist could or would raise price

9

profitably.

Most people would switch to B.

The answer is yes.

You ask

You have defined your

10

market.

C is not even in your market.

11

clearly, we know that there is a competitive effect when

12

A merges with C.

13

Although,

So, in both of those examples, it’s clear

14

there’s really not a good fit between what the agencies

15

are doing and how the current guidelines suggest that you

16

go about market definition.

17

further when you start talking about whether or not you

18

are within or outside the safe harbors of HHI thresholds

19

or whether or not you have a combined share of 35

20

percent.

21

in the revision should be to clarify some of that

22

confusion.

23

This just gets confused even

So, at a minimum, I think, one of the exercises

There are cases where you’re going to find a

24

unilateral effect with a merger, but you’re not going to

25

define it as a complete market.

One example might be
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that you decide that if A and B combine, A could raise

2

prices by 3 percent, but not by 5 percent.

3

maybe you don’t meet the SSNIP test.

4

start adding more products in.

5

cases where you’re going to have a properly defined

6

product market under the existing market definition

7

principles that doesn’t just consist of the two merging

8

companies.

9

that might come about.

So, okay,

So, you’re going to

So, maybe there are some

But that’s only one of the many possibilities
So, I think that’s an area that

10

clearly could benefit from greater clarity and

11

elucidation.

12

I could talk about that for a while, but I know

13

others on the panel can probably talk about it in more

14

detail than I will.

15

that I think might benefit from clarification.

16

2.212 of the current guidelines suggests that --

So, I’ll just mention one other area

17

MR. SHAPIRO:

Get your copies out.

18

MS. MOLTENBREY:

Section

Come on.

If other participants -- I’m

19

not going to say in the market because I’m not sure that

20

makes sense, but other participants in the industry might

21

reposition so that they would capture more of the lost

22

sales of the merging companies, that you would not likely

23

have an anti-competitive effect and that should be taken

24

into account.

25

But both in the merger guidelines commentary
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and I would suggest even in the agency practice, what was

2

given with one hand seems to be taken away with the

3

other.

4

they rarely find that repositioning would be sufficient

5

to overcome a unilateral effect and, in fact, it is hard

6

to find cases where it appears that the agencies accepted

7

a repositioning argument.

8

again, warrants maybe more than the very brief attention

9

that’s given to it in the existing guidelines and ought

In the commentary, the agencies have said that

I think that is an area that,

10

to either be revised -- depending on who you ask, either

11

the guidelines or the agency practice might need

12

revisions.

13
14
15
16

And I will stop there and save the rest for
question and answer.
MR. SHAPIRO:

Okay, thanks, M. J., Marius

Schwartz next.

17

MR. SCHWARTZ:

Okay, thanks, Carl.

18

You all posed 20 great questions and question

19

10 has eight parts and I’m only going to deal with one

20

part of question 10, which is the relationship between

21

market definition and unilateral effects and only one

22

aspect of that, and that is what type of evidence should

23

we use in merger review and why?

24

And the quick answer, of course, is you use both.

25

order shouldn’t matter, as has been mentioned.

Direct or structural?
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should iterate between these two types of evidence.

2

None of this is remarkable, of course, but I

3

hope to flush out the reasons for doing that and

4

illustrate with an example from a merger challenge that

5

was brought by the Department of Justice where I was an

6

expert.

7

So, go back to what a horizontal merger does.

8

It consolidates the ownership of assets used by the firms

9

to compete in supplying their overlap product or

10

services.

11

risk of substantial harm to consumers, is that the

12

requisite assets very broadly defined tangible,

13

intangible, whatever it takes to supply this stuff, are

14

in sufficiently scarce supply to other firms, at least

15

over the relevant time frame.

16

brainer.

17

because there could still be efficiencies.

18

So, a necessary condition for there to be the

That seems like a no-

That’s a necessary, not sufficient, condition

So, a fundamental question -- maybe the

19

fundamental question is, do the merged firms possess some

20

unique assets?

21

important unique assets.

22

challenge is, how do you get at this from the kind of

23

evidence you have in practice?

24
25

That’s the question.

And relatively

Of course, the operational

There are two ways to start the inquiry which
starts off with different types of information.
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going to call one bottom up, which is start by trying to

2

identify the fundamental assets that are needed and who

3

might have them, and the other one is top down.

4

with evidence about competitive outcomes, who seems to be

5

competing with who, what are the results, and then try to

6

understand the why, the drivers.

7

Start

The bottom up approach starts by trying to

8

identify the key attributes of the competing products,

9

the physical dimensions, the geography, and so on.

And

10

then asking which other firms have or could easily get

11

these things to get the assets needed to generate those

12

attributes.

13

the same kind of questions that we ask when we do market

14

definition.

15

Well, you need to know what matters.

16

reasonable except that, oftentimes, when we try to do the

17

market definition formally, it’s hard to pin down the

18

exact dimensions of the product market of the geography

19

because it’s not always obvious.

20

differentiated in many dimensions, it’s not always

21

obvious the relative importance of various dimensions.

22

It’s a structural analysis corresponding to

You say, what is the relevant product?
And that all seems

If products are

So, if you try to come up with a market

23

definition, you may well get stuck right there, unable to

24

show that there’s a narrow enough market in which

25

concentration is high enough to warrant concern.
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get knocked out of stage one before you even get to first

2

base.

So, that’s a problem.

3

Now, at the same time, in such cases, you may

4

well have suggestive direct evidence that those firms do

5

seem to compete pretty strong directly with each other

6

and lesser with other parties.

7

information that’s called evidence of competitive

8

effects.

9

type of information -- you know, we see that they seem to

That’s sometimes

I like to actually distinguish that.

It’s the

10

be bidding against each other a fair bit as compared to

11

others, but that doesn’t quite tell us that there will be

12

competitive effects.

13

before we get there.

14

We have a few more things to cross

But it’s a different kind of information.

15

Enough to suggest that even though we may not be able to

16

define the market with any precision, which would have

17

tripped us up in stage one, we really ought to take a

18

hard look.

19

may not know why it is that Steve and I are strong

20

competitors, but there may be good evidence that we are,

21

at least good suggestive evidence.

22

think of this, too.

23

So, in other words, the thing about it is, we

So, that’s how I

So, it makes sense to start there and say,

24

well, are there some fundamental underlying structural

25

factors, fundamental assets that do, in fact, validate
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that these two firms are especially close and that other

2

firms couldn’t step into the mix?

3

stop with this suggestive evidence.

4

because, one, there could be a lot of data problems with

5

win-loss and these kind of measures.

6

reasons that we could talk about later.

And, so, I view

7

these as very complementary approaches.

You look at the

8

suggestive evidence and then you try to understand is

9

there something fundamental that validates that?

It’s important to not
It’s important

And there’s other

And

10

that second step requires basically the kind of stuff we

11

do when we do a market definition of concentration, I

12

think.

13

Now, let me just illustrate all of this -- like

14

I said, it sounds pretty obvious.

Let me illustrate it

15

with a case study where I submitted a declaration.

16

involved a proposed merger of two amphitheaters in

17

Southern California that -- these are open-air venues

18

that were mainly used to stage rock concerts in the

19

summer.

20

vote.

21

Rickie Lee Jones.

This

So, this is the division trying to get the youth

And we showed our hipness when we referred to Mr.

22

(Laughter).

23

MR. SCHWARTZ:

For those who remember that.

24

Now, when I first looked at this case, there are so many

25

dots on the map of Southern California that were
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potential venues, you had no idea what to do with this

2

stuff.

3

what’s the relevant geography?

4

it also Los Angeles?

5

market.

6

written down dimensions -- by location, proximity to

7

freeways, availability of parking, noise restrictions,

8

size, outdoor versus indoor, general ambience.

9

stuff.

10

How can there possibly be a case here?

Well,

Is it Orange County or is

Not obvious a priori.

Product

Concert venues are differentiated -- I’ve

Lots of

If you tried to define the market from first

11

principles, you would have been killed, right?

12

just not enough information there to get a strong market

13

presumption of a market definition and high

14

concentration.

15

Baker says, let’s see how they view each other, who do

16

they think they’re competing with?

17

document that showed of all of the times when one

18

facility bid to attract an act, 90 percent of the time

19

they lost to the other guy.

20

You could say there’s something going on.

21

There’s

At the same time, picking up on what John

There was just a

Well, that’s interesting.

There were also documents suggesting that price

22

competition between those two was responsible for rock

23

groups getting a bigger percentage of the gate revenue

24

there than in other markets.

25

interesting and forced us to try and understand the why.

So, all of this was
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Look at the documents, talk to promoters, talk

2

to industry participants and pretty soon you got some

3

insight into this.

4

very close.

5

40 miles matters in Southern California.

6

comparable size.

7

50,000, are fine for the Rolling Stones but are not fine

8

for Mr. Rickie Lee Jones.

9

It turns out that these venues were

That mattered.

Twenty miles as opposed to
They were

Stadiums, for example, which were

(Laughter).

10

MR. SCHWARTZ:

The open-air nature mattered.

11

Furthermore, those attributes, once you understood why it

12

is these firms are uniquely close competitors are not

13

things that competitors could easily replicate.

14

getting a zoning variances in Southern California.

15

of which gave me a fair bit of confidence that you’ve got

16

something.

17

Try
All

Now, to supplement this and to put the market

18

definition concentration overlay, I actually did a

19

robustness check.

20

geography also Los Angeles, what happens?

21

we include also closed-air facilities and under 5,000,

22

what happens?

23

high.

24

your shares by -- when I say concentration, I meant by

25

revenues, how we measured it.

Let’s suppose that we include in the
Let’s suppose

The concentration still remained quite

Now, if you included the stadium and you measured

When you use your capacity
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as you measure, number of seats, well, yeah, it’s diluted

2

because a couple of stadiums wipe out the concentration,

3

but that’s not relevant because these are differentiated

4

products and just counting seats is not the right metric.

5

So, I give that as an example of how when we

6

think of unilateral effects and market definition,

7

there’s an aspect to this, which is, there’s different

8

kinds of information we tend to put under those buckets

9

and I think both of those are useful and they should both

10
11
12
13

be used.
So, let me just stop there and leave the rest
for Q and A.
MR. SHAPIRO:

Thank you so much.

14

good example.

15

very issues come up all the time.

That’s a very

Even a little dated, I think.

But those

So, thank you.

16

Next, I would like to turn to Renata Hesse.

17

MS. HESSE:

So, I was going to actually try to

18

talk about Oracle without really talking about Oracle

19

because I think everybody’s probably sick of hearing

20

about it, but it is something that both -- because I was

21

involved with it at the Division and also because I work

22

for technology companies a lot now, is a case I’ve given

23

a lot of thought to.

24

precisely why it is that Judge Walker ended up where he

25

was, given that we thought it was pretty clear that these

And I have tried to figure out

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

210
1

two companies were very close competitors and that we had

2

a lot of evidence suggesting that that was the case.

3

So, I don’t mean exactly how he got to the end

4

result because there’s been a lot of discussion about

5

how, in some ways, that might have been a foregone

6

conclusion.

7

problematic about the decision is this inherent tension

8

in it that he felt between how you define markets -- and

9

there’s a lot in the decision that you can read about how

But what I really mean is what, to me, is

10

he was struggling with this idea of defining markets too

11

narrowly -- and the assessment of competitive effects in

12

the context of differentiated product markets where what

13

you’re trying to focus on is figuring out whether or not

14

the products of the two merging firms are really next

15

best substitutes.

16

merger to monopoly for these two products.

17

in my view, Judge Walker ended up in a place that’s not

18

particularly helpful because he defined a very narrow set

19

of cases where you could find a problem.

20

In a sense, whether or not it’s a
And I think,

But what does that really have to do with the

21

guidelines?

So, I think one of the things you can give

22

him credit for -- and obviously as a losing party, I’m

23

willing to give him credit for very few things -- but he

24

really was struggling for guidance.

25

help with unilateral effects.

He was looking for

And you can see, if you
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read the opinion, that he read all kinds of economic

2

articles.

3

didn’t quite get them right, but he did look for

4

information.

5

The economists in the room might think he

And I don’t think the guidelines gave him very

6

much help because they really don’t say very much about

7

how to look at market definition and unilateral effects

8

in the context of differentiated product markets and they

9

really don’t address the unique issues associated with

10

these two pieces that you’re looking at, market

11

definition and competitive effects.

12

everybody so far who’s spoken has basically agreed in the

13

context of at least differentiated products, the analyses

14

really aren’t very different.

15

really say very much about that.

16

would be helpful to have more explication of how it

17

really works.

18

And I think

But the guidelines don’t
And, so, I think it

I guess in my view there are kind of two things

19

you can do.

And I guess there’s a third thing, which I

20

will start with, which is basically saying you don’t need

21

you to define markets when you’re looking at unilateral

22

effects in differentiated product markets.

23

that the Supreme Court has basically said you have to

24

define markets, that’s pretty much off the table.

25

despite the fact that that might be economically the

I think given
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right thing to do, I’m not sure you can just mandate

2

through guidelines that you don’t have to define markets.

3

I think people are going to continue until case law

4

changes.

5

So, once you’re in the world of defining

6

markets, I think you’ve got two choices.

And one is to

7

really understand and make more transparent that in the

8

context of differentiated product mergers and unilateral

9

-- I always get tongue-tied around this, unilateral

10

effects cases involving differentiated products, that the

11

market definition analysis is going to tend to lead to

12

much smaller and narrow markets and in many, many cases

13

may, in fact, lead to just two firm markets and that you

14

shouldn’t be afraid of that.

It’s okay.

15

You can look at -- I think it’s the Staples

16

decision where you sort of get the feeling that Judge

17

Hogan is like, I can’t define this narrowly as a market,

18

I’ll call it a sub-market and that will be okay.

19

market.

20

market in terms of competitive effects, it’s a market and

21

we should let the world know that’s all right, judges,

22

you can do that.

23

It’s a

I mean, if you want to think about that as a

The other option I think is to continue to do

24

what I’ll call sort of traditional market definition,

25

which will tell you, I think, something about market
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dynamics, but it won’t really give you very much insight

2

and it certainly won’t tell you enough about what’s going

3

on so that you can get into the world where you’re

4

talking about presumptions.

5

think there has to be some explicit statement that that’s

6

also okay.

7

And if you go that route, I

By that, I think what I’m really talking about

8

is sort of a recalibration of how we think about market

9

definition in this context.

So, if you define markets

10

narrowly, it may not be appropriate to label a firm

11

dominant, as Judge Walker said in Oracle.

12

traditionally defined market, the firm may have very low

13

market shares.

14

thought was the case in Oracle.

15

In a

In fact, that was what Judge Walker

Conversely, if you continue to define markets

16

more broadly, but then, in terms of thinking about

17

competitive effects, focus more uniquely on the

18

competitive interaction between the two firms, it may be

19

similarly inappropriate to say that the plaintiff, in

20

many cases the agency, that you failed to meet a

21

presumption and you don’t have a prima facie case because

22

you don’t have a structural case and the market is not

23

concentrated and, therefore, you can’t go forward.

24

think there just has to be some acknowledgment that

25

these two similar, but different ways of thinking about
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market definition in the context of unilateral effects

2

cases are different than what you’re going to do in a

3

coordinated effects case, for example, but they really

4

are okay.

5

beginning, but they’re actually, from an economic

6

perspective, correct and that courts and practitioners

7

shouldn’t shy away from them.

8
9
10

They may seem a little bizarre at the

So, there’s a lot more to say about these
things, but I will pass the mic back to Carl.
MR. SHAPIRO:

Thank you, Renata.

We are going

11

to follow up on that, I promise you that.

12

we hear from our last panelist, Steve Salop.

13

MR. SALOP:

Thank you.

But not before

I just want to say, as

14

I begin, this represents joint work that I’m doing with

15

my colleague, Serge Moresi, at CRA.

16

What I want to focus on today is really two

17

issues and a third if I’ve got time.

The first is

18

downgrading the importance of market shares and

19

concentration in unilateral effects cases.

20

there’s anything wrong with defining a market in

21

unilateral effects cases, though Mark Popofsky told us

22

this morning that both he and Judge Posner think that

23

Section 7 of the Clayton Act don’t actually require that.

24

But rather whether or not we define a market, the issue

25

is the importance that we’re going to place on market

I don’t think
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share and concentration.

2

The second thing I want to talk about is

3

alternative presumptions, alternative evidence that we

4

can use in unilateral effects cases if we do downgrade

5

the role of market shares and concentration.

6

And then, third, if there’s time, I want to

7

talk a little bit about deterrence and the role of

8

deterrence in the merger guidelines because it’s

9

something I found that was left out of the questions and

10

is something that’s really very important.

11

In the previous panel, with respect to market

12

definition, they talked about, gee, there’s really a lot

13

of consensus about the SSNIP test, and I don’t think

14

that’s true.

15

well, there may be a lot of consensus, but there’s not

16

consensus on the SSNIP test, which implies unanimity.

17

think there are real problems with the hypothetical

18

monopolist SSNIP test in the guidelines and I think that

19

it requires a lot of renovation that also indicates why

20

we should be downgrading the role of market shares.

I think that there’s not much consensus --

21

The SSNIP test is really very elegant

22

methodology, but it’s both complicated and very

23

imperfect.

24

ambiguous results.

25

can’t tell what market is most appropriate.

I

And as a result, it often leads to very
Noisy evidence at best.

You often
And I think
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the revised guidelines should explicitly concede this

2

point.

3

Shelanski.

4

of market shares should be downgraded.

It was made very nicely in a paper by Katz and

5

And it implies that the role of concentration

Now, we already know from Baker Hughes and

6

other cases that the Philadelphia National Bank

7

presumption has been weakened over the last 40 years, and

8

I think a key reason for that are the flaws in market

9

share and concentration as indicating competitive

10

effects.

11

would say sort of it’s interesting the ABA’s comments to

12

the questions ignored the fact that if you weaken the

13

presumption, the Philadelphia National Bank presumption,

14

which they wanted to do, that implies that you would also

15

weaken the safe harbor presumption.

16

both ways.

17

But, of course, it should be recognized, I

And that door swings

If market shares and concentration are an

18

unreliable measure of the likelihood of anti-competitive

19

harm so that they can’t be used to create an anti-

20

competitive presumption, well, then they’re flawed with

21

respect to the safe harbor presumption as well.

22

was quite taken by the fact on the previous panel that

23

Joe Simons, who is usually associated with the

24

conservative wing, is someone who thinks that that safe

25

harbor also should be downgraded.
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With respect to market definition, I think

2

there are several areas in which the implementation of

3

the SSNIP test is very problematical.

4

smallest market principle, which I think should be

5

deleted.

6

many other people have said, the fact there may not be a

7

problem in the narrowest market does not mean that

8

there’s not a competitive problem in a broader market.

9

So, you simply can’t stop with the smallest market.

The first is the

Most importantly, as a matter of policy, as

10

Secondly, it can lead to a very distorted view

11

of competition by using this next best substitute

12

algorithm.

13

cellophane fallacy, despite the fact they recognize its

14

existence.

15

there’s evidence strongly suggesting passive

16

coordination, I know of virtually no cases in which the

17

agencies have used a lower price.

18

is pretty common and one should be very cognizant of the

19

potential for falling for the cellophane fallacy.

20

our comments, we suggest a way around it.

21

I think the current guidelines fall for the

This use of the prevailing price, unless

But tacit coordination

And in

Third, margins may be high not because of tacit

22

coordinated but because of differentiated products.

23

when products are differentiated, we think we should use

24

the Katz and Shapiro, and O’Brien, and Wickelgren

25

methodology that uses margins as an indicator of
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elasticities, like the OFT is doing in their merger

2

guidelines.

3

Fourth, the SSNIP test is very complicated when

4

there are multi-product firms, either substitutes or

5

complements; very complicated when there are dynamic

6

effects and one cannot count on the simple-minded SSNIP

7

test to give a reliable answer.

8

firms and dynamic competition into account in the SSNIP

9

test, you essentially have to do a simulation model that

10

simply eliminates efficiencies.

11

analysis.

12

And to put multi-product

Very complicated

So, the point I want to make here is that

13

these are all reasons why the market definition process

14

is necessarily complex, imperfect and error prone.

15

Sometimes it’s virtually intractable.

16

to define a market, because market definition is very

17

useful for getting an understanding of who the close

18

substitutes are, it says that we should be downgrading

19

the role of market shares and concentration.

20

want to put too much weight on that.

21

While we may want

You don’t

So, what should we do in unilateral effects?

22

Well, I start from the idea that there’s lots of evidence

23

that’s relevant for unilateral effects besides market

24

shares.

25

experiments, such as Staples, you know, the kind of

There’s direct evidence from natural
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evidence in Staples and Whole Foods.

2

direct evidence of pricing interaction.

3

firms claim pricing interaction as did documents in both

4

Whole Foods and Staples.

5

evidence available of the closeness of substitution from

6

consumer switching evidence, from entry studies.

7

variety of evidence that could be used to throw light on

8

closeness of substitutes.

9

Sometimes there’s
Sometimes the

There’s also circumstantial

A whole

I want to focus here on one particular type of

10

circumstantial evidence, these upward price pressure

11

indices of the sort that Alison was talking about and

12

that we talked about in detail in our comments, price

13

pressure indexes or PPIs.

14

upward price pressure indexes or net ones.

15

pressure and unilateral effects depends on the closeness

16

of substitution, which I think you can proxy by the

17

diversion ratio and the margin, as well as other

18

factors.

19

And they can be either gross
Upward price

But the particular measure that looks at the

20

diversion ratio in the margin is very useful.

21

generally pretty simple to calculate and it can be used

22

as a presumption.

23

that is the product of the market shares or the combined

24

market share.

25

It’s

It could be used to replace the HHI

There was a lot of anxiety expressed in the

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

220
1

ABA’s comments about this upward price pressure index.

2

And it’s funny for two reasons.

3

consulting around 1982 and clients were willing to pay me

4

a great deal of great money to calculate HHIs in 1982.

5

Lawyers were very uptight about the HHIs.

6

that’s considered old hat.

7

MR. SCHWARTZ:

8

MR. SALOP:

9

One, I started

But, now,

Anybody can do an HHI.

Those were the days.

Those were the days, yeah.

But the

same thing with respect to the upward price pressure

10

index.

11

guidelines -- I don’t have the section.

12

find it.

13

by the value of diversion.

14

measure of the value of diversion is the diversion ratio

15

times the margin.

16

measure.

17

in the merger guidelines, you already need to know this

18

upward price pressure index.

19

In fact, it’s not alien at all.

The merger
Maybe Carl can

Talk about the next best substitute as defined
Well, I think the best

That would be the proper analytic

So, really in order to carry out the SSNIP test

It’s also not alien because diversion ratios

20

are basically the ratio of the cross elasticity rather to

21

the own elasticity and those elasticities have been

22

around in merger analysis since the DuPont and Brown Shoe

23

cases.

24

gross price pressure index that Serge and I focused on in

25

our comments is a very close cousin to the market

Indeed, this upward price pressure index, the
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definition test in Katz and Shapiro, and O’Brien, and

2

Wickelgren.

3

So, we think it’s a really very useful bit of

4

circumstantial evidence.

It’s not direct evidence; it’s

5

circumstantial evidence.

But it’s better circumstantial

6

evidence than looking at market shares.

7

used to form the presumption, either the safe harbor

8

presumption or the anti-competitive effects presumption.

9

In fact, it’s very interesting because this index that we

10

use, the diversion ratio times the margin, in fact, it is

11

the market definition test if the hypothetical SSNIP is a

12

SSNIP for just a single product.

13

And it can be

If it’s a uniform SSNIP, then it’s a little

14

more complicated.

15

margin divided by one minus the diversion ratio, at least

16

in the simple form where everything’s symmetric.

17

is very closely related and it’s a good way to think

18

about the presumption.

19

market just of the products of the merging firms and you

20

find that an increase in the price of one of the products

21

would be profitable, so that those two products would

22

define a market.

23

It’s the diversion ratio times the

So, it

I mean, suppose you propose a

Well, that seems like a pretty defensible

24

presumption of anti-competitive harm.

Not a

25

nonrebuttable presumption because this is only using part
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of the information, but it is a rebuttable presumption as

2

good as the HHI, as good as the combined market share, it

3

really seems much better.

4

fairly simple presumption and then you can move on from

5

there and gather the additional evidence that you’d need

6

in order to evaluate the likelihood of anti-competitive

7

effect.

8
9

And then you can go with that

Do I have one more minute to talk about
deterrence?

10

MR. SHAPIRO:

11

MR. SALOP:

One minute.

One minute.

You know, the

12

guidelines are really all about deterrence.

13

all just about analyzing a single merger.

14

merger enforcement goes beyond analysis of the particular

15

mergers that happen to come before you.

16

to take into account deterrence.

17

positives and false negatives in merger analysis as in

18

anything else but deterrence goes beyond the false

19

positives and false negatives for the deals you have, but

20

also the effect on the deals that are being proposed.

21

And false negatives include insufficient remedies.

22

They’re not

The goal of

They also have

We know there are false

So, I think it’s important in setting these

23

presumptions and working through the guidelines that you

24

figure out the impact on deterrence.

25

about incipiency.

Section 7 talks

In 1960, that was about a trend to
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concentration, but in the world of decision theory that

2

we’re in now, what incipiency must mean is a greater

3

concern about false negatives and under-deterrence, than

4

about out false positives and over-deterrence.

5

So, I hope that the agencies, in thinking

6

through the guidelines and in particular in deciding what

7

cases that you’re willing to go to court over, that you

8

take the deterrence effects into account.

9

There’s been a lot of talk in the last few

10

years about won/lost records.

11

very clear that there’s selection bias, that won/lost

12

records tell you virtually nothing about the litigation

13

because of settlement rates.

14

looking at sort of what people have been writing about

15

the last few years, that the agencies are paying too

16

close attention to won/lost rates and possibly are being

17

too risk adverse with respect to the cases they bring.

18

So, thank you.

19

MR. SHAPIRO:

20

One, economics makes it

And it seems to me, in

Thank you, Steve.

Thank you,

all, for your comments.

21

There’s a lot more to talk about and not that

22

much time.

Let me frame, at least, my first set of

23

questions around the relevant section in the guidelines

24

that deals with lessening of competition through

25

unilateral effects and, in particular, differentiated
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products which I have to say, in my experience, at least

2

the last eight months at being back at DOJ, that’s a lot

3

of the cases.

4

of the cases, particularly intermediate goods where we’re

5

seeing if suppliers are bidding for patroNAAGe of their

6

downstream business customers.

7

I can’t give you a count, but it’s a lot

So, there’s about two pages on this in the

8

guidelines, a page and a half.

And I want to read --

9

bear with me -- after describing unilateral effects

10

generally what they are.

11

guidance and, so, I want to push on where we would go

12

beyond that.

13

elevation in the market for differentiated products

14

requires that there be a significant share of sales in

15

the market accounted for by consumers who regard the

16

products of the merging firms as their first and second

17

choices.”

18

And here’s, I think, the main

It says, “Substantial unilateral price

So, our staff is often looking at that

19

question, first and second choices, that’s very closely

20

related to diversion ratios.

21

in terms of share of sales in the market.

22

But notice that it’s framed
Okay?

Now, I want to set that in contrast -- now, you

23

can imagine some modifications there that wouldn’t

24

necessarily refer to the market when doing that part of

25

the test.

And I want to then bring in your example,
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Marius, where you said you don’t know what the market is,

2

you don’t know what the boundaries are, you could look at

3

a win/loss record, you could look at bidding, you could

4

look at some other measures of how often the two firms

5

bump against each other.

6

but then Bobby Willig warned us this morning.

7

well, careful, if you just look at the win/loss records,

8

you might be missing the fact that there’s other firms,

9

let’s say other venues in your case, that are almost as

So, if you do that, and then -He says,

10

good substitutes to the two merging venues and if you

11

ignore them and just looked at the direct competition,

12

you’d get a false positive.

13

So, Marius, starting with you, could we do

14

modest revisions here, for example, that would reflect

15

your iterative process, not assume you’ve figured out the

16

market yet to give guidance about how this actual

17

investigative process would work?

18

MR. SCHWARTZ:

19

a little more precise?

20

MR. SHAPIRO:

Okay.

Can you make the question

What do you do next?

After you

21

look and you see that the two -- they’re often bidding

22

against each other, what do you do next to make sure that

23

you’ve paid enough attention to surrounding competition

24

even if you haven’t defined the market?

25

MR. SCHWARTZ:

I’ll tell you what we did and I
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think it’s a good general lesson, is you try to

2

understand why it is that you’re seeing this seemingly

3

close competition.

4

documents, decision documents, and try to pin down what

5

are those fundamental assets that might be driving this.

6

And it’s important -- I agree with Bobby there, that if

7

there’s no fundamental assets or anything that is

8

explaining this pattern, you ought to worry a little bit

9

because --

10

So, you talk to people, you read

MR. SHAPIRO:

You’ve got, obviously, your

11

locations and venue, physical properties in your case.

12

That’s often the case.

13

product attributes.

14

MR. SCHWARTZ:

You have some pretty well defined

You have that, but if you don’t

15

know how important those are -- somebody says, oh,

16

consumers would, at the drop of a hat, drive 30 more

17

miles.

18

That blows me out of the water.
So, you need to try to get information on how

19

important these things are.

20

you can come back and try to craft maybe a range of

21

candidate markets, all of which would show you if you’ve

22

done it right, that there’s pretty high concentration.

23

And with that information,

Back to the point that if you’re confident

24

there’s a unilateral effect, there ought to be a market

25

there.
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MR. SHAPIRO:

2

guess, is the problem.

3

you’ve figured out the unilateral effects, you can back

4

out the market.

5

not going to do it based on market shares, does that mean

6

we’re doing the full competitive effects analysis?

7

if we look at the bidding and maybe margins, is that good

8

enough or do I back out the margin from that or is that

9

too easy?

10

I’m trying to get confident, I
I think M.J. said, well, if

But how do we figure that out?

If we’re

What

Others?
MR. SALOP:

This is a drafting issue, Carl.

It

11

seems to me that the share of the sales accounted for you

12

should just interpret as the diversion ratio.

13

importance of the other substitutes, as Alison pointed

14

out, they’re all in the denominator.

15

taken into account.

16

account.

17

The

They’re already

You need to take the margin into

It seems to me that Bobby’s -- you know,

18

Bobby’s example came from some testimony that Bobby gave

19

at the Antitrust Modernization Commission that said if

20

you’ve got two gas stations on a traffic circle that are

21

perfect substitutes and then you’ve got some other more

22

distant gas stations that are a little more distant

23

substitutes, I suppose the relevant market would be all

24

the gas stations, not just the ones on the circle, but

25

the merger involves the two gas stations on the circle.
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So, if you raise the price at one of the

2

stations on the circle, all the sales would be diverted

3

to the other station.

4

unilateral problem, but, in fact, if they’d really try to

5

raise the price, people would go to the other stations.

6

And the conclusion is problematical because his example

7

doesn’t hold together.

8

were perfect substitutes, like he assumed, and if they

9

weren’t colluding -- you definitely don’t want to allow

So, it would seem like there’s a

If the two stations on the circle

10

the merger, if they were colluding.

11

colluding and they’re perfect substitutes, they can keep

12

the price down to costs, the margin would be zero.

13

there would be no unilateral effects concern.

14

example just doesn’t work.

15

But if they weren’t

So,

So, the

If you fix the example so they’re

16

differentiated products, then this upward price pressure

17

index works just fine.

18

of the stations, some people would go to the other

19

stations and they would be protected, but the people that

20

didn’t go to the other stations, they would get hammered

21

from the merger.

22

effect that could occur from raising only a single price.

23

It seems to me that the people that are worried

If you’d raise the price at one

So, you need to deal with unilateral

24

about the more distant substitutes -- I mean, clearly,

25

they need to come into account of a full analysis.
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the people that want us to say that trumps, they’re

2

ignoring the fact that a unilateral effect can involve a

3

subset of the product’s prices being raised, not a

4

uniform price increase.

5

reasoning.

6

MR. SHAPIRO:

And that’s the flaw in their

So, let me pick up on that and

7

materiality.

8

don’t have to respond if you don’t feel like it.

9

Alison, I know you mentioned this, but you

One notion of materiality would be there’s

10

going to be a significant price increase and how do we

11

know about that?

12

just a product or two, does that really count?

13

there’s two guys that sell two different brands of

14

breakfast cereal, but there are a whole different set of

15

cereals that are offered and we think the price of one or

16

both of those brands will go up a bit, but they’re just

17

two of many, is that enough under -- you know, should

18

that be enough?

19

materiality, either magnitude or scope of the price

20

increase?

21

Another would be, well, it’s maybe not
If

What might we say about that

My sense is some judges might say, look, that’s

22

a sub-market or that’s a narrow part of a market.

23

not enough.

24
25

Reaction?

MS. OLDALE:
answer at all.

That’s

Alison?
I have to say I don’t have an

I’ve got more questions on materiality.
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I’m really not sure what I have to say about it.

2

probably the best characterization of the way that we’ve

3

tended to think about it in the UK is in terms of the

4

size of the price increase rather than the volume of

5

products that are affected in relation to the size of the

6

market.

7

are right.

8

there some notion of materiality being related to this

9

size of the consumer detriment arising?

10

I think

But it’s not clear to me that either of those
Should we care more about bigger markets?

Is

I think it’s an

important and under-explored area.

11

MR. SHAPIRO:

12

MR. SALOP:

Go ahead.

Well, if you take this gas station

13

example, if the only people that would be hurt would be

14

the people that stayed and you only thought a small

15

portion of the consumers would stay with the first gas

16

station, but there are efficiencies that apply to, you

17

know, large efficiencies that apply to all the customers,

18

then you might say it’s immaterial.

19

okay, if 10 percent of the consumers that buy the two

20

products are going to be harmed, but the other 90 percent

21

are going to benefit, then you might say that’s not

22

material.

23

efficiency benefits that you expect in the market.

24
25

That’s because,

So, I’d say it’s always relative to the

MR. SHAPIRO:

Renata, this is sort of directed

at you, but, again, I’m not trying to put anybody on the
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spot too much.

You said we should say it’s okay to have

2

narrow markets.

But there’s certainly a sense that if

3

the markets seem narrower than courts are likely to be

4

comfortable with that they’ll, at least, raise eyebrows,

5

and I’m sure you experienced that when you were at DOJ.

6

And you mentioned Oracle and since many of us

7

know that, maybe it’s good for illustrative purposes.

8

mean, strictly speaking, if you said, okay, if there’s a

9

unilateral effect between Oracle and PeopleSoft, then

10

they could be a market, the two of them, without even

11

including SAP.

12

conclusion, at least if they were next closest

13

substitutes, which is kind of an artifact anyhow.

14

seems -- and I should add, the commentary gives a lot of

15

language about how these markets that we get could

16

exclude a lot of products that are substitutes for some

17

customers.

18

I

That would be somehow the logical

So it

It’s the same idea.
Should we import in language from the

19

commentary? If we’re going to go that route, of course,

20

if we’re convinced that’s right as a matter of analysis,

21

we’d like to make the argument for the courts either in

22

the guidelines or case by case.

23

to be brave or what?

24

MS. HESSE:

25

Maybe so.

Are you just telling us

I mean, I think,

obviously, the challenge is that you have these cases
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sitting out there and so you now have to do something

2

about them.

3

priorities that you all should have is actually finding a

4

good differentiated products case where you can try to

5

fix what’s wrong in Oracle.

6

to do.

7

could give --

8
9

And, so, in my view, one of the biggest

And that’s not an easy thing

But I think the guidelines, at the very least,

MR. SHAPIRO:

Are some of your clients going to

offer us a good opportunity?

10

MS. HESSE:

I’m hoping not.

Could offer some

11

more explanation for how this really works and why the

12

narrow market isn’t something that you should be afraid

13

of.

14

is preferable because I think it’s a more true reflection

15

of what the overall market dynamic is.

For me, personally, I think actually the other route

16

MR. SHAPIRO:

17

MS. HESSE:

What do you mean by that?

Meaning that you look at the market

18

and you don’t define it as just Oracle and PeopleSoft,

19

you define it as Oracle, PeopleSoft and SAP and the

20

shares of Oracle and PeopleSoft are lower, they don’t

21

meet the structural market concentration Philadelphia

22

National Bank presumptions.

23

But you could say, okay, this is what the

24

market looks like.

But if you look at the competitive

25

interaction between these two parties, we’ve identified a
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significant number of customers who account for a

2

significant proportion of the sales in the market who

3

will be harmed.

4

of different ways, merger simulation, customer testimony,

5

documents from the parties, et cetera.

6

And we can show that to you in a variety

MR. SHAPIRO:

What about the other way to go, I

7

imagine, would be to say even if the SSNIP markets are

8

fairly narrow and aligned with unilateral effects, as you

9

said, we could plead broader markets either by abandoning

10

the smallest market principle, using a bigger SSNIP or

11

whatever, and then we might have relatively small market

12

shares and argue, well, these market shares understate

13

the effect because the two firms are selling products

14

that are very close and we see them against each other a

15

lot.

16

shares are so small, you guys are wrong, okay, and that’s

17

sort of a safe harbor.

Then we’d be up against arguments, oh, the market

18

Were you going to pick up on that?

19

MS. MOLTENBREY:

20

MR. SHAPIRO:

21

MS. MOLTENBREY:

Yes.

I thought you were.
I think it’s difficult, I

22

guess, to think about this partly the way an economist, I

23

think, would think about it and the way a lawyer would

24

think about it, which are not necessarily identical,

25

especially if you’re not a lawyer who was raised as an
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antitrust lawyer.
I think all of us, all of the lawyers in this

3

room who do this every day, are relatively comfortable

4

with economic models and looking at econometrics as a way

5

to define markets and to say it doesn’t matter that in an

6

industry where the firms identify one another as -- you

7

know, maybe identify five or six firms as their big

8

competitors, look at them, respond to them.

9

Nevertheless, there is a market that consists of only two

10

of those firms.

11

it accurately we may say there are probably multiple

12

markets within that industry, all of which are relevant

13

for antitrust purposes and all of which could be

14

appropriate.

15

In fact, you know, when we think about

But as lawyers when we think about how we’re

16

going to present a case and you think about case law, the

17

precedents you’re going to be looking at and the fact

18

that you may well be in front of a judge who maybe does

19

two or three difficult antitrust cases in their entire

20

career, that’s not really a very attractive way to think

21

about markets.

22

guidelines, is going to be to find a way to explain why

23

this localized competition is what you’re going to be

24

focused on, but not in a way that makes it seem as though

25

everything else that’s happening out there is irrelevant.

The challenge, I think,

in the

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

235
1

If you sit there and say, a merger between --

2

and I’m not suggesting agreement or disagreement with any

3

of these particular cases, but if you look at the Whole

4

Foods/Wild Oats case, for example, and you say

5

competition between Whole Foods and Wild Oats is very

6

important and this merger is going to eliminate this

7

localized competition and prices are going to go up, it

8

doesn’t follow from that that the other supermarkets in

9

the relevant geographies are irrelevant.

It doesn’t mean

10

that the importance of another supermarket is basically

11

no different than the importance of the dry cleaner down

12

the road.

13

thinking about it.

14

Obviously, that’s not how the agencies are

So, I think the challenge is to find a way to

15

reconcile those two things.

16

language.

17

in the mid-eighties, to date myself, it was a time period

18

when if you actually used the word “sub-market” when

19

talking about things, you were immediately chastised and

20

ridiculed and kind of sent back to your office to write

21

1,000 times, there is no such thing as a sub-market.

22

that comes out of the misuse of the concept of sub-

23

markets in the courts and in some older cases.

24
25

Some of it may be about

When I started at the Antitrust Division back

And

But I’m not sure that that isn’t possibly a
useful way to talk to a non-antitrust specialist about
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why we care about a merger between two firms, even though

2

there are other competitors in a market.

3

other ways, if people are too afraid of reintroducing

4

some of the abuses that you have from sub-markets and the

5

notion of talking about localized competition or

6

something.

7

problem; it’s not an analytical problem.

8
9

Maybe there are

But, to me, that’s really an expositional

But it is an important part of what the
guidelines do, is to help courts understand exactly what

10

it is and, frankly, lawyers and practitioners who may not

11

be as facile with some of the economic concepts to have

12

this make sense to them.

13

MR. SHAPIRO:

14

MR. SALOP:

We’re --

Can I just make a comment about

15

that?

16

wise is that Philadelphia National Bank and sub-markets

17

were crutches and they’re crutches that have turned out

18

now, you know, 40 years later, to get in the way of

19

getting the right result.

20

I think that what M.J.’s saying that’s really very

And, so, if you’d go back and abandon

21

Philadelphia National Bank and just take a competitive

22

effects approach, a first principles approach and come up

23

with credible evidence that there’s harm, irrespective of

24

the presumptions, and then bring in the presumptions in a

25

secondary way, we win even if there are no presumptions,
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but by the way, there ought to be a presumption, maybe

2

not based on market share, maybe based on a price index,

3

then that’s the way to do it.

4

MR. SHAPIRO:

Let me pick up on that with that

5

last question and we will go just a few more minutes.

6

So, we heard earlier today from the first panel -- the

7

first two panels, actually, this morning that presumption

8

isn’t so strong anyhow and agencies need to tell a

9

convincing story of effects to convince a judge that

10

customers will be harmed.

11

put it, for example.

12

That was the way Rich Parker

So, in unilateral effects cases, the guidelines

13

don’t really get into what categories of evidence are

14

convincing or probative or we look to.

15

of ones that I can list.

16

have people say, do you think the guidelines should get

17

into talking about some of these categories of evidence

18

or is that too much detail, for example?

19

win/loss reports, bidding episodes, other indicia of

20

head-to-head competition.

21

can look at shares of some collection of products,

22

customer surveys, company documents, merger simulation at

23

the high end, it’s more sophisticated, hard to understand

24

maybe.

25

There’s a bunch

I just want to very quickly

So, there’s

One can look at margins.

You

What about listing some of these and how we
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1

look at them and what role they play, would that be

2

helpful or too much detail?

3

quickly each person.

4

MR. SCHWARTZ:

Let’s go down sort of very

I think without being taxonomic,

5

listing a few and saying that, yeah, we take them

6

seriously, especially because they give a window to how

7

the participants view the competition, that would be

8

helpful.

9

list it?

That’s how I’d approach things.

10

MR. SHAPIRO:

11

MR. SALOP:

So, why not

Yeah, Steve.

I think some categories would be

12

useful.

In fact, there are categories -- in the market

13

definition section, there’s a categorization of types of

14

evidence.

15

natural experiments because that’s really key.

I think you certainly should have in that list

16

MR. SHAPIRO:

M.J., just going down.

17

MS. MOLTENBREY:

18

MS. HESSE:

Yeah, I agree.

I’m against listing actually.

In

19

part because I think there are some markets and some

20

industries where some of these tools don’t work very

21

well, and, so, if you list them out, people are going to

22

feel like, oh, my god, what if I can’t do a merger

23

simulation and I don’t have win/loss?

24
25

From the outside, people look at these lists
and they think, okay, I can check off these boxes.
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1

the other reason is that I actually think that it’s

2

always some combination of these things.

3

informative and I guess you can list them in a win and

4

say these kinds of things can be informative.

5

MR. SHAPIRO:

And they’re

So, if we said -- and I think

6

this is the way it’s done in other parts of the

7

government -- here are the types of things that we look

8

at, each case is different, you might have none of these

9

or some of them, it all depends, these are just

10

instructive, would you still be pretty uneasy with that,

11

Renata?

12

MS. HESSE:

I think what you’re going to end up

13

doing is driving people towards specific kinds of

14

evidence.

15

MR. SHAPIRO:

16

MS. HESSE:

17
18
19
20

And that’s bad?

Yes, I mean, I think because it

could be -- yes.
MR. SHAPIRO:

Alison, do you want to weigh in

on this or not?
MS. OLDALE:

A couple of things.

I think

21

there’s possibly a difference between listing types of

22

evidence and types of tools.

23

more durable than tools.

24

our tools are evolving all the time as we get better at

25

what we do and they may not last 20 years or however long

So, evidence may be a bit

I have the impression that
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1

it is between revisions of guidelines in quite the same

2

way.

3

I have to say, our guidelines do contain quite

4

a lot of lists.

5

today that maybe the guidelines ought to focus on the

6

more durable bits and some of the lists should be perhaps

7

in commentary, which I’m going to take away and think

8

about.

9
10

But I’ve heard quite a lot of arguments

MR. SHAPIRO:

Well, your draft is quite a bit

longer than our guidelines, for example.

11

MS. OLDALE:

Yes.

12

MR. SHAPIRO:

Yeah, it is much longer.

For better or worse.

Okay,

13

I know I’m imposing on you a little bit.

14

slightly past time, but let me give each panelist up to a

15

minute, if they want, to leave us with a last pearl of

16

wisdom.

17

MR. SCHWARTZ:

We are

I’ll take less than a minute.

18

just suggest to Carl, it may be a good idea if the

19

agencies released a draft of the proposed guidelines so

20

we can look at the actual language and maybe have a

21

second round, at the risk of creating more work.

22
23

MR. SALOP:

I

I just think you should put a page

limit on the guidelines.

24

(Laughter).

25

MS. MOLTENBREY:

I think you should do
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1

everything you can to avoid putting any Greek letters

2

into the guidelines, but other than that...

3

MS. HESSE:

So, as my prior comment indicated,

4

I think I am in favor of more general but explanatory

5

information, use of hypotheticals, maybe along the lines

6

of the merger commentary, but not a lot of real detailed,

7

specific information.

8

MS. OLDALE:

9

challenge.

And I just think that you have a

There seems to be quite a common view about

10

what we actually do and what we ought to be doing for

11

unilateral effects, but also a very common view that

12

trying to express this in the existing framework for the

13

way that we do market definition is quite difficult.

14
15

MR. SHAPIRO:

Join me in

thanking the panel.

16

(Applause).

17

MR. SHAPIRO:

18

Well, thank you all.

So, we’re going to adjourn until

Tuesday when we’re in New York.

19

(Panel 4 concluded.)

20

(The workshop was adjourned.)

21
22
23
24
25
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